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The study will examine  the introduction of the computerisation of crime and intelligence recording in three police forces in the United Kingdom in the decade 1976-1986.  The thesis will critique the roles and actions of the main players in this decade, The Home Office in London England, three provincial police forces, Kent County Constabulary, Humberside Police and Lothian and Borders Police, and the computer supply industry.
The study will consider the concept of ‘crime’ from a jurisprudential viewpoint and will consider the legal imposition on chief officers of police to collect, store and distribute certain crime based data. The study will also examine and analyse in detail three computer projects in different police forces.  The use of new, complex and expensive computer programs is highlighted with the introduction of free text searching of large data sources and the need for large scale mainframe computers to handle the analysis and storage of that data.  The limited success of two police projects will question the requirement for central government control of publicly funded new technology.
The study will examine strategic planning in the process, as well as the rush to be the first police force to embrace the new technology. Further the study will review central government control over public spending, in the first police force based computerisation projects. 
In conclusion, the thesis will suggest that new police systems should be scaled to local needs and guided by expert central advice. Additionally, chief police officers should be encouraged to use new technology in a strategic manner, sharing outcomes in open fora. Possible new research problems are listed and evaluated.
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This study is a critique of computer projects in the police service in England and Scotland during the decade 1976-1986.  The projects were the first attempts by the police to introduce computers into the recording of crime and the systematic control of criminal intelligence.
The specific objectives of this study are;
	
	to identify the main issues in the introduction of computerised crime  and intelligence recording  systems 1976-1986 with emphasis on the legal and social environment in which the implementation took place

	to identify the risk factors in the implementation of computers for police forces in that decade

	to examine and evaluate the procurement and  immediate post implementation usage, of  these systems

	to consider how implementation of large scale computer systems in the police can be managed successfully to meet predetermined performance criteria.

These objectives have been carefully chosen so that there is a steady progression of enquiry from the initiation of the projects through to their completion and thereafter a thorough analysis of the findings to allow the objectives to be validated. It is essential to elaborate on these objectives as follows;

	to identify the main issues in the introduction of computerised crime  and intelligence recording  systems 1976-1986 with emphasis on the legal and social environment in which the implementation took place

 this objective examines the apparent inexorable rise in reported crime from 1965 onwards and the inability of police manual systems to cope.(Appendix Five and Six).  The intelligence model was no better with damning reports on the lack of robust systems to collect, hold and retrieve data which may have contributed to a number of murders in Yorkshire in the late 1970s (Bland 1984). Further police officers themselves were becoming frustrated with the inability of internal systems to provide accurate and timeous information with the result that there was a  start of personal filing systems. Thus within the police service, ‘something had to be done’. Additionally a new political arena arrived with a Prime Minister intent on receiving some return for the 50% increase awarded to police officers in pay and requiring that the reforms of a previous Home Secretary be speeded up in the police to cut the crime rate.(Thatcher 1995)


	to identify the risk factors in the implementation of computers for police forces in that decade

this objective reviews the risks involved in the implementation of the proposed new systems  and  how these risks affected the Home Office, the police forces involved and the computer industry.  The Home Office rested on its credibility with the inauguration of the Police National Computer completed in 1974 – as a result of the reforming veal of a previous Home Secretary. (Branson and Bence 1982). For the Home Office anything less that a working computer system to meet the needs of the operational officer was failure.  These new systems were working in the United States of America and the American companies had manufacturing bases in Great Britain.  To the police forces there was a stark choice – either take the risk of being the first to achieve a working system or face the ignominy of failure should the system fail to work.  Lastly the commercial risks to the computer companies was finely balanced – a working system could mean another 40 police forces would buy the same working model whilst failure would condemn the company to the hinterland of police computing.

	to examine and evaluate the procurement and  immediate post implementation usage, of  these systems

this  objective includes semi structured interviews and case study.  The interviews took place in two tranches in 1978 and 1988 and were with chief officers of police.  Additional interviews took place with senior staff in the Home Office and other authorities and hence there is a strong claim that these interviews are properly triangulated.  In essence the 1978 interviews show that the police service as a whole was unready for computerisation as there was an inability to see beyond the narrow parochialism which dominated the thinking of most of the chief officers. By 1988 when the Home Office required a new system for the handling of data collected in major civil emergencies, there was an acceptance that co operative working would allow the police service to meet its overall objectives of assisting the public.  The case studies chronicle and critique the actuality of procurement , installation and implementation of the new systems with emphasis on new free text computer systems and form the main part of this study.


	to consider how implementation of large scale computer systems in the police can be managed successfully to meet predetermined performance criteria.

 Finally this objective includes the analysis of the study with a review of those aspects of crime and intelligence recording which could offer further areas for academic study. However the successful implementation requires some form of pre determined criteria against which the new systems can be measured.  Apart from the ‘need to do something’ – there was little strategic planning nor yet collaborative thinking on the part of that generation of chief police officers.  One police system worked well for the next 17 years bringing kudos and some financial reward to that police force but the dismal failure of the other two projects to meet performance, time and cost criteria, held these forces in technical limbo for a number of years.

Background to the study
To enable the study to be placed in context, there are a number of preliminary concepts and definitions which require to be established.  These factors are contained in Part One of the thesis which consists of 4 chapters.  Chapter One attempts to find a comprehensive definition of crime and explores the start of the industry now known as crime recording.  Chapter Two covers the role of the police,  the police use of data and the plethora of non police agencies which investigate allegations relating to their sphere of work. Chapter Three identifies the risks involved in this early computerisation with respect to the three main sets of players in these projects; the Home Office, the police forces involved and the computer companies. Chapters One, Two and Three include a review of the current literature on the computerisation of crime and criminal intelligence recording.
Chapter Four explains the methods used in the study along with an appreciation of modern research techniques. An examination of policing ethics and the ethics of this study are included in this chapter. Without loss of generality, the study is based on a critical realism ethos, allowing sense to be made of the effects of man-made phenomena on society.  Thereafter a brief examination of other research philosophies is assembled with explanations as to their worth in this type of longitudinal study, covering many years and a variety of actors. 
The Second Part of the study commences with Chapter Five which details the start of the research proper, with an explanation of triangulated semi structured interviews which occurred in two tranches, one in 1978 and the other in 1988.  These interviews were with chief officers of police and they show the intransigence to collaborate with other forces in 1978 and the healthy scepticism to meet Home Office requirements in 1988.
Chapters Six to Nine cover the case studies for the projects involved and show the progress towards the first operational system in Scotland and the faltering progress towards court action in England as a result of the failure of the installed system.  By detailing as case studies the individual projects and attention to the minutiae of system design and the introduction of free text computer systems, the study will show management shortfalls in a number of areas.  Lastly as a result of these case studies, three new areas of research are offered as bases for further work which may be appropriate in the future.

Chapter Ten includes the analysis of this study. As this study commenced before there were routinely available computer based qualitative systems in contrast with the then burgeoning quantitative systems, there was a requirement to collect, store and analyse data in a simple but robust manner. The Lothian and Borders Police Project Team included a sergeant with a pure science background and so there was some research experience available.  The fusion of the knowledge achieved through academic study along with the experience of assisting in the compilation of evidence for murder trials, allowed the team to analyse the available data.  The analytical techniques used were manual systems of adducing evidence and proposing a solution to a problem.  Thereafter further enquiry would either verify or falsify the first theory and dependant on the outcome a new theory would be proposed.  These outcomes were based on simple minded but effective police based enquiry systems which had been used in major crime investigations over the years. Indeed these systems were eventually computerised into the Home Office Large major Enquiry System (HOLMES), which was launched in 1984 and receives some critical comment later in this study. In addition to this work, the analysis of social projects compiled by Carol Weiss (1972) was fundamental to the manner in which the project team came to conclusions.  By judging the merit of an answer against either implicit or explicit expectations, the team was able to assess the scope, size duration and clarity of a solution, where only a problem had previously been identified.
 From the data collected, sifted and presented as a thesis, it is clear that there were fundamental flaws in some of the design of the project management. The project management was diverse – from strict critical time analysis techniques in Edinburgh to the embryonic SSADM in the Home Office London, based on the work of the Central Computer and Telecommunication Agency. There was little effort to coalesce these systems into a hierarchical model which could then have been rolled out across the remaining 40 police forces in the country. This lack of long term strategic planning can be placed at the feet of the Home Office and the Chief Officers of the day – each set of players attempting to maintain  an arms length relationship with the other.
  The design of the actual computer systems was sound – not merely replacing paper systems with replicated fast and secure filing on computer – but genuine attempts to use computers in the 1970s to negate the deployment of redundant effort in police administration.  The ability of computers to produce timed reminders; to produce exception reports if actions were not updated in time; to correlate the modus operandi of active criminals into probability lists and to assist the collection of data with drop down menus and alpha numeric field definitions, were all pointers to the blue sky thinking of the police teams.  They were not content with electronic filing – they required and to an extent achieved – a working tool for the operational detectives. The analysis concludes with the view that large scale police based computer systems are best designed by the people who are going to use them, assisted by a central core of knowledge based experts from a variety of technical fields who are able to strike some empathy with the practitioners.  Thereafter the system should be offered to other practitioners as the model to be used, with concomitant savings in manpower and costs.
In any study of this kind, which uses more than one formal method of data collection and analysis, a clear statement of the theoretical bases for the thesis is important. The original work which started in October 1978 consisted of a series of data collection exercises which were based on the work of Weiss (1972). Carol Weiss stated that research projects should have a fixed start point where the condition of the object of the project was well known.  Theoretically it is stated by Weiss and later Garland (2001), that the setting of a ‘start point’ in any study may be difficult but must be achieved, in order to establish if the applied solution has had an effect – either beneficial or not. The application of a solution to a known, set problem should be able to ascertain if there has been a change in the original problem.  Hence analysis of the outcome should be able to show what benefit or negative enhancement has been achieved. These theoretical ideas were to the fore in the early data collection of this study. In order to achieve the ends set by the chief officers of Lothian and Borders Police, the embryonic research team took advice from F7 Division of the Home Office and set up the first data collection exercise.  This stage was the interviewing of senior and chief officers from other police forces.  Theoretically, by adopting an early review of the other police forces, it was assumed by both F7 Division and the local police, that any mistakes in procurement
could be rectified or any innovative systems could be identified and if appropriate used in the system design in Edinburgh.  This process fitted well with the processes which Weiss had explained in her early design work. 
In later years when the study had moved to an analysis stage there was a requirement to expand on the theoretical base, as there were, by that time, three separate but linked research methods being utilised in the study.  To accommodate this novel approach to a policing problem, there was a requirement to develop a theoretical model which exhibited methodological pluralism – as defined by, amongst others, Pratschke (2003). The novelty in this study is the use of a complete literature review, semi structured interviews and detailed case studies. These three paradigms have allowed the collection of a complete data set, which when analysed has allowed the thesis to meet its design objectives. In essence then, this set of research methods fits into the overall concept of critical realism as defined originally by Bhaskar (1975) and more recently explained by Collier (1994).  These texts and others proclaim the general principles of this research method in that there is often a mapping of  many-many relationships rather than a simple pictorial relationship. Additionally a theory is claimed to be realist if it can exhibit the following facets;
objectivity -  what is known about any phenomenon would still be real whether or not it were known. This facet stresses the reality concept that empirical studies rest on the interpretation of the observer – rather than the objectivity required. Participation in policing practice can give rise to a recognition that certain types of approach which are embedded in rules, can give rise to less than objective truths. Hence during this study it was always important to ensure that objectivity was foremost in any collection or analysis of data.
fallibility – realism is open to refutation by information which may be unknown at this time but may be apparent in later work.  Hence there is a need to be open to new information.
transphenomenology – there may be meanings and interpretations which are hidden and require to be adduced from beyond first appearances and
counterphenomenology – it may be that deep structures in human behaviour or in social issues actually contradict first appearances.
These facets were adopted by the Lothian and Borders Computer Assisted Policing Team –not in a formal and recorded sense – but by the adoption of ‘murder enquiry’ techniques. Murder enquiry techniques are open, sceptical and iterative until a solution is found. This form of enquiry was fundamental to the Lothian and Borders Police team as they sought to collect and analyse diverse data from a number of sources. Fundamentally the team were searching for a ‘truth’ – concealed in the myriad data sources were the building blocks of the new computer systems – which were eventually revealed in the SSADM systems.  This truth based system was one of the planks on which later presentations were given to councillors and chief and senior police officers.  Hence this study can claim to be critical realist in nature.
















Chapters One ,Two and Three are designed to cover the subjects listed by means of a literature review.  The academic literature covering the collection and recording of crime and intelligence data is small, comprising of two major works ( Garland 2001;  Haggerty 2001) along with some papers by civil servants and others (Simmons). Additionally a section at the end of this chapter will enumerate the collection of miscellaneous papers, letters and manuscripts used in the study along with an theoretical appreciation of the use of such in academic research. A review of the current theses in the body of British Universities has also failed to uncover any significant contribution to this subject.  It is apparent therefore that Professor Harries (University of Columbia, USA) is correct in his statement, ‘that unless you are part of a police department, then research is very difficult and opaque’. 
Primarily then, this chapter will focus upon the definition of ‘crime’ from a pragmatic as well as a theoretical academic viewpoint. 


1.1 The Police in Society
The history and sociology of the police service is well documented through the aegis of a variety of writers.(Adlam 2003, Morgan and Newburn 1997, Marshall 1967, Emsley 2003,  Leishman and Wood 2000). These writers and many others all have a perspective on the development of the ‘new police’ from around 1829 in London and possibly earlier in Glasgow and Edinburgh.  They all note the extent of modern police work in being, as Morgan and Newburn quote,
‘the only 24 hour service available to the public in the absence of any other assistance’. 
The duties of the police are contained in statute;
 General functions and jurisdiction of constables
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall be the duty of the constables of a police force—
(a) to guard, patrol and watch so as—
(i) to prevent the commission of offences.
(ii) to preserve order, and
(iii) to protect life and property;
(b) where an offence has been committed (whether within or outwith the police area for which the police force is maintained) to take all such lawful measures, and make such reports to the appropriate prosecutor, as may be necessary for the purpose of bringing the offender with all due speed to justice;
(c) to serve and execute when required any warrant, citation or deliverance issued, or process duly endorsed, by a Lord Commissioner of Justiciary, sheriff, or justice of the peace], being a warrant, citation, deliverance or process relating to any criminal proceeding;
(d) to attend any court of law for the purpose of giving evidence;
and without prejudice to the operation of section 135(3) and (4) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995] (bringing of apprehended person before court on first lawful day after arrest) it shall be the duty of any constable in carrying out his duties under paragraph (b) of this subsection to take every precaution to ensure that any person charged with an offence is not unreasonably and unnecessarily detained in custody. 
(2) The performance by a constable of his functions under this or any other enactment or under any rule of law shall be subject to the direction of the appropriate chief constable.
Police (Scotland) Act 1967 Section 17.

Crucially in this study, the instruction to ‘prevent the commission of offences’ is perhaps the prime injunction which the police attempt to follow.  The secondary plea, to take all lawful measures to bring offenders to justice includes the need to record crimes and offences made known.
Policing thus  is a complex although simple minded set of processes whereby officers and support staff supply both a service and a crime fighting facility to the general public. (Reiner 2000; Mawby 1999; Waddington 1984). Fiercely independent of political interference but relying on both central and local government funding, the police of post modern society in Britain seeks to operate within the laws of the land (Oliver 1997). The service element of policing includes that most amorphous set of actions – befriending and assisting the public as well as traffic control, community relations, uniformed operations and administration. The models of policing are many but Kleinig (1996) and others proposed two main categories of policing – the military and coercive model and secondly the liberal and consensual model. The military model is firmly based on the concept of control exercised by  the state and being applied by a well trained, disciplined body with power to arrest and restrict movement of people.  The liberal model is based on the ideal that by persuasion and the use of minimum force, the population will obey the laws of the land.  In this model, the police are persuaders and provide a service to the community.   In either case there is a dependence on personal experiences and interpretations of just what the police are for and how they are managed and administered.  (Butler 1984 ). At its most basic, the police is an organisation arranged by the state to protect the citizens from themselves.  This is in comparison to the armed forces, where the role is to defend the citizen from external threats. Policing is thus both a preventative and an enforcement service – preventing crime by uniformed patrol and detecting criminals by normally un-uniformed officers.  The models of providing these services along with the myriad of other duties fallen to the police – animal inspection, lost and found property, road safety, community relations, administration, licensing of many sorts, are well defined in academic texts. However, most headlines in newspapers, on television and radio, extend to the reality of crime, its reporting and its solution. Crime is newsworthy and at times all media will concentrate on crime stories, portraying actors as heroes or villains and concentrating on other like crimes to establish some sort of veracity for the views expressed.  The extent of crime is often referred to in the media and the annual trumpeting of the released crime figures show whether the population has suffered or endured another year of crime rises or decreases.
 There appears to be general agreement amongst academics that the recording of crime is an inexact science.(Reiner 2000; Baldwin 1982; Bottomley and Coleman 1981, Bottomley and Pease 1986; Brantingham and Brantingham 1981)  Indeed one of the foremost crime cartographers  Keith Harries, PhD, Professor of Crime Cartography in the University of Maryland, Baltimore, has had a correspondence with the author, regarding this subject.  Harries has published widely in his chosen field (Harries 2003; 2006) and uses police generated crime data for the majority of his work. His work has been widely used by police departments in the United States both as a record of the crimes committed in specific neighbourhoods, but also using regression analysis as a predictive tool to estimate the temporal and spatial future crime occurrences. However, Harries depends on the police departments within the United States to provide the information which he then uses.  His comments that the gathering, processing and release of these data being ‘opaque’, relates to his personal experience of research work in Baltimore and other police areas. Harries constrains his comments to the use of the term ‘opaque’ in relation to the collection of crime data in American police forces. He stops short of the use of terms such as used in the Lawrence Enquiry – as the police being ‘institutionally racist’ and the principal recommendation from that enquiry;
"To increase trust and confidence in policing amongst minority ethnic 
communities"
perhaps shows that the police service required some fundamental review of its ethical 
standpoint.(Macpherson of Cluny 1999)
 Other police commentators, from the disciplines of law (criminology), management and geography, often refer to the paucity of police recording systems and the lack of integrity of the data provided.(Chambers 1984; Davidson 1983;Evans 1992). There are arguments later in this study which will in part account for the ‘dark figures’ of crime and need further research.
As society changed in the 1960s, there was a rise in recorded crime (Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary {England and Scotland} Reports 1961-1969) Appendix Six).  The recording of crime became an enlarged issue within police forces (Home Office Circular 114/1973) with many forces facing a larger deployment of resources to meet the need of data filing.  Additionally as criminal intelligence became more and more important in the detection of crime, the systematic filing and retrieval of this material again relied on paper cards and manual filing systems. (Ackroyd 1992). Ackroyd’s work in Lancashire Constabulary details the introduction of information technology into that force. He emphasises that the force, along with other forces, had been facing overwhelming pressure from working officers to meet their perceived needs in the detection of crime.  This view is supported by the three Computer Feasibility reports prepared by Kent County Constabulary, Humberside Police and Lothian and Borders Police which form part of Chapters 4-7. More recent analysis of the introduction of information technology in the police, has been summarised by Chan (2003). Janet Chan contends that
               ‘the police spend their time in an endless cycle of information collection and processing – all for social control’.  
She includes the sentiment that the police have been able to cope with the increasing demands of central government to be more accountable through the use of information, without a concomitant increase in workforce to accommodate the extra work. Her work includes a summary of Manning’s (1977) work which concludes that there was a disappointing set of results from the introduction of police technologies and
     ‘such research as does exist is often inconclusive or suggests that new technologies have had less effect on the police practices than their proponents predict.’  
Perhaps the most pungent comment of these analyses of police technology is contained in the audit on crime recording in English forces in the year 2000. The audit was conducted by the Audit Commission and reported in a succession of years from December 2000 to December 2004. There was a widespread and varying interpretation of the Home Office Counting Rules with between 15 and 65% of crimes being wrongly classified and an abject failure to record the number of crimes reported,
	‘with 58 per cent of forces achieving a compliance rate’
(Crime recording Improving the Quality of Crime Records in Police Authorities and Forces in England and Wales. Audit Commission London 2004)

  It is therefore clear that the efforts to computerise crime and intelligence recording in the 1970s, enjoyed or suffered from the same structural and social errors which Chan and others have reported. Manning’s own work presented in 1977, summarises the assumed problems of policing in that time – ‘detailed knowledge is rarely shared’ the emphasis being on the ability to have some control over others by withholding information.  Manning’s work in the United States was clearly some years ahead of any comparable work in the United Kingdom and emphasises the conservative nature of the police mind set.  His final argument is that police departments in the United States were unable to review their information handling systems in a constructive manner, as pressures of time and costs only allowed systems which would replicate those already in use. It is important to stress that although the police as individual police forces are run semi independently – with some business and project practices – the overall objective of the police to prevent crime, negates simple comparisons with commerce. The preventative element of policing is notoriously difficult to quantify, there being no mechanism to count the number of crimes which have not been committed. Sadler (1994) and to a lesser extent Burke (2006) stress the need in any project for clear lines of design – what is the required result and how much is it going to cost? To a large extent these factors were largely missing from the initial project sets up in the police forces involved. Sadler and Burke contribute to the standard project management criteria of there being well defined start points, objectives, assessments and final hand over of all projects which are deemed successful.  Project management has been used in enterprises for many years, but the start of modern techniques was the development of the Gantt chart. (Buttrick 2000).


The chart, or wall chart as it was designed to be wall mounted, was the forerunner of many modern techniques which are computer based, was easily legible and could impart the information of how well a project was progressing.  A style of these charts was used by Lothian and Borders Police as a Critical Path Analysis to control the implementation of the computer systems in the mid 1970s.













1.2 The start of crime and intelligence recording
This section contains a number of paragraphs which contribute to the overall background of the study.  Definitions are required to be explored for the two central subjects of the study – crime and secondly criminal intelligence.

1.2.1 A definition of Crime

This section is an investigation into the definitions of ‘crime’ in post modern   
Society and seeks to highlight the difficulties facing police officers in deciding if circumstances presented to them by members of the public are indeed criminal.  To fulfil the investigation it is necessary to review crime from a number of perspectives.  This section is structured to reflect both the academic approach to crime definition and then to analyse the very real difficulties facing police officers when they are informed or when they uncover a course of action which may be considered criminal. An epistemological approach will consider the difficulties faced by a variety of academics and commentators over many years as attempts have been made to define crime. Additionally the police as the agency of first resort, require a simple but rigorous set of definitions so that there is an equal attention given to like circumstances.  
The problems of evidence and verification are not appropriate at this stage and only prima facia reports are considered. The average police officer, educated to Scottish ‘Higher’ certificate level, is presented with circumstances where an immediate decision is required.  That officer seldom has the advantage of either time to consider the options available  nor yet the assistance of a wiser officer. The concept of instant decision making – and answering in court sometime later for these decisions- requires the officers to be supported by training and supervision.
	Primarily the question ‘what is a crime’ deserves to be considered in isolation before moving to other aspects of this study.  If there is an ambiguous definition of actions which can be considered ‘criminal’, then what should the police record?  This section examines the controversy surrounding crime definition and concludes that the pragmatic approach is for the police  to follow the statutory obligations but to be cognisant of changes in societal mores which may need extraordinary solutions.

The study will show that ‘crime’ is not easily defined and although intuitively recognised by academics and society at large, the absence of a tight and controlled definition contributes to the overall confusion regarding the fundamentals of ‘crime recording’.  It is axiomatic that if there is not a universally recognised definition of ‘crime’ – how then can the questions relating to crime be measured. Lord Kelvin’s aphorism that if a subject cannot be measured, then it is not a scientific study - seems particularly appropriate in this context as will be shown below.
‘When you measure what you are speaking about and express it in numbers, you know something about it, but when you cannot express it in numbers your knowledge about is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind’.
Quoted in D MacHale, Comic Sections (Dublin 1993) 
 Moreover, as the study of law includes the use of words and language, the works of Hart,(1963,1968) Dworkin (1977)  and Wittgenstein (1975) contribute to the overall conception of ‘definition’ – why is there such a complex argument over the definition of ‘crime’.  The thesis will tease out some thoughts on this subject which is crucial to the whole study. The concept of certainty is a difficult subject for police officers when viewed from the perspective of academic researchers.  There is the possibility of misinterpretation of the words of another and police officers often have to make decisions based on their intuition – rather than the strict definitions of crime as presented by the statistical requirements.(Valentine 2000).


1.2.2 A Definition of  ‘Crime’ from an Epistemological Viewpoint
	
	According to the Oxford Dictionary.
	‘crime’ is ‘an act, usually a grave offence, punishable by law.’   

	The ‘Scottish Criminal Law’ published and updated annually by the Chief Constable of Grampian Police and known as ‘The Aberdeen Handbook’ defines ‘crime’ as
‘any act or omission which renders the culprit liable  to sanctions defined by law’. 

	One of the Institutional writers on Scots Criminal Law, Archibald Alison – known simply as ‘Alison’, writes concerning crime.
‘All criminal actions subject the offending party to a two fold obligation; that of expiating, by a punishment inflicted by the criminal tribunals, the outrage done to the offended law, and that of repairing the damage thereby sustained’  (p.2 Volume II).    
According to Alison therefore, any violation against the criminal code of Scotland, will subject the culprit to a two fold penalty.  Firstly the ‘law’ has been offended against and thus a punishment should be extracted from the culprit and secondly, there should be recompense for any wrong to an innocent victim.  Whilst these comments are now 150 years old, the law of Scotland adheres to these sentiments in modern legislation (Criminal Proceeding (Scotland) Act 1995)                                                                                                               
More recently in Marshall (1996) there is the simple statement that
‘criminal courts are concerned with the punishment of persons who have been found guilty of conduct which the state considers should be repressed’.  
There is no mention in Marshall’s definition of the rehabilitative efforts of Scottish Courts or of the variety of sentences open to Judges should they consider using them. All these court disposals are reviewed regularly by the Scottish Executive and university departments have established research units based on the sentencing patterns of Scottish Court.  So this definition is hardly helpful.

Again Gordon (1978) states at p.13.
‘The terms crime and criminal law are well known but it is not easy to give a comprehensive definition of them or to state clearly the difference between criminal and civil law.  An offence is ‘an act, attempt or omission punishable by law’.

Gordon continues to expand on the difficulties in defining crime by using the likelihood of imprisonment, if given as a punishment, to define a ‘crime’.  But that would exculpate the criminal acts completed by companies – as they cannot be imprisoned but can commit acts which are criminal.

‘The criminal law is probably therefore sufficiently defined as that branch of the law which deals with those acts attempts and omissions of which the state may take cognisance by prosecution in the criminal courts.’ (ibid p.15).

The terms ‘prosecution’ and ‘criminal courts’ require their own definitions to ensure that the student will have a complete understanding of the philosophy supporting Scots criminal law.
Gordon, Marshall and others relate their definitions to Scotland in particular but generally to the liberal western democracies. Within these societies there are other groupings who may not recognize the mores of the majority.
In The ‘Times’ newspaper on 13th November 2002, the journalists Richard Ford and Alexandra Frean, have contributed a piece on page 15.
‘Taking a sexual partner of their own choice or applying for a university place, is still regarded as an unforgivable crime for many young Asian women in Britain.  Fears that such crimes will damage family honour prompt many  British Asian families to force their daughters into marriage against their will … according to Government research.’

These are newspaper headlines and are a précis of the report ‘Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage’. completed by two academics, Yunas Samad and John Eade. The report explains that Asian young women commit crime within their society by defying their parental choice of wedding partner.
Elsewhere in the Samad/ Eade report, there are details of the survey which allowed the conclusions to be made.  The deportation of girls to Asian countries to be married to a man whom they had not seen and to start a new life in a different environment, is similar ‘punishment’ as was meted out in the time of Alison (Practice of the Criminal Law of Scotland 1833 at page 666);
.  The next punishment to death is transportation beyond seas, which has long been incorporated in our common law, and must now be inflicted for life in all cases of forgery or uttering, capital by the former law without exception’
The only point being made here is to echo Durkheim’s theory that there will be in all societies, behaviour which is considered criminal, although to another society, the actions may be reasonable.  Hart (1961) also raises the concept of ‘crime’ within ordered society.  The crime of a man wearing a hat within a reformed church, during a holy service, was considered by the church authorities to be a crime.  It was an action which was punishable by the church courts, through the auspices of the presbytery – that meeting of the brotherhood of elders which ran the spiritual life of the church.  Thus it can be argued that even within the western democracies, there is no homogeneous society – but rather a loose amalgam of communities, many of which have their own rules and sanctions. Hart also uses concepts of laws, commands and orders to differentiate between the level of authority with which instructions or requests may be made –and the sanctions whether legal or social -  which may be imposed.
So as Scots law has moved away from Transportation as a punishment, it is perhaps inevitable that Asian mores will change to cease the practice of transportation for marriage.  The point here is to reflect on similarities in the definition of ‘crime’ as the facts are represented in different cultures, within the same society.	

Of necessity in study of imprecise terms, there will be other views, not necessarily based on Scots law which will assist in the lexicon of crime definition.

Davidson (1983) claims that such simple minded definitions as listed by Gordon, Marshall and others fail to account for the many thousands of crimes which do not receive the law’s sanctions.  He further claims:
‘Limiting crime to events which fall within the sphere of operations of the criminal justice system likewise ignores the many which should, but do not.’

So if Davidson is correct in his statement that simple definitions of crime do not meet the needs of society, how does he define crime?
Ron Davidson rather than offering any thoughts on defining crime, then proceeds to define ‘environment’ and the impetus to find a clear and concise definition of ‘crime’ is lost.  However, Davidson (ibid. p.19) fails to recognise the independence of Scots criminal law.  He quotes from the Criminal Law Act 1977 which defines modes of trial for a list of offences:





 1.2.3The non existence of the ‘British Legal System’
In Scotland, the Criminal Law Act 1977 does not apply – it is an England and Wales piece of legislation.   Secondly, there are no Crown Courts in Scotland – the range of courts is listed eloquently in Alison– and now amended by the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1995 to include a replacement for the Police or Burgh Courts.  So Davidson et al have really missed the point – there is no British Legal System in terms of Criminal Law – there is a distinct and historic Scottish System which is defended by Alison, Volume II, pps. 1-4.
‘The Court of Justiciary, established in 1672 and enlarged as to its powers and jurisdictions by subsequent acts of Parliament, is the supreme Criminal Court in Scotland; and is competent to the trial of every offence within the realm of the highest or lowest degree.’ 
The Scottish criminal law system is thus separate and distinct from that in England and Wales and again from that in Northern Ireland.  It is apparent from the writings of some criminologists and legal commentators that this distinction is not recognized. Without the xenophobic accusations of Scottish Law supremacy, it is clear that few leading criminologists are native born Scots, with a Scottish law qualification and so the confusion may continue – which may be an extra outcome for this present study.
In terms of definition, the use of ‘offence’ as a jurisprudential catch all for crimes and offences is indicative of the thinking of the mid nineteenth century in Scotland – ‘offences’ were the acts which offended the law and hence were all encompassing for every criminal event.

1.2.4   Sources of primary legislation
Primarily both the Westminster Parliament and the Scottish Parliament (acting only for the reserved issues (The Scotland Act 1998)) issue the laws of the land. Scots criminal law is based on common law, supported where necessary by primary legislation, and affected by precedent – the obiter dictum and ratio decendi of previous cases brought normally through appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal.  Indeed common law is itself based on the confluence of previous law traditions including the Judean tradition, the Justinian principles, Canon Law and previous court decisions. This thesis is not the place to rehearse the sources of Scots criminal law  - there are many texts giving comprehensive accounts – including Gordon(1978), Marshall(1996), Renton and Brown (1990) and others. However, it is instructive to review at least one of the many commentaries available from sociologists regarding the pressures on legislators in other criminal jurisdictions.
 Hester and Eglin (1992) take as a case study on pps.29 – 45 the formation of drunk driving law in Canada.  The approach they take is ethno-methodological- that is the study of members’ methods of making sense – of producing and recognising sensible social actions and settings.  When people produce actions they do so in such a way as to make the actions accountable – or reportable.  This type of methodology is only one way of sociologists studying society and for the sake of this thesis, the only one to be mentioned.   So Hester et al, review the study of drunk driving legislation.  The law is formed to protect the population from drunk drivers.  Hester el at p.38 state:
‘Alcohol and its presumed inherent effects are also used as a way for accounting for traffic accidents…  The police routinely search for signs of drinking when they investigate accidents.  Such a practice not only presumes alcohol is responsible for the accident, it also diverts attention away from other possible and plausible causes … Given the highly complex way in which motor vehicles are constructed there exists a formidable array of possible causes of any accident … this diverts attention away from the corporate malpractice of vehicle manufacturers, through their desire to make profits to ensure that vehicles are as safe as they can be in the event of an accident.  There is evidence which shows that the degree of injury and the extent of fatalities are both related to the type of vehicle, with the cheaper and smaller types offering the most chance of the more serious consequences.’

There are a number of points in this passage and elsewhere in the text, which are open to serious question.    Firstly, there is no evidence that Hester and Elgin base their  views on police action at the scene of a fatal road accident on anything but opinion.  There is no empirical evidence produced in the text to substantiate this claim  and whilst it may have some veracity, it is open to another view of police action at an accident scene.   A fatal road traffic accident in Scotland, most likely will be examined in court - either by a Fatal Accident Enquiry (Fatal Accident and Sudden Deaths (Scotland) Act 1976) or by a trial for causing death by dangerous driving/ culpable homicide or murder, dependant on the circumstances and the evidence.   (Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 as amended)
 The scene of a fatal accident is thus treated as a crime scene.  The locus is photographed - at the time and later if necessary in better lighting conditions.  The scene is examined by an Accident Examiner who measures marks on the road, impact points, debris scatter patterns and vehicle impact damage.  That officer then estimates the speed and direction of travel of any vehicles before and during the actual accident.  All drivers of vehicles involved in road traffic accidents are routinely breath tested for alcohol in the system and action taken if the indication is positive.  Hence there is a thorough examination of all the facts, including the possibility of any alcohol consumption.  (Lothian and Borders Police Standing Orders, 1990, unpublished).  
Secondly, Hester and Elgin  allude to corporate failure to produce safe vehicles. In the continent in which Ralph Nader (1970) ran the successful campaigns in the 60s and 70s of the 20th century, to awaken the American public to car safety issues, it is open to question that Hester continues with a two line accusation of car manufacturers putting profit before safety. The assumption based on ‘there is evidence which shows’ (p.39) is not at all supported in the writings and the view that small cars are more likely to have serious damage is a statement of common sense rather than scientific research.  What Hester and Elgin fail to consider or even mention, are the pedestrians which are killed by motor vehicles.  According to the Road Transport Laboratory Annual Report, 1998, some 25% of all road traffic deaths in the United Kingdom were of pedestrians being killed by drivers whose ability to control their vehicle, was impaired through alcohol consumption. (343 out of 1444 people killed).  
(http://www.transtat.dft.gov.uk/tables/1998/ragb/ddart975.htm (​http:​/​​/​www.transtat.dft.gov.uk​/​tables​/​1998​/​ragb​/​ddart975.htm​))

Hester and Elgin were representing the views in Canada – a quite different legal and social system and so although it is of interest to follow their views, they do not necessarily allow for direct comparison with the United Kingdom.  What these authors do emphasise is the view that society is crucial as having a genesis in the passing of law - hence a society deems what is criminal and what is not; that there is required to be some enforcement agency – the police and thirdly that an administration of the law is required  –  the courts.  Again Hester and Elgin fail to contemplate or consider that there are other agencies which investigate and report crimes. A separate appendix in this study contains these agencies  (Appendix Five)  There are other writers who have views on societal pressures on the legislature and although these are interesting commentaries, they generally agree that new criminal laws which are made in haste to meet perceived needs, at times fail to meet objectives.  These considerations are correctly in the field of criminology or sociology and further comment and analysis is beyond the scope of this study.

However, in Scotland there are systems which can generate ‘new’ crimes according to circumstances and according to the evidence available

1.2.5  The Declaratory Power
Scots Law allows the courts, as well as Parliament, to construct new crimes. Without loss of generality this facility is known as the Declaratory Power and is limited to the High Court of Justiciary.  Lord Justice General Cooper stated in the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (Royal Commission on Capital Punishment Minutes of Evidence, p.428, 1950).
‘The Scottish law of crime is not statutory but almost exclusively common  law, which has been and still is being evolved by judicial decisions applied with anxious care to the precise facts of actual cases …  No two cases are exactly alike’.

Hence there is legal precedent for events which were previously unknown to be included into the lexicon of ‘crimes’, should the courts so consider. The legal term ‘Novus Actus Interveniens’ relates to the degree of supervention which an accused person shows in the acts which are considered illegal. Until 1984, the act of selling glue sniffing kits to pupils and young persons was not a crime in Scotland.  The social damage being inflicted on society by these young people intoxicated by the fumes of glue was causing concern in the west of Scotland.  Further, many of the children were exhibiting physical illnesses of mouth sores and breathing difficulties from their dalliance with glue sniffing.  The police and the procurator fiscal in the town of Airdrie, Scotland took action.  The shopkeeper Khaliq was arrested and placed before the Sheriff court, charged with supplying glue sniffing kits.   The kits, consisting of used potato crisp packets with glue inside them, were sold to youngsters.  Khaliq was convicted, and appealed against conviction. The appeal failed and Khaliq was imprisoned.

	The point in this case was the originality of the ‘providing’ of glue to pupils and young persons for the express purpose of inhaling the fumes – and causing harm to their health and the possibility of social unrest by the children’s behaviour. This case demonstrated that there was a new way – not passed by any legislature – to harm pupils and young persons and so the courts were seen to substantially amend the law of the land. The fact that the Scottish Courts have this power although used infrequently, is at odds with most criminologists’ views on the definition of crime.  Michael and Alder (1933) Williams (1994); Tappan (1947); Sutherland and Cressey (1924) all contribute to Muncie’s view that:
‘the act must be legally prohibited at the time it is committed’
The definitions of crime as listed by these and many other authors fail to mention the Declaratory Power – which is limited to Scotland only. This facet of criminological writing is hardly surprising as most of the leading criminologists are either English or American. Again, as in the comments regarding Davidson’s work above, the lack of Scottish criminologist is apparent in this area where the Declaratory Power is thought to be unique to Scotland.
	However, jurists are now increasingly concerned that the European Convention of Human Rights (Article 7) may cause this particular aspect of Scots law to disappear.  Article 7 (Wallace 1999) includes the sentiment that the circumstances for which a person is detained must be proscribed by the judicial system under which the person lives. In a common law system with a Declaratory Power this is a real difficulty. Many other European legal systems are codified – England, France, Spain and Germany  - the largest grouping of western democracies with such a legal base.  Hence the Declaratory Power is almost unique to Scotland and change may yet come.
	The principle of non retroactivity is centred in European Law (Foster 2006) and includes the ideal as contained in Article Seven above.  The case law is sound, based on Case 80/86 Public Prosecutor v Kolpinghuis Nijmegan where the Dutch authorities had failed to include in their domestic law, the principles above, and hence the prosecution was invalid. 
	 The question of the Declaratory Power in Scotland has not yet been settled and further research is required at a later date.
	1.2.6 Definition of Crime from the United States of America
	Lastly in this examination of crime, a definition from another jurisdiction – that of the United States of America - shows that the requirement for an all encompassing and reliable definition escapes most academics. Perkins (1974) states (p.6)
		‘A true definition is made up of three parts (1) the term, (2) the genus and (3) the differentia.  The term is the subject of the definition – the word or phrase to  be defined; genus is the classification or category – a class or group ranking above a species but below a family ;  differentia is the attribute or characteristic by which one species is distinguished from another’. 
	 Perkins continues in this section on ‘definition’ to try to assimilate the botanical concepts developed by Carl  Linnaeus in the 18th century  which proved to be one of foundations of modern scientific study. By ascribing such characteristics to the definition of crime, Perkins requires the support of other academics. Perkins considers works by other authors –Bishop and Blackstone -  in an attempt to convince the reader that this botanical approach is sound  The range of definitions which follow in Perkin’s work, include the phrase, ‘act or omission’ in relation to any event which may be considered criminal.  However, is there a need to consider ‘capacity’, the age of the perpetrator or the perpetrator’s state of mental acuity as crime is debated.  Fundamentally the answer must be that the act is criminal and age and capacity can be considered as pleas in bar of trial or as extenuating circumstances when a person is to be sentenced.  Perkin concludes his statement on crime definition with the rather curt phrase ;
		crime is any social harm defined and made punishable by law.
	Whilst this definition may have been acceptable in the United States in 1974, the date of the 8th edition of Perkins’ work, the concept of punishment is certainly an area to be questioned.  Post modern society includes the idea that appearance before a criminal tribunal could incorporate rehabilitation or treatment rather than punishment. Hence although Perkins established himself as one of the legal commentators in the time of burgeoning crime recording, his definition does not now meet the needs of society.
	
	Thus it is suggested that despite the arguments and statements of the variety of commentators listed above, it is sufficient for this thesis to state that ‘crime’ is known intuitively by the community in which it is used and that the police in Scotland are open to the possibility that new crimes may be presented by circumstances which previously had been exculpated.  The police work with and to the demands of the Counting Rules, issued by the relevant Home Offices.


1.3.1 The start of crime recording in Europe 
This section will explore some of the work which is available to allow an appreciation of crime recording. In order to trace the origins of the art of recording crime, it would be necessary to research each criminal jurisdiction, world wide. In a research study of the magnitude of this present thesis, the concept of a pan world exercise is not feasible.  Hence research has been limited to northern Europe, which will reveal the genesis of crime recording and possibly sociology. (Emsley 1999).   It is clear from the evidence that France was some years ahead of other western nations in establishing a collection process of crimes made known and that data was utilised by crime cartographers to show the extent of recorded crime.

Policing as is known in post modern society, is a modern phenomenon, having a history of two centuries.  Emsley (1999, 2002,1996,) Jones (1996), Weiner (1990) Butler (1984) and Oliver (1997) all view the establishment of the ‘new police’ as a necessary fact of life from around 1805.  Emsley in particular studied both the English and the French development of the policing systems, noting the differences in both countries.  The French system relied on the armed semi military gendarmerie national and Emsley’s work is both painstaking and informative. His research covers the crucial temporal areas following the Napoleonic wars and Napoleon’s creation of the Code Civil which included the formation of a codified set of crimes and offences in France.  The model in England was similar although Scotland took a distinctly dissimilar route and maintained the tradition of Common law – allowing the courts by precedent to reform the state of crime and offences.(Hume,1829, Alison 1833).  The need for some form of state sponsored control of the population came as the vast movement of population from the countryside to the cities as a result of the industrial revolution and the need for cheap labour.  This movement in turn lead to overcrowding in the cities and the formation of slum dwelling.  The rise in street crime required the state to act.  In France the movement towards a policing facility took the form of enabling the almost defunct Gendarmerie to coalesce with the Marechaussee, to form a light cavalry mounted policing system.  Emsley’s 1996 work which centres on the development from these early  days of policing is again based on old manuscripts in provincial and archival records.  His work should be measured against that of Oliver and Butler.  The latter two were serving chief officers of police, both with doctoral qualifications and their insight into modern policing is helpful.  Oliver centres much of his work with his conflict with his local authority in Scotland during the time of the miners’ strike in 1984.  His police authority, drawn from elected councillors in the local authority, sought to refuse him funding to send Central Scotland Police officers furth of their policing area to assist other police forces.  The central issue was the operational control of policing which is vested by statute in the Chief Constable of the area.  Butler gives an account of policing structures in modern society, laying out command levels and management facilities which enable police forces to function.  These accounts are all useful background to this study and show where modern policing has its roots and the dilemmas facing chief constables to balance the perceived needs of society with the resources available from the vote of money from central and local government.

Following the Revolution in France in 1789, a form of constitutional monarchy ensued until 1840. The Republicans and the Royal family established national governments for some 50 years until the Paris Revolution when the Royal family was finally overthrown.    The Revolution had been the culmination of years of protest by the peasant class against the conditions under which they were required to live.  One and only one of the conditions, was the use of the criminal law by regional nobles throughout the country to maintain the peasants in a state of subjugation. The criminal law was used to hold peasants without trial and to subject them to sentences far in excess of what seemed reasonable at that time.(Haenel 1993)  

Part of the outcome of the Revolution was the completion of a new written constitution.  Napoleon Bonaparte wrote in his last diaries from St. Helena, that:
‘I will be remembered not for the 24 battles in which I was victorious, nor the one which I lost, but for my Code Civil, which will last as long as France’ (Villard 1996)

Part of the Code Civil, which covered all the laws of France, from contract law through inheritance and marriage laws, was the Code Penal – the criminal law.  The criminal law had been used by the nobles and wealthy land owners to maintain public order as well as subjugation of the peasants.  The old French constables – similar in many ways to the High Constables in England and Scotland –were marechaussee.  These officers were originally ostlers and stablemen, looking after the horses for the nobles and eventually graduated into a public order role – maintaining the peace.  A national ordinance of the XIVth century gave the legal powers to the marechaussee to keep the peace.  From Villard’s work it would appear that the marechaussee were discontinued as a peace keeping force throughout the nation after the Revolution. At that time (1791) a national ordinance created an enlarged and more powerful Gendarmerie National – a light cavalry system of keeping order, collecting taxes and finding fugitives from the military enrolment and escaped prisoners.(Haenel 1996)  The marechaussee are now (2007) officially disbanded but the name lives on in France – used to denominate the local park keepers and officers of towns and larger villages – and as a term of endearment for those officers without the powers of arrest or the right to bear arms.

Emsley however takes a slightly different approach to the formation of the Gendarmerie National. His view from research within the original papers of the French national Archives, is that the marechaussee were not disbanded as such.  They were amalgamated into the new national force and took on the duties and responsibilities of the state police.  Horton (2005) takes a different view in her research regarding the formation of the new police within towns and cities in France post 1796. She claims that there was a civil policing cadre formed which was centred on towns of at least 50,000 people and above.  The police were a new concept and were subservient to the Gendarmerie and took orders from them.  It is not possible to substantiate this claim without the inspection of the Office of Mayor in each of the municipalities in France and this project is outwith the scope of this study. Which ever view is correct and the research is inconclusive from this distance of time, it is clear that a national system of law enforcement officers was established in France by 1800.

	With the completion of the new Code Penal, came the formal enlargement of the Gendarmerie Nationale.  This organisation had been established in the XIVth century and
‘The decisive step was produced on 25 January 1536 under an edict from Francois Ier when all the crimes or thefts committed in great houses were put under the jurisdiction of the Gendarmerie Nationale.’

The Gendarmerie Nationale  was developed over many years but was a national body of enlisted officers, armed, mostly light cavalry in military concept, and charged with dealing with public order and crimes throughout the land.

The formation of this new national force was controlled from Paris but with regional and local centres based on departements in the rural areas and addrondissments in the cities.  The fundamental requirement of allegiance is contained in the forming documents of the Gendarmerie Nationale - :
‘if the marechaussee were servants of the King, the Gendarmerie Nationale were servants of the law.’(Emsley 1999)

This crucial change in the internal politics of France was to have monumental changes throughout the French Empire as well as Europe. Emsley’s research shows that in  Germany, Spain and that part of Italy under formal national rule in the early XIXth century, all accepted the new model of internal peace keeping and criminal jurisdiction. The gendarmes, it is argued, played a significant role in the establishing the rule of law, particularly in rural France.  As a physical manifestation of the state, gendarmes applied the state law and offered the protection of the state to a population which had not know such benevolence before.  The gendarmes also ensured that the state taxes were collected and properly accounted, but also ensured that when required, a number of conscripts was identified to meet the needs of the state. Only England, Scotland and the Low Countries found the model unacceptable and started new policing based on different systems of  accountability and  funding. 

	The Gendarmerie National, started to keep records of all the events to which they were called or which they found whilst out on patrol.  The events were a catalogue or inventory especially of those events which had affected ‘the large houses’.  Although not recognisable now as national statistics, the collection of crime information was based on departements in country areas and arrondissements within cities.  These local areas were the centres of the Gendarmerie National and despite the collection of crimes being available on an annual basis it was some years before they were used in a meaningful way. (Villard 1996)

1.3.2 The early crime recording model in France






Le premier volume de statistiques, rapport du Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice au Roi a pru en 1825…Il contient le nombre des affaires traitees en presisant la nature des delits par cour et par departement..’

‘The first volume of statistics concerned with the Gadre des Sceaux, Ministry of the King’s Justice, appeared in 1825.  It contained the number of events of a treaty (definitions of crime) and exactly the nature of the indictments by Court and by Area.’ 


	Thus some 15 years ahead of the crime collection events in England, France had started to collect and use crime information.  These initiatives were available for other French academics, the foremost of whom was Durkheim.  It is no coincidence that Durkheim was professor of politics in Bordeaux University where he was surrounded by the teaching of French judges.  The University of Montsequieu IV in Bordeaux, has held the accolade of being the premier Law faculty in France for some three centuries.  
	
	It can be suggested then from the foregoing that France started the systematic collection of crime information and other northern European countries followed suit – although there had been Statistic Societies throughout Europe collecting data on other subjects for many years beforehand. 


1.3.3 The philosophy of crime, criminality and liberty
It is not possible in a study of this type which seeks to chronicle and analyse the introduction of computers into one aspect of policing, to examine in detail all the relevant texts in this massive subset.  A series of academics have sought to define crime and the works in Scotland centre on the institutional writers, Hume(1829), and Alison (1833).  The collective name – institutional writers- is believed to have its genesis in the Justinian Institutes, the complete revision of Roman law under the emperor Justinian in the 6th Century and is only used for those writers whose works are fundamental to the law of the land.  A review of these works is contained in this study in an effort to define ‘crime’. However, Hume gives an account of the introduction of some form of criminal proceedings, which occurred in Scotland around 1357, with the King taking control of the Court and a Fiscal introducing evidence.  From these ancient beginnings a series of step changes have taken place with the establishment of courts (away from the Royal court) and the employment of full time officials to present cases, administer the proceedings and to deal with the miscreants who were arraigned before the hearings.  More recent works by Gordon (1978 and revisions), Marshall (1996) and Manning (1977) all attempt to define crime, categorise police work and crime collection.  Gordon’s monumental work details the crimes of Scotland and gives the serious student of Scots criminal law an easy and thorough introduction to the subject.  The concept of crime is as old as humanity itself.  The western democracies loosely based their criminal law on the Pentateuch, the first five books of the Old Testament and later refined the concept of murder, theft and rape to the collection of crimes known to the general public in modern society.  As these concepts of wrongdoing developed, the knowledge of evil, of good and of liberty were espoused by Mill(1859) and others.  John Stuart Mill in his treatise on ‘Liberty’ stated;
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.’









The Role of the Police in Scotland
This chapter, along with the succeeding chapter, continues with the background to the study.  The police as agents of the state, funded by local and central government, are obliged by law to fulfil certain duties and to keep certain records of their work. (Police (Scotland) Act 1964 (as amended))  Accordingly this chapter will explain the duties of the police, using acts of Parliament where necessary, and a number of criminological texts.

2.1 Crime Recording in Scotland before Local Government Reorganisation 1975
This section considers the methods used by the police to collect crime and intelligence 

data using the manual systems before 1975. There have been many changes in the collection processes of crime recording in the past few years.  Local government in Scotland was reorganised on 15th May 1975 and again in May 1995.  As a result of that first reorganisation, the 35 police forces in Scotland – loosely based on Burghs and Counties were newly constructed into 8 forces.  Two had Joint Police Boards, Northern Constabulary and Lothian and Borders Police – whilst the others were part of the unitary ‘Region’ – Strathclyde, Grampian, Dumfries and Galloway, Fife, Central Scotland, Tayside. (Local Government (Scotland) Act 1974).  Until 1975 the recording of crime was based on the following process.
	A complainer (the victim of crime) would contact the police – normally through an emergency ‘999’ call and a uniformed patrol officer would be dispatched to the locus (Edinburgh City Police Force Instruction Book circa 1965).  Thereafter the patrol officer would record the details in his pocket book and phone a central office – the CID Main Office in the case of Edinburgh – where an experienced detective officer would review the information.






2.2 An explanation of Beat Complaints

An explanation of beat complaints is appropriate.  Urban police organisation consists of territorial divisions – a land area usually covered by up to 700 police officers.  They are administered into shifts – covering the 24 hour clock, 7 days per week.  As each officer works a statutory 40 hour week, plus what overtime is required or can be funded, then the shift pattern means that officers have different tours of duty throughout the year.  The division is divided into sub divisions of about 250 officers.  The remaining officers cover Traffic, Criminal Investigation Department, Administration, Death Enquiry (not murder), Divisional Planning, Criminal Intelligence.  A full explanation of police structure and administration can be found in Oliver (1997), Butler (1984) and others.

	The lowest administrative and operational unit is the ‘beat’.   Originally a beat was the area in a town, which a constable could patrol during the night and examine the commercial property for insecure doors etc..  This patrol would be completed twice each night shift - according to the exigencies of duty.  Hence some 8-10 beats would form a section – supervised by a sergeant – the sections combining into the sub division with an inspector in charge.

The beat in the cities of Edinburgh and Glasgow was centred from 1933 in police boxes.  These boxes were situated throughout the section and gave the patrolling constable a place to start and end his tour of duty.  The beat system relied on local knowledge – or now known as criminal intelligence.  Local knowledge was based on the patrol officer’s ability to ingratiate him/her self with local community groups, gain their confidence and listen to the gossip of the neighbourhood.  By gaining information the theory was that beat officers could prevent and detect crime, from the movements of known or reputed criminals.  The beat constable would be allocated to a beat according to seniority in the police service.
(Edinburgh City Police Instruction Book – Beat Duties circa 1965, unpublished)
The section on beat duties then instructs the constables as to Crime incidents.
Each incident of crime reported to the constable would then be reported by her/him to a supervisor – either a CID officer or the duty section sergeant.
	In the event of the supervisor taking the decision that the matter was too trivial to deal with as a criminal enquiry, the event was entered into a Beat Journal.  The journal was kept either in the police box or at the sub-divisional headquarters.
	A typical example would be the theft of morning rolls from outside a corner shop.  About 0300hours each morning a baker’s delivery van would leave many dozens of rolls in trays outside the shop.  The shopkeeper may arrive at 0500hours to open for business and find that say 10 rolls are missing from the consignment.

The total value may be less that £1 sterling.  This is a ‘beat complaint’ and is not recorded as a crime. It would be recorded in a book maintained in the local police box – or at sub divisional headquarters.  The book entry would show the locus, time and date of the complaint, the nature of the complaint, which officer is to give attention to the complaint – and a space for the result.  The result would be submitted by the officer allocated within 14 days, and the sergeant and later the Inspector, would ‘sign off’ the complaint.  The person complaining - ‘the complainer’ would then be told of the result. The performance assessment of beat officers included their attention to beat complaints and the results of the work undertaken.

	However, if a diligent and assiduous beat officer were to keep watch on the corner shop from 0300 hours onwards and catch the thief, then the matter was treated differently.  A crime report would be raised by the CID officer and the culprit would be questioned about the other similar events.  If a confession were forthcoming, then a series of many crimes would be reported and would be solved.

	The word ‘solved’ is used often in policing statistics and is commensurate with ‘and reported’ – the official title given to those crimes for which a report is sent to court.  However, the official statistics do not include a correction element – showing those individual crimes for which a report has been submitted to court and either no proceedings have been taken by the prosecutor because of lack of evidence or the event was not in the public interest or the events have been aired in court and a disposal of ‘not guilty’ or ‘not proven’ has been reached by the court.

	However, in reality the vast majority of beat complaints were never solved – they formed the ‘dark figures’ of the crime reporting system.  When the British Crime Survey released its figures, in 1983, and showed a level of crime some 4 times higher than that reported by the police, there was little effort by the police or academic researchers to examine the beat complaint system, to see if the figures could be reconciled (The British Crime Survey Home Office Research Study, No. 76 HMSO, London – Hough and Mayhew). Further research is required in this area.

2.3 The Mechanics of crime recording
The crime report was on paper and was then sent to the Records Office staffed by police officers and support staff. Unilateral decisions were taken by the staff as to what data was important and a card index of that data was created. Nominal information, name and address of the complainer, witnesses, accused (if any), officers involved,  was filed in alphabetical order on colour coded cards – a different colour for each of these categories.
Additional indices were created for descriptions of suspects and accused which included physical descriptions – male/female; age; height; hair colour; eye colour; clothing; marks, scars and tattoos.
Different sections of card indices were created for type of property violated, types of property stolen, weapons used, modus operandi (method of committing the crime), vehicles used – registered number, description, dents and distinguishing marks. (Edinburgh City Police Instruction Book, circa 1970).
This work was manpower intensive utilising 18 full time staff in Edinburgh alone, which accounted for some 25% of all recorded crime in Scotland at that time.  In the event of a murder occurring, there would be a full search of the indices to meet the detectives’ requirements as far as description of any suspect or accused.  In the case of the ‘Yorkshire Ripper’ – accused Peter Sutcliffe, (Bland 1984), there was a misfiling of some of the index cards and there was the possibility that Sutcliffe evaded detection during his three year murder period.
Thus the system was not dependable or reliable and detective officers refused to use the system for routine enquiries. (Lothian and Borders Police Computer Assisted Policing Feasibility Report 1978). The redundant effort involved in maintaining this set of records was estimated at 18 full time staff.  An additional responsibility for the officer in charge of this system, was the maintenance of the criminal records on a local level , as well as the criminal intelligence database for the force.  The City of Edinburgh maintained a record of those people who had been reported to court for crimes and offences made known within the city, as well as those offences which were reported to the Edinburgh courts, as the capital city of Scotland


2.4 Criminal Intelligence Recording
This section describes and analyses the development of criminal intelligence from the uncoordinated filing systems of individual officers to the sophisticated modern systems of post modern policing.
Pre computerisation, criminal intelligence tended to rest in the memory of the working detectives. (Valentine 2000, Ackroyd 1992). This state of affairs had the dual effect of limiting the availability of intelligence to the owning officer but also there was no check on the veracity of the information.  Hence the collection by an officer of hearsay, gossip or speculation could have an adverse affect on the investigation of crime in that area. The efforts of the three police forces in this study to standardise the collection ,storage and dissemination of criminal intelligence had only limited effect.  The need for a central database with good communications to allow for the swift dispersal of the data was evident in 1976, but until the year 1997, there was no formal move to a national system.  
The crime recording projects which form the base of this present study, were the first comprehensive efforts to rationalise and develop what had been a piece meal set of procedures, into a constrained and well constructed set of instructions.
Criminal intelligence is that set of data collected by the police in the course of their duties, which may assist future enquiries. A more formal definition is contained in the Interpol web site as follows;
'The identification of and provision of insight into the relationship between crime data and other potentially relevant data with a view to police and judicial practice'.(Interpol definition created 2007)
 Recent changes in legislation have affected post modern policing systems. The Police Act 1997, related to the whole of the United Kingdom and set up the National Criminal Intelligence Service.  The purpose of the Service is to provide a national database of criminal intelligence for the working police officer.  The actions of each individual police officer in the collection of criminal intelligence has been carefully controlled over recent years in order to ensure a proportionate and accountable set of actions for each incident. (The Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) Interception of Communications Regulations 2000; Money Laundering Regulations 2003)
Additionally the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005) now exists to coordinate and action the intelligence effort of the police service.  The development of MEMEX, the commercial software available from the United States in the early 1990s provided another spur to the construction of a systematic criminal intelligence system, capable of standing the utmost scrutiny from subjects (Fife Constabulary Chief Constable’s Report 1995).  Subjects of criminal intelligence are able to examine what is held about them on police computers – except in those cases of national security under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
The legislation listed above presents control mechanisms for police offices so that subjects of criminal intelligence reports are able (unless national security is compromised) to examine their own files. Hence criminal intelligence is now seen to be open , proportionate and accountable.


2.5.1 Legal obligation to record crime
Primarily the police in Scotland are required under statute:

‘The Chief Constable shall report in such form as the Secretary of State shall from time to time require, the following information:
a)	the number of offences reported
b)	the number of persons reported and arrested
c)	the nature of the charges made against those persons in (b)
d)	the nature of further proceedings against any person
e)	such other statistical information which the Secretary of State shall from time to time require for the police area’
(Police (Scotland) Act 1967 Section 47)

It is clear even at this stage of research, that the police are passive recipients of information – ‘the number of offences reported’.  Although the report may come from a police officer, there is no obligation on the Chief Constable to seek out offences in other fields of activity – Scottish Environmental Protection Agency is only one example of the 37 agencies in Scotland enjoined with reporting offences (see Appendix Five)
2.5.2 Legal response
From such information, the Secretary of State:
‘shall produce an consolidated report of  the state of crime in Scotland and shall lay the Report before Parliament’





Thereafter the legislation at subsection 3 gives Chief Constables the requirement to maintain records to allow for the collection of the information and to collect such required information from the Clerks of Court to allow for the completion of the report.  The report shall be submitted reflecting the state of crime up to and including the 31st December annually.
2.5.4 Influences on Chief Constables to standardise data collection.

To enable central government to have some form of rational response to the statutory requirement, the Counting Rules  are the instructions issued by the relevant Home Department to Chief Constables to ensure as far as is possible, that crimes of like seriousness are counted in different police forces, in the same way.(Scottish Home and Health Department circulars – annual {pre 1995})
These rules apply to Scotland only – with a similar or analogous set being produced for England and Wales and again for Northern Ireland.  The rules are an attempt by civil servant statisticians, local authority officers, the police and the prosecution agencies to establish a set of workable practices.  These practices should allow like sets of criminal circumstances to be recorded by different police officers in different areas of Scotland in a rigorous and correct manner.  Already in this thesis the difficulty in establishing standardisation has been explained.
However the police do not act only on their own initiatives under the law or under civil service guidelines.. The Chief Constable’s  operational control is not totally unfettered ;
‘While one of the main functions of the police is to investigate crime, their investigations are subject to advice and instructions from the Crown.  The position of the police in relation to the Crown  is to some extent regulated by statute – in particular by Section 17 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967, which provides for the making of reports by the police to the appropriate prosecutor and by Section 9 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975, which provides for the issuing by the Lord Advocate of instructions to a Chief Constable, with regard to the reporting, for the consideration of the question of prosecution, of offences alleged to have been committed within the area of the Chief Constable, and imposes upon the Chief Constable to whom any such instruction is issued to secure compliance therewith..  But the office of Lord Advocate has existed long before the creation of any police force, and his functions and responsibilities have not been diminished by the availability of the police to conduct criminal investigations.  The fundamental principle is that he has the right to investigate any alleged crime at any time.  The position is well stated in the Opinion of Lord Justice Clerk - Thomson, in Smith V HMA 1952 JC 66  at pp 71 – 72;
“When a crime is committed it is the responsibility of the Procurator Fiscal to investigate it.  In actual practice much of the preliminary investigation is nowadays, especially in the larger centres of population with highly organised police forces, increasingly conducted by the police under the general supervision of the Fiscal.  This is due to the remarkable development in recent years of the efficiency of the criminal investigation departments of the police forces, especially on the technical side of crime detection.  However, the duty of the police is simply one of investigation under the supervision of the Procurator-fiscal and the results of the investigation are communicated to the Procurator-fiscal as the enquiry progresses.  It is for the Crown Office and not for the police to decide whether the results of the investigation justify prosecution.  The two functions are quite distinct.  In carrying out their initial investigation the police perform a public duty.  Their investigation is entirely private and no one else is entitled to take part in it.  As the police have a monopoly, two results follow.  First, the manner in which they are allowed to carry out their investigation is regulated by certain rules.  Second as they are the sole investigators and no more than investigators, it is their duty to put before the Procurator-fiscal everything which may be relevant and material to the issue of whether the suspected party is innocent or guilty.  We repeat, it is not for the police to decide what is relevant and material, but to give all the information which may be relevant and material.’




2.5.5 Legal Influences on the police
Thus the police act under instruction from the senior law officers of the land who are now (2007) appointed by the Scottish Executive – an elected body of Members of the Scottish Parliament. Additionally under the same legislation, a Sheriff may issue instructions to a chief officer of police, during times of ‘serious civil unrest’.   These are unusual circumstances which seldom occur and the police have over the years since the cessation of hostilities in 1945, become a well qualified and responsible body.(Alderson 1979)
However, in less calamitous circumstances, there can be direct instructions to the police from senior law officers.  In 1990, the Lord Advocate in Scotland, the senior law officer in the land, issued an instruction to chief constables regarding the seizure of needles from intravenous drug users. The police, especially in Edinburgh and Glasgow had been involved in the attempts to restrict drugs use, by confiscating used and unused needles found in the possession of persons arrested for crime.  These needles were then safely disposed off.  The result was that sharing needles became the norm for the drugs users and the incidence of cross infections and hepatitis rose alarmingly.  The Lord Advocate under pressure from the medical and social professionals, required police officers to photograph the needles, use the photographs as evidence and return the needle to the criminal. (Leishman and Wood 2000).  Thus whilst chief police officers do have discretion under the law, they are subject to instructions from law officers.
2.5.6 Influence of the Courts
However, the corollary of that position is also set out in the law.
In an English case (Regina v. The Chief Constable of Sussex ex parte International 

Trader’s Ferry Limited (1998) 3 WLR 1260; (1999) 1 All ER 186,HL,)

a company tried to ensure that they could continue their legitimate trade by forcing the Chief Constable to protect them.  The case dealt with the exporting of live lambs from England to the Continent, and violent protests had forced the company to stop transport.  The police (via the Chief Constable of Sussex)  had initially undertaken to protect the ferry company, but had then withdrawn.  The ferry company came against the protestors and was unable to trade.

The company appealed eventually to the House of Lords with Lord Hoffman 

dismissing the appeal as ‘quite hopeless’.

“Although the courts would intervene to review a clearly unlawful act by a Chief Constable in respect of his duty to keep the peace, the right of the kind claimed here - to trade lawfully - was not an absolute right which placed a duty on the Chief Constable to protect the trader whatever the cost.  In any situation there are conflicting rights and the police have a duty to uphold the law, the police may have to balance a number of factors, not least of which is the likelihood of a serious breach of the peace being committed.  That balance involves the exercise of judgement and discretion.  The courts will respect the margin of appreciation of a chief constable, who knows the local situation, the availability of officers and his financial position.”
Despite the obvious and well rehearsed differences in legal systems in England and Scotland, the premise here is quite clear. English courts cannot tell Chief Constables what to do, in terms of operational proceedings – but they may have a say in the way that the police officers comply with the details of the law in terms of prosecutions. 


Secondly the police react to the instructions from the Scottish Executive and at times through the aegis of the Home Office in London regarding some of the national legislation relating to criminal events.  This is particularly apparent in the formation of the Serious Organised Crime Agency which is based in London, under English control, but will have operational legitimacy in Scotland.  Although this agency is being newly formed in February 2005 and a Memorandum of Agreement has yet to be established to allow English Police officers to work in Scotland and vice versa  ( SOCA launched April 2006) 
There is no doubt that central government in London will have an influence on police operations in Scotland.
Lastly the police in Scotland are regulated by the Scottish Executive Police Division in terms of working practices between forces.  The Executive exercises control by the issuing of instructions from the Statistics Section of Police Division, through the collection of funds from local authorities to administer the Common Police Services (Scottish Police College; the Scottish Criminal Record Office and the Scottish Drugs Enforcement Agency) and the many formal and informal meetings between ministers and police representatives.
2.5.7 Influences furth of Scotland  - advisory
The peculiar state of the Secretary of State for the Home Department having influence over the police in another legislature has not been resolved. Although Scots Law is independent and the police in Scotland act under that law, there are Home Office circulars which apply across the United Kingdom.  Hence Home Office Circular Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency Circular of 1967 (Home Office Circular 114/ 67) required of all chief constables (Scotland, England and Wales, as well as at that time the Royal Ulster Constabulary) to instigate some form of management accountability for the revenue which they received. 
2.5.8 Influences furth of Scotland - administrative
Other common areas are the conditions of service (pay, pensions and conditions) for the police which are negotiated by Home Office staff alongside representatives of the police staff associations. However, the result of the 2007 police pay review was handled differently in Scotland, with a backdated pay award to September 2007, whereas the English and Welsh police pay award was delayed until January 2008.  These facts were adduced from newspaper reports in December 2007, just as this thesis was being finalised.  There is more research required in this area – the relationship between the Home Office and the Scottish Executive.

2.5.9 Influences furth of Scotland - operational




	2.5.10 Wider definition of solved crime
Thus there is a legal obligation upon Chief Constables to record both the crimes and those for which a report has been submitted.  This second element is commonly referred to as ‘solved’ crime. However, as will be seen later, solved crime is a misnomer.  The true solved figure must be those crime which are proved in open court – not merely those for which a report has been submitted by the police.  This point requires careful consideration and will be expanded later in this study. 
 

2.6.1 Is all crime recorded?
As has been established in earlier sections, there is no obligation upon the chief constable to seek out crime – he only records that which is recorded by the police.  The crimes which are recorded by other agencies in Scotland with the authority to report offenders to the Procurator Fiscal – the prosecuting authority in Scotland –fall into two categories. Those cases which are heard in open court, from these other agencies, will then be subsumed into the local chief constable’s statistics, through the aegis of the requirement to the Clerk of Court to provide these reports to the chief constable. (Police {Scotland} Act 1967 Section 47(3)). Otherwise, the crimes investigated by those other agencies, will only show on their own reporting mechanisms – often in web based reports. Hence crime reporting will be seen to be selective and at best inaccurate.

2.6.2 Police use of data
	However, the police use this data in other ways, further than those of their legal obligations.  
‘The FBI computerises all Uniform Crime Reports for analysis and uses the computer for special projects on the war against crime’(Johnston 1981)

Thus some quarter of a century ago, the United States of American, by virtue of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was using crime statistics, garnered from some 1,800 police agencies throughout the nation, in a war.  The war against crime is primarily an operational police response and includes the programmes of ‘Zero Tolerance’ – those initiatives where the smallest criminal misdemeanour is reported to court for due process. Additionally police forces in the United Kingdom have used crime generated data in attempts to forecast the spatial and temporal distribution of crime (Valentine 2000). 


2.6.3 Origins of ‘the war’ against crime
In 1966, in response to the start of the increase in recorded crime in England and Wales, the Home Office issued an instruction to Chief Constables.  The focus was on ‘the war against crime’, a term which although not new in its format, certainly was new in the central government lexicon of the day.  The concept of turning a police service into a police force, showed that the Home Secretary of the time, Roy Jenkins, was serious about the effect of crime on the community.  Indeed as part of his reforming zeal, and the introduction of hand held wirelesses for the police, a great change took place in policing methodologies.  These included small motor cars ‘Panda’ cars, lightweight motor cycles for selected police officers and areas, and a reduction in foot patrolling.  These and other changes in the 1960s were as part of a response to the new commitment by central government to attack crime and criminals.(Alderson 1988)

2.6.4 A validation for the war
The war is a bye product of the efforts of the civil police to retain its control of the streets.  Valentine(2001) takes the argument for a war against crime, into the centre of policing.  Her empirical research shows that police officers view criminals as ‘the enemy’ and that a secured conviction is a ‘victory’.  These and other phrases which Valentine uses, are symbolic of a war and it can be seen that at least part of the policing effort is a series of small battles.  Hence the police use this language as one set of organisational values to maintain their independence and self sufficiency.


	2.7.1 Other Agencies Recording Crime
	However the police are not the only agency to enquire into allegations of crime. There are many agencies formed under statute to investigate incidents reported to them or discovered as part of their duties.(Appendix Five). It is illustrative to examine just some of these agencies to examine their procedures and comments about their efficacy.

2.7.2  RSPCA
In 2001, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals investigated 123,156 allegations of ill treatment to animals in Great Britain. (http://www.rspca.org.uk).  The Annual Report of the Society, on the web site, then shows that 736 prosecutions were brought against 948 defendants (the English term for accused persons) resulting in 2,448 offences being proved.  

The statistics from the Society are slightly ingenuous, showing the number of allegations but not differentiating on which allegations were found to be ‘no crimes’ for whatever reason
	false alarm with good intent,
genuine mistake by the informer,
malicious information, 
	and not showing which allegations were genuine but where there was insufficient evidence to complete a prosecution.

Hence the Society received reports of cruelty and according to its Royal Charter, committed resources to investigate these allegations.  That so few reports were  ‘solved’ or reported to court, 736 out of 123,156, is not a condemnation of the Society but merely a reflection on two elements;
	The amount of evidence required to bring an allegation from an enquiry into a criminal court with the likelihood of achieving a conviction – and thus reflecting the public interest in this area of cruelty to animals




Another agency which completes investigations which could result in an accused person or a company appearing before a criminal court is the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). SEPA have their own professional officers, who are qualified in a variety of environmental studies ranging from hydrology through to biology and botany. These are in the main science graduates.  An analysis of SEPAs work in Scotland raises at least one note of concern.

‘In Scotland environmental regulators such as SEPA cannot bring their own prosecutions.  Instead if they wish criminal proceedings to be brought against a person, they must send a report to the local public prosecutor, the procurator fiscal, who has the discretion as to whether proceedings should be brought or not.  If the procurator fiscal considers the case to be too complex, he may refer the case to an advocate depute. The system has been criticised because it involves the exercise of discretion at two levels.  It has also been alleged that procurators fiscal are not conversant with environmental law and do not accord it an appropriate priority.  It has also been criticised on the basis that environmental regulators lack an appreciation of the rules of criminal  evidence leading to poor reports being sent to procurators fiscal.’ (Smith, Collar and Poustie 1997)

Smith et al continue at p.44 by comparing the apparent success of English prosecutions and fines levied, against those in Scotland, regarding river pollution.  According to the Table (ibid p.45) in 1994 there were 3,218 pollution incidents on the main Scottish rivers, resulting in 35 prosecutions – a ‘solution rate’ of 11%.     The Procurator Fiscal service in Scotland is one of the oldest professional prosecuting agencies in the western world with references to a list of Procurators Fiscal being named in the minutes of the Scottish Parliament in August 1584 (http://www.procuratorfiscal.gov.uk/News/Historical/HistDevPF (​http:​/​​/​www.procuratorfiscal.gov.uk​/​News​/​Historical​/​HistDevPF​)).  It is noteworthy that none of the author’s  - either Smith, Collar or Poustie are Scots and their comments may be of concern to an establishment (The Procurator Fiscal Service) which allowed itself to be the model for the English Crown Prosecution Service – founded in 1989 (when Lord MacKay of Clashfern  - a Scot  - was Lord Chancellor of England.).
However, if there were to be a  conviction, the record  will show on the police statistics as the police are required to collect disposal figures of cases appearing before the Scottish Criminal Courts.  These statistics form part of the consolidated criminal statistics and are only available through the court system. Again however, there is no easy conduit to release the events into which an enquiry has been made and no case brought to court – other than through web sites and annual reports.  These seldom meet the glare of publicity afforded to the police crime statistics – but nevertheless – they are recorded crimes.

2.7.4 More statistical collections
The national statistics issued by the Scottish Executive relate to the collected crime reports from the 8 Scottish Police forces and shown by Local Authority Council areas.  According to the web page of the Scottish Executive Statistics Office 
(http://www.scotland.gov.uk/pages/news/2002/10/p_seed117.aspx), 
the following events are excluded from the annual statistics as they are collected and classified by non ‘Home Office’ police forces:
	Crimes			4,900
	Offences		5,900







2.7.5 Non civil police statistics
These events are reported by the combined efforts of the British Transport Police, The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Police and the Ministry of Defence Police, as regards their operations in Scotland.  Hence the administration of the recorded crime statistics in Scotland excludes some 8,000 unsolved crimes, the other 26% or some 2,000 crimes having been cleared up, or reported, will show in the relevant police forces crime statistical returns to the Statistics unit.
According to the personal correspondence between the author and the senior civil servant running the Crime Section of the Statistics Unit, there is 





2.7.6 Further statistics from other police forces
There are other ‘constabularies’ where recruits are sworn to uphold the duties of a constable – defined in the relevant regulations allocated to the founding of the constabulary.  For example, the Royal Parks Constabulary in Scotland is part of Historic Scotland – a department of the Scottish Education Department within the Scottish Executive.

The Royal Parks Constabulary in England and Wales is an Agency of the Home Office and in an Inspection Report listed the offences dealt with by the Constables in an appendix.  They include trading within the Park without a permit, cycling on prohibited areas and the like.  Additionally, in anther appendix there are listed the ‘crimes’ which occurred in the Parks and these are akin to the Scots law crimes of murder, assault and theft.(Royal Parks Constabulary Inspection Report 2002)

The Inspection Report highlights the lack of a ‘proper’ crime recording system in the Royal Parks Constabulary.  The collection of crime information is paper based with the consequent problems of access and accuracy. However, these crimes have also been reported by the Metropolitan Police who instigate proceedings for the solved crimes through the London Courts.  Hence a degree of confusion exists as to the ‘correct’ state of recorded crime. 

2.7.7 Other crime investigation agencies in Scotland
Research work completed in 2006, showed that there were in excess of 43 agencies with the power of search and entry within Scotland, England and Wales or Northern Ireland.  Some of these agencies with the relevant sections or articles authorising these actions are listed in Appendix Five.  There are others and this facet of crime requires further academic research to complete the concept of ‘crimes made known’ in Scotland. This research project is further explained in the thesis summary.
Hence it can be seen that the collection of crimes records in Scotland is an inexact art.  The proliferation of agencies and other non governmental bodies with the authority to investigate crimes, has risen to over 43,  as society seeks recourse to problems and the Scottish Executive attempts to ensure a fair and controlled society.  All this is indicative of a degree of confusion with no clear overall strategy for the collection of crime data in Scotland .  Whilst the civil police act under the issue of the Counting Rules, which change from time to time, they also require to maintain a constant vigil for those circumstances which are new and seem criminal, and then to take the matter to the appropriate prosecutor. 
The paucity of informative literature on the subject of the early computerisation of crime and intelligence information makes any review concentrate on the four substantive volumes by Haggerty, Garland, Kinsey and Simmons.  The common theme from these books is that of inconsistent application of the rules by the police forces involved.  The rules are only the guidelines constructed by statisticians to assist police forces to record similar or analogous circumstances in a consistent way. The fact that the rules are constructed by staff in  central government departments, often far removed from the reality of street encounters with which the police officers deal daily, requires some modicum of understanding for both sides, the police and the statistician.  The section defining ‘crime’ along with a review of ‘intelligence’ forcefully reinforces the difficulties which all face in the recording of crime and intelligence.







2.8.1 The specificity of crime and intelligence recording




2.8.2 Texts relating to the recording of crime
The definitive text is that by Haggerty (2000) in his description of the crime recording system in Canada.  Indeed there does not appear to be another academic text available which covers this area of police work. Haggerty surveyed the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics and claims that his approach is ‘constructionist’ – that is exploring in detail the social and historical means by which truths are produced, rather than being a simple rhetorical device to slight the value of knowledge formation.  Haggerty continues his explanation of his own research methodology by invoking the actor-network theory.  His claim that the production of a heterogeneous set of complete data is dependent on a contingent alliance of individuals, technologies and institutions, cannot be dismissed too lightly.  His failure to comment succinctly on the emergent computer technologies is remiss, as this element of crime recording is fundamental to post modernist police forces.  However, Haggerty does produce a volume of social comment on the vagaries of  collection of crime data.  His appraisal of  Canadian police based crime recording systems on computers reflect the early days in the United Kingdom.  The centre for collection of crime data in Canada is the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics and it collects crime data from 10 provinces and three territories.  The policing effort in Canada is operated at local authority level with the Federal police being the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.  Some 200 police organisations collect crime data and many of these are small units of less than 100 officers and other staff.  Haggerty’s appraisal of this spread of organisations is reflected in his views that 
	‘police organisational routines can also influence crime rates’
as each of the police organisations has the right to define its own operational procedures.  Haggerty then moves into the area so beloved by criminologist over the past sixty years of  commenting on the ‘dark figures’ of crime. These are the crimes which are alleged by the victims who chose not to report them to the policing organisation. One way to try to reconcile the difference in the statistics, between those crimes recorded and those allegedly occurred is to complete some survey work. A number of post incident surveys have been concluded within a variety of jurisdictions and including Canada.  Without loss of generality these surveys show that recorded crime is not the true figure of actual crime (Mayhew 1984; Johnson 1996 )  Haggerty argues that there are many factors influencing the recording of crime.  These include public crusades against particular offences – prostitution, drunk driving and street violence and these campaigns can inflate recorded crime by the actions of the police.  These effects have concomitant results within statistics departments with staff being vulnerable to criticism that their work is demeaned by inaccurate figures.  In all, there is a number of competing influences, from police operations and procedures, through professional opinion at the scenes of homicides, through the public not reporting for a variety of social and economic reasons, to pressure on statisticians, to create a ‘truth’ of recorded crime.  The Canadian model is based on the Canadian government’s request for criminal justice data to influence future planning and resource allocation. According to Haggerty, the liberal western democracies use criminal statistics as part of the planning process for national or federal spending.  These monies are used to alleviate the conditions either caused by criminals or to remedy the criminals’ own actions by way of treatment or incarceration.  Additionally the progress towards a crime free society is judged by the recording of crime types over a number of years.  These indicators allegedly allow politicians to state that their policies are working – or the contrary view that they are not working.  To allow these claims to be substantiated, it is important in Haggerty’s view to have a set of data, collected by impartial police force people, and submitted against set crime definitions.
However, the question of  - definition -  is raised in Haggerty’s work as a spectre.  The treatment of indigenous Canadian peoples – the First Generation – has been exercising the problem of racial stereotyping.  By recording the racial category of both the victim and the perpetrator of crimes recorded in Canada in the early 1990s, the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics sought to bring some harmony to a country which was suffering from internecine squabbling over French status for part of Canada.  Additionally, there were claims from native tribes that their actions were in retaliation to white supremacist land violations.  Hence the ‘racial status’ contained within the crime reports ceased to be collected from 1993 onwards and the problem of racial definition was discontinued.
In terms of crime recording however, this facet of definition should be treated more seriously and should not be allowed to be circumvented by mere politics.  The inconvenient truths about crimes are certainly not for the faint hearted and many politicians, close to re elections, would not be willing to face up to the facts.  There are within the community pockets of crime which relate to ethnic groups (Valentine 2000).  If indeed the end product of crime recording is not the solution of the crime by the police, but the sincere planning of society by politicians, there needs to be a recognition that some groups in some areas are more crime prevalent than others, according to the records of crimes recorded.  If these inconvenient facts are ignored then the channelling of police, social work, education and health resources to these areas may indeed be diverted to other non essential areas of the politicians’ bailiwick  In turn by not allowing all the information regarding crime to be considered by the impartial statistician, then there is a danger that society may be inadvertently ill served by politicians.
One facet of the discussion regarding ‘racial classification’ which Haggerty is at pains to stress, is that often, the police officer constructing the report is taking a non informed decision regarding ethnic origins.  Haggerty argues that this is due to suppressed embarrassment by the police officer in not wishing to overtly offend the victim of crime – who may be traumatised at the time.  Although Haggerty claims this is a truth, there is no evidence in his work to substantiate his claim.  The Scottish Police Service Training School at Tulliallan Castle in Fife, Scotland, repeats in its training manuals in all courses to probationary constables, that exact definition of name, age, date of birth, occupation and address is required of all people with whom that constable has contact. The concept of ethnicity has been included in crime reports in Scotland for 15 years and although it appears that there are no published tables relating to race and crime, the data is held.  Hence, Haggerty is perhaps on unsafe ground when he claims that police officers display ‘suppressed embarrassment’, although in a different country with different racial tensions, there could be some truth in his claim. 

 This raises the unanswered question of the right of police officers to comment politically on the data they have collected and subsequently passed onto a central government statistics manipulation service.  Police officers in the United Kingdom are proscribed by law (Police Acts and Police {Scotland} Acts) from making political statements of any kind.  The early computer projects in both crime and operational event recording, allowed easy computation of crimes per local authority ward or even events per street.  This ability  was debated by the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland in 1981 (Minutes of ACPOS Council) and the overriding concern was the possible misuse of the data by competing elected councillors.  This fear of new data sources being misused circumscribed the ability of police officers to comment dispassionately on crime statistics.  
However, Haggerty does not mention the recording of intelligence, that most difficult of policing ventures.  His thesis rest solely on the recording of crime and the subsequent use of crime data and the manipulation of the statistics by the Canadian Centre.  His work is thorough and reflects an empirical study of crime data capture in Canada.  
 Ackroyd (1992) et al in their description of the introduction of information technology in the police, limit their research by concentrating on Lancashire Constabulary.  Their research is empirical, at time anecdotal and the ability to wring some sort of predictive theory from their work is unconvincing.  The Ackroyd research contemplates the use of crime information systems in that police force and elicits some generalisations of detective work from their observations.   However pungent the comments from the detectives interviewed, the ability to formulate a theory is open to other interpretations.  That particular police force has its own operating procedures and as every other public body, battles for funding from the public purse.  These battles often are politically skewed and thus the ability of chief police officers to meet the aspirations of the working detectives can be circumscribed by factors other than those of operational efficiency (Oliver 1997).  Hence Ackroyd et al are at pains to elaborate on their findings that the introduction of computers to Lancashire Police ‘may or may not meet the objectives of the designers’ .  There is little in this work to show the basic design parameters or indeed what the overall objectives were – other than the statement – to assist the police with their enquiries. To substantiate the work Ackroyd claims that his research team followed a qualitative approach in that they talked to the users of the computer system and observed the tasks undertaken by the operational officers.  Any qualitative approach should show some criteria against which the new system will be judged (Weiss 1972;Garland ).  Ackroyd fails to display the ‘before and after’ scenario beloved by police officers to show the improvement in their performance.  As shown by Garland,(below), the steady erosion of police independence to follow intuitive working patterns, is caused in part, by the requirement to meet both local government and central government, performance tables.  The police force finding itself at the bottom of the league table, has been threatened by successive Home Secretaries, to have a closer examination of the leadership of the chief police officer cadre completed.  This threat has not yet been implemented but the Chief constable of Humberside Police was encouraged to resign because of the Soham tragedy, when a school caretaker murdered two ten year old girls.  Hence much of Ackroyd’s work although informative lacks academic merit in terms of substantial research methodology.
2.9 Alternative views on the control of statistics in the criminal justice field
By contrast, one examination of the criminal justice system in the United Kingdom by David Garland, follows a strict before and after pattern.  
	‘The study begins by contrasting our present –day policies and practices with those that existed up until the 1970s’
This is a sound research model and allows the reader to see the development of Garland’s thesis in a historical  and sociological context.  Garland claims that in general, central government has advocated the use of integrated intelligence and data handling technology in the state’s determination to reduce recorded crime. One of the unforeseen side effects of this increase in investment in technology was the factor of accountability – of new police management models. Garland is aware that these models were  either imposed from the centre or were police derived from the management training which chief and senior police officers had completed.  The development of new technologies in the United States of America through the aegis of the Law Enforcement Administration Authority allowed the handling of large data sources to be managed on business models.  However according to Garland, many of these initiatives were not introduced in the Home Office funded polices forces, apart from the introduction of the Police National Computer in 1974, on a phased roll out basis. The success of the Police National Computer stands as a beacon for the Home Office – as did the completion of  HOLMES (Home Office {large} Major Enquiry System) again by the Home Office in 1983/4. This again points to the lack of an overall agreed strategy within the civil police forces.  The Home Office as masters of the allocation of funds for police technology research, could have taken a more robust role. Garland continues and  delves into the vexed question of racial classification and his analysis of Canadian crime recording systems is at a variance with Haggerty above.  His claims echo those of  George Carlin quoted by Garland – who states that the Canadian First Generation would rather be called by their ‘tribal name’ and thereafter lists some 100 different tribes.  The important aspect of Garland’s analysis is that the Canadian Indians wanted to continue to provide ethnic information to the police; but the data managers found the resultant information just too difficult to manage.  This collection of racial information was discontinued in 1991.  The Canadian Indians wanted the information collected to ensure that they were not being discriminated against and the cancellation of the data collection, failed to meet their social aspirations, as explained in the précis of Haggerty’s work above.  However, Garland’s analysis of crime control is much more wide ranging and complex.  In quoting John Major, one time Prime Minister of Great Britain, that ‘crime is a decision and not a disease’, Garland exploits the perception that criminal societies are here forever. In relating the fact that prisons are now (late 20th and early 21st centuries), not only receiving high approval ratings for their incarceration capabilities, but prisons also achieve the further functions of punishment and correction, control and condemnation. Hence Garland’s work is both legally based and is written with a sociological perspective.  His analysis of the use of crime data is based on his overriding thesis that control of society is being centralised by the institutions of crime management which were based on the free market, socially conservative politics which dominated both America and Britain in the 1970s-1990s. .  As Garland admits there are implicit dangers in the generalisations of dealing with crime in America and Britain over a thirty year span.  However, by viewing the changes in society from an academic perspective, the view is proposed that both America and Britain, in different ways have sought to control crime by adapting the institutions of control.  Garland also points out that the American model is still heavily skewed by race, with 6 to 10 times more black people being executed compared with other nations – not just within the American jurisdiction.  
Baldwin and Kinsey (1982) wrote their seminal work, ‘Police Power and Politics’ in the midst of the police introduction of computer systems.  Kinsey in fact visited the Scottish police force (Lothian and Borders Police) featured in this study during their feasibility, operational requirement and procurement phases.  His views were astringent, to the effect that free text searching of large data sources, was wasteful of computer resources and only structured data sets should be used for police systems. Kinsey expressed considerable concerns regarding the costs of the new free text system and the fact that there were no controls over the police use of such data.  He further commented that the answers to free text multiple question computer searching was likely to infringe the liberty of the individual in that many spurious answers to questions could be given to unsophisticated police officers.  Their ensuing enquiries could be held to be infringement of their civil liberties and this in an age when the European Convention on Human Rights was not part of domestic law. The views which they expressed were  mirrored to some extent by the analysis of police management espoused some years later by Oliver and by Butler.  The human rights issues were indeed problematic for the police, as the free range enjoyed by the police in the keeping of particularly , intelligence information, required to be subjected in part to inspection by the subjects of the data.  This concept which is now enshrined in the Freedom of Information Act 2000, required the police to justify the keeping of information.  This in Scotland is particularly troublesome as the Scottish Parliament has decided (September 2006), not to record DNA samples which were obtained from persons who were not convicted in court.  This is in strict contradiction to the rest of the United Kingdom, where in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, DNA samples taken from suspects, are then retained on a central database.  Kinsey offers a detailed critique of the Lothian and Borders computer system from an academic’s viewpoint.  He was particularly concerned regarding the ability of officers to ‘browse’ files both in the crime record and the intelligence reports.  His view that officers would trawl the whole database for fragments of data relating to people who were not convicted, would open the force to adverse opinions when wrongful arrests were made.  Kinsey included in this analysis details from the force’s Computer Operational Requirement, the base document against which computer suppliers would fix their bids.  His objective was to show to a wider audience than the local police authority, just what information was being held by the police.  His comments were reported locally in the press and Kinsey was interviewed on national television – as was the police officer leading the computerisation project.  The result of these exchanges was for the police authority to approve further spending on the computer project, to include the first use of the major crime data system HOLMES in 1984.
In 1976 however, all these problems were very much in the future, and Baldwin and Kinsey certainly had an academic eye to the future and their prognostications  - 30 years on – have been at least in part, justified.  The police as a corporate entity effectively ignored these warnings and despite the representations which Kinsey made to Lothian and Borders Police Board to attempt to modify the computer procurement process for that force, the computer system was delivered almost as had been described in the Computer Assisted Policing Operational Requirement.  The use of computer based textual searching in 2006 is now commonplace and is hardly worth realistic comment.  The massive increase in memory and disc capacity to store the diagraphs required to support the free text system chosen by some of the police forces involved, was funded by police committees who were unable to question chief officers in sufficient technical detail. Indeed many of the chief constables were technically ignorant of the systems which were being proposed and acquiesced to the introduction of computers, as Kinsey states ‘in order to be seen to be doing something about the rise in recorded crime’. In 1978 the spend on Lothian and Borders Police computer project was about 10% of the force’s budget and thereafter reduced to 7% on an annual basis.  Kinsey’s comments are still valid – free text systems are expensive.  A more detailed analysis of free text systems is given in Chapter Seven. 
The final literature report considered in this thesis was completed by Jon Simmons (2000) – an English Home Office Civil Servant. The Simmons report on the state of crime recording in England and Wales is an excellent example of the attempts to implement direction and control over police statistics in that country. Simmons is a senior statistician in the Home Office England and has reported on crime recording on a number of occasions.  In his review of crime recording, he pleads for a standard approach to like circumstances and requests that senior police officers take a greater interest in the crime recording industry.  Further Simmons makes recommendations regarding the collection of crime statistics and exhorts chief officers of police to ensure strict adherence to the counting rules. Simmons also concedes however, that the Counting Rules are amended on a 4 yearly cycle to ensure that the government of the day’s policy on crime receives favourable attention in England and Wales.  The previous major review was completed by a committee chaired by Wilfred Perks - The Perks Report December 1967, The Home Office, London – following some 4.5 years of deliberations. Perks was an actuary, a statistician of international renown and produced papers on probability theory. However his cumbersome report on the collection of crime data, was especially from the view of the statistician – not the practitioner collecting the data.  His recommendations that chief constables be instructed to conform to the new counting rules were issued to the police forces – but according to the next review by Simmons, there was no apparent difference in the collection of crime data.   The Simmons Report commenced in November 1999 and a preliminary report followed some 7 months later. The report runs to 88 pages and includes some 66 recommendations.  The author Jon Simmons suggests that these recommendations be discussed and refined in the light of consultation over the ensuing months and years.  For the purposes of this thesis, Simmons has two main thrusts to his review – the reason for the collection of crime data and secondly suggestions as to how to improve the present system.  .

According to Simmons, in England and Wales the crime data collected from each force arrives in the Home Office in paper tables on a quarterly basis.  The report shows that the requirements of crime statistic data users are listed as key demands and are:
40% or respondents require more detailed information;
40% of respondents require greater context in analysis and data;
30% require greater timeliness;
20% greater local geographic detail.

This review shows that there is a demand for crime statistics which is not being met by the present paper based system.  Simmons goes on to show at paragraph 18 that most (not quantified) police forces use computers to record their incidents and crimes.  Simmons uses a simple research methodology to complete his study.  His review is pragmatic and uses a comparable analysis to give a before and after look at the use and availability of recorded crime.  The conclusions relating to statistical use are simple summations of  answers to questions which are posed to ‘officers in charge’ of criminal statistics production in each of the 43 English and Welsh police forces.  There is no further need for analysis – the answers reflect the apparent needs of the forces surveyed.
The real debate from Simmons viewpoint is the disparity between forces in recording like sets of circumstances – that is the definition of crime and the recording in a set of disparate police environments. Simmons admits that there is only the plea to chief and senior police officers to insist that their officers adhere to the counting rules but the admitted comment that police middle ranking officers are wary of the counting rules being changes to reflect political requirements – rather than their perception of real crime – whatever real crime means in policing circles.
2.10.1 The miscellany of papers, letters and manuscripts
This study centres on the computerisation of crime and intelligence recording in three police forces in Britain during the decade 1976-1986.  To verify the claims of the thesis, there has been  recourse to original papers, letters and manuscripts as follows;




Original papers in the Pamphlet Boxes of the City of Edinburgh library 

archives detailing the introduction of the ‘new police’ circa 1825
	
The original computer operational requirements, for the three police forces involved, Kent County Constabulary, Humberside Police and Lothian and Borders Police, along with correspondence between these forces and the computer suppliers involved.
Original papers and reports constructed by computer staff within the Home Office, London, England.
2.10.2 Academic considerations of manuscripts
This study in part rests on the interpretation of these documents. In particular, the minutes of meetings in which the three police forces and their chosen computer suppliers and separately the Home Office, all took part are the original paperwork.  The documents are private but have been loaned to the author in order to complete this study.  They will be available for some years after this study is completed and can be examined under Napier University Library, Edinburgh conditions.
Scott(1990) suggests that there are four criteria for testing the quality of these documents. 
Firstly, are they authentic?  Is there incontrovertible proof that the documents are actually what they purport to be? In the case of the library documentation, the papers are part of the French and Scots national archives and as far as is practicable, they have been catalogued by professional staff as the genuine record of happenings some 200 years ago. The documents are original as far as the computer projects are concerned– they  have been signed and initialled by officers of chief officer rank and senior civil servants. 
The second test is credibility. Are the documents free from error and distortion? The documents are error free – however the interpretation of some decisions is a mater of some subjectivity on the part of the author and these considerations have been highlighted in the Research Methodology chapter. 
Thirdly are the documents representative of their genre?  In terms of these files, they are the full record of the transactions from 1976-1986 and hence the representation is complete.  
The last of Scott’s criteria is meaning.  Is the evidence clear and comprehensive. The documentation for the computer projects is indeed clear.  The only ambiguity in this whole study is the translation of some of the early works in Bordeaux University.  The translation of some words and phrases could have more than one meaning.  For example, Napoleon Bonepart required the collection of crime data to establish is the population was ‘heureux’ year by year.  The translation could mean ‘happy’ ‘not discontent’ or ‘at peace’.
The veracity of the works presented in this section is based on the simple process of comparing the results of one document with the corresponding letter or memorandum which was sent in reply.  Minutes of meetings were verified at the subsequent meeting and any correction to the minute content were raised and noted at that second meeting. Lastly the translation of technical matters from Bordeaux University, was made by a Lecturer of English language, Mlle Magali Fleurot.





This background chapter has explored the nature of crime and criminal intelligence, without finding an all encompassing definition. Secondly, a full explanation of pre computerisation crime recording in Edinburgh has been offered with particular emphasis on the nature of decision making by detective officers as to the nature of the events adduced. Thirdly some of the genesis of crime recording has been assembled with particular emphasis on the French influence on civil administration from the early 19th century onwards. Lastly there are some brief comments on the nature of criminality.
All these points collectively have established the veracity of the opening claims of this chapter.




Chapter Three   Risk factors involved in the computer projects
This chapter continues with the background to the study and attempts to collate the risks attached to large scale computing in the police in 1970s. In detail the risks are presented from three perspectives, those of the Home Office, London, the three police forces involved but more particularly from the aspect of the computer supply industry.  Large scale computing had been available to local authorities for some years to handle batch systems such as local taxation collection and fixed penalty ticketing.(Shave 1975).  The chapter will conclude by recognising the high risk attached to these embryonic and far reaching attempts to move policing systems forward.

3.1.1 The Home Office Risk
The risk to the Home Office was immense.  The correspondence between chief police officers and the senior civil servants shows that although the Home Office was keen to initiate new work, the Home Office ‘could not be seen to encourage the spending of more money on the police’ (Home Office minutes 1976 of a meeting with the Chief Constable of Humberside). Thus there was the classic dilemma for the Home Office F7 Division.  To meet the aspirations of officers especially detectives to have a robust data collection and dissemination service at both a local and national level, there was a requirement to take some decisions which were both bold and untested.  The Police National Computer was working – working well but almost pedantically – an electronic filing cabinet (Kinsey 1984)- with little new thinking to assist the operational office.  The reflected glory of a national working system allowed the Home Office the kudos to initiate new work.  If this new work foundered, there could be a massive set back to the modernisation of the police service. The pressure from police forces for many aspects of computing was mounting.  The 1978-1980 working group on Approved Vocabulary (to be used in computer systems) was one part of the Home Office response to meet the perceived need.(F7 Division minutes 1978-)  The working group was formed to standardise the words to be used in all police systems – from the description of crimes and offences – to the description of marks and scars on accused people.
This response by the Home Office to a perceived problem shows that there was no thought to look at alternative solutions.  The alternatives included free text systems which were new, untried and high risk(Baldwin).  Thus some background on computing is apposite.
3.1.2 A high level review of computing circa 1976
The development of data base management in computing is well documented through works by Bertziss (1975), Harrison (1972) and Shave (1975) as well as many others. It is inappropriate in this study to chronicle the development of computing, the design of the computer chip and the writing of operating systems and functional programmes.  However, basic computing articles can be found in many works starting in the 1950s and extending to the present day.  The studies by the authors listed above specifically deal with the need to handle large sources of data.    In particular, work centre on the design of systems which would be of benefit to particular user groups. 
Large data sets had particular problems  - not of storage but of access. The filing of data was easy -  in sequential order – alphabetical lists and car numbers, but multi factor searches were a problem.  The programming ability was being sought – the golden egg of computing. (Shave).
 The American military had developed command and control systems based on hardware and software which would allow field commanders to keep control of their forces in battle situations.  These systems were then adapted to American police forces and gave management information to operational commanders of the work completed by their officers over specific time periods.  When Roy Jenkins became Home Secretary, as the most liberal of Labour ministers of his day (Brown 1998), he was determined to move the British police from the war time mentality into the equivalent of the American efficiency modelled systems.  Amongst the reforms which Jenkins introduced were unit beat policing, personal radios and particular to this thesis, computers.  The command and control experimental systems were introduced to Birmingham and Glasgow during the late 1960s and early 1970s(Baldwin and Kinsey 1982) and were able to affect some of the intransigence of the police hierarchy, to change of any kind.
Into this changing environment, the Police National Computer (PNC) was created by the Home Office in London and this served all the forces in Scotland, England and Wales and at that time the Royal Ulster Constabulary.  The system was rolled out in a progressive manner over some 4 years. The central control from Hendon, London, ensured data standards and effectively limited computer use to a register of names and addresses of keepers of vehicles; persons wanted; persons reported missing and a facility to send messages between police forces.  The computer hardware was supplied by Burroughs and Software Sciences created the searching programmes.  These programmes were simple minded table look-up systems based on Cobol and were batch updated. The batching system was created by each police force which wished to update a record, filling in a paper form and sending it to Hendon, London the base for the Police National Computer.  There operators would scrutinise the paper work for veracity and would send the data to the computer to be updated overnight.  This paper based system of updating the computer system could take three or four working days.  Similarly there were interactive search facilities on names and vehicle registrations.  The names were exact matching systems, McLauchlin not being the same as MacLaughlan and hence the vagaries of police officers’ name collection could prove to be fatal to a police enquiry. (PNC Operations Manual 1972-1976). 
This review of computing facilities would be incomplete without centring on the work which commenced in the Atomic Energy facility at Harwell England.  To meet the needs of all concerned with the massive regulatory requirements of operating a nuclear power station, including the actual operation as well as the legal and environmental facility, a computer free text searching programme was designed and implemented. (Nunn Price 1969,1974,1980,1981,2001).  The history of free text searching, which now seems trivial in post modern society, is fundamental to the implementation of police computing in the 1970s.  As listed above, Baldwin et al were fundamentally opposed to the introduction of free text ; whereas Nunn Price as a technician and later senior computer manager in England and Australia, actually designed the first operational free text system.  Within the free text system, there were facilities to use synonym chains so that the misspelling of surnames by operational officers could be accommodated, that is MacLauchlin could also mean McLaghlin. Similarly the conjunction of words which would be separated in normal Cobol based database systems, would allow for searching for events as ‘blue car with S in the registration mark’.  This was a significant development in police technology and allowed detective officers the ability to gather database information on a variety of words and phrases to assist with their enquiries.  Nunn Price and Kinsey both point out the significant overhead in developing such systems.  The use of Nunn Price’s programme – called STATUS- doubled the memory and disc capacity of computers- and hence significantly increase main frame costs.
 The concept of free text is the use of inverted file structures which allows for diagraphs to be stored and blocked at the second searching level – thus allowing for two letter or two number searching to be faster than whole word searching. (Nunn Price 1973)  A more detailed set of examples of free text searching is contained in Chapter 8.  This however was a new venture for police forces but especially for the computer companies.




3.2.1 Risk to three police forces
For the three police forces involved in this project, the risks were again large.  The need to ‘do something’ to avert a crisis in the public’s confidence of the police being able to handle large scale criminal enquiries, was paramount in many chief officers’ thinking  (Semi structured interviews 1976-1980).  The ‘something’ was difficult to define. Many chief officers saw the dangers in the new Data Protection legislation as being written to meet the needs of a government which was nearing the end of its political ambition – only to be replaced by the new government which took a different view of societal needs. (Thatcher 1993).  These incipient dangers included the restriction on record keeping which could be construed as speculative or unproven. Thus the venture of spending millions of pounds of hard won police budget on computers, which worked well in the United States (Manning 1977) but which were new and untested in the United Kingdom was problematic.  Those police forces which did accept the risk managed the concept in different ways.  Lothian and Borders Police appointed three police officers all with less than 10 years service – so that the consequences of their actions would be apparent for the rest of their 20 years service.  Kent County Constabulary appointed an economist graduate Superintendent as their officer in charge and Humberside Police recalled an officer from F7 Division of the Home Office to lead their team.
Hence the police service regarded the venture into computing in a variety of ways – but the scepticism from chief officers often overrode the operational necessity to provide quality information to their officers.  Those forces which decided that the risk was too great to allow police budgets to be ventured, were in the majority.  They were content to allow the trailblazers to take the risk of failure as well as the possibility of success.


3.3.1 Risk to the computer industry
The computer industry in the mid 1970s, was strongly based on American machines.  At that time IBM (International Business Machines) sold some 70% of all the computer hardware worldwide and their software research linked to Harvard University in the United States to produce leading edge database systems.                                 
(http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/history/year_1970.html) 
The rest of the industry trailed behind with Honeywell, Burroughs and McDonnell Douglas being the principle other American companies, and ICL (International Computers Ltd, in Great Britain and Bull Systemes in France being the other manufacturers of note.
Burroughs and Software Sciences – a British software house- had won the contract to supply the new Police National Computer for the Home Office which by 1974 was running well but pedantically.
The new systems which were being designed by police officers to record crime information were similar or analogous to those in the United States. The systems were new, designed in police headquarters across the country with little assistance from any advisory body and thus the development could be seen as haphazard. There were some 14 police forces in the initial stages of design and the computer industry was being requested to submit tenders to supply systems.
The risk was great.  If one force could beat the others to procurement of a new system, then there was the probability that other forces would be able to licence the software at preferential rates.  If the system was faulty and did not deliver the specified output, then all the other forces would effectively eschew that company. The 3 or 4 year investment by a software team, along with hardware specialists and communications technicians by any of the companies listed above, would have meant an outlay of nearly £1 million. (Honeywell estimate 1978).
These concerns would affect any commercial supplier in any other field of enterprise in the police market. However, the high level profile of the police and the perceived benefits of computerisation, placed these matters on a political and newsworthy platform from which there was little room to fail. 
















3.4 Conclusion from Chapters One ,Two and Three
The history of policing is well covered in a variety of texts – each giving their own interpretation of the role and function of the police.  The place of police in post modern society is also well covered although the history of police technology is sketchy and no firm conclusions can be drawn from Ackroyd’s work. Definitions of crime, the philosophy of criminal action is also well covered by academic philosophers, criminologists and geographers.
Little has been written about the computerisation of police crime and intelligence  recording systems and according to Valentine, Oliver and Butler, the details are difficult to ascertain.  Most of the information available is supplied by the Canadian study by Haggerty and a review of the England and Wales crime recording system by Simmons.
What is apparent, therefore, is that there is no substantive academic research on the actuality of computerised crime recording.  Peripheral to all the leading criminologists, geographers and other academics, crime recording is often castigated as being unrealistic and meeting only the needs of the police.  The British Crime Surveys (Mayhew et al) give different views of the reality of crime in communities and therefore there are several views of what is actually happening in society as far as crime is concerned.  A discussion of what is ‘crime’ is also considered in this thesis without any firm conclusion.
This thesis is the first available academic study of the computerisation of crime recording and is new work.  The comments by Professor Harries from the University of Maryland, Baltimore, are particularly pungent is this context.  His views are that only those from the policing industry itself will have enough available research material  to make any meaningful contribution to this topic.  Criminologists often question police officers regarding the recording of crime but seldom do the criminologists reach really meaningful conclusions. 
The need ‘to do something’ was paramount in the minds of some chief officers of police who were willing to take the risk of being the first police force into this new and largely experimental field.  The Home Office were accepting the kudos of installing and commissioning the Police National Computer – linking all 55 police forces for the first time electronically – and for that effort the Home Office deserves praise. The computer industry saw the police service as a batch of  up to 55 business opportunities but the risk of failure was great.






Chapter Four Research Methodology
4.1.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out the methods used in the study. The methods are an amalgamation of three different techniques which have been used for many years in management research and combine under the philosophical banner of critical realism.  Critical Realism has been chosen as a method for this study as the concepts reflect the reality of the methods used in the early 1978 start of this project, which aimed to change the way in which police officers worked.  Thus this chapter falls into two parts, one which examines the methods used to complete the study and secondly an underpinning calculus of methods which are available to the academic researcher in pursuit of knowledge.  This second section, whilst theoretical in nature, is firmly based on the methods used by police officers in the 1970s to construct a model  which could be held to be examined at the most intensive level by finance directors within local government  as well as by Home Office officials involved in the provision of a safer Britain.
4.1.2 Background to the research
The study commenced in 1978 when Lothian and Borders Police set up a Computer Assisted Policing Project Team (Chief Constable’s Annual report 1979).  At that time there was a dual focus for the team.  Primarily the need to meet the management specification of delivering an operational computer system and secondly, researching the availability of similar or analogous computer systems along with some credo which could form the basis of the new system.  This second element of the work was the foundation on which this study is based. Considering post modern research methods in the year 2006, these early studies may seem simple minded and almost naive. However as will be shown, this research was thorough, documented assiduously, well analysed and was the crux of a computer system which lasted 17 years in a police operational environment. In most hierarchical management systems, (Oliver 2000) there was a need to ensure that thorough research was undertaken as public money was being spent, and chief police officers required the Computer Assisted Policing team to examine all available options and present alternatives to meet the perceived requirements of a police force of 3,400 officers and support staff.  (Lothian and Borders Police Feasibility Study 1978) This aspect of the work undertaken during these early years was well documented – all conversations, meetings and even telephone calls were noted – forming a paper trail of some complexity and cross referencing – but allowing this present study to claim an ethical standpoint for the research.
The overall theoretical base for the research was one of contemplative scepticism – listening to the many voices offering the golden egg of police data capture – but being able to look beneath the surface  - the transphenomenology quoted by Bhaskar.  This theoretical stance was essential to the formation of any practical work – the semi structured questionnaires – in which very senior police officers would be questioned by junior staff regarding their force’s preparedness for the future.

Moving now to consider the present work, the use of modern techniques in both qualitative and quantitative studies is examined later and analysed so that the study will show that there are considerable academic differences in the ability to combine more than one research method in one study.  Different paradigms require different sets of study types (Bryman 1988) and thus there can be differences in the interpretation of outcomes.  The academic material covering this area is immense – being a research field in its own right and producing a series of claim and counterclaim as to what can be rightfully nominated as the correct method.
This chapter will examine the following four principal topics which will show a sound research method;

	the overall approach to this study
	the different methods used during this study in 
Phase I 	– the interview stage 
Phase II	- the literature review
Phase III	- the data collection and
Phase IV	-the analysis of the study.
	the ethical issues in the study 
	limitations of the study methods


4.2.1 The overall approach to the study
  By highlighting the paucity of available techniques in the mid 1970s to embryonic police studies, this thesis will contend that the mix of techniques used is robust, rigorous and competent to provide thoughtful analysis. The author of this present study, a serving police officer, with a first degree in pure science from Edinburgh University, had an academic background which included courses in the history and philosophy of science – delivered by the late Professor Eric Gray Forbes.  This background allowed the police in Edinburgh to have a measured approach to its research work and based that research on openness and accountability.
There are many philosophical views on research especially into the social sciences and some of these rest on the 19th century physical science success in describing and catalogueing the world.    The examination of the physical sciences, with its attendant focus on observation, categorisation and recording, gave rise to the apparent need for the social sciences to follow such endeavours.  Durkheim(1891), in his treatise on the sociological method, gave credence to the observation theory which many scientists espoused.  The difficulty in sociological science is that phenomena do not remain constant – as human behaviour is variable.
In essence, Popper (1973) addressed justification and the ability of the researcher to  provide a framework of trustworthiness and authenticity as follows.  Within qualitative research, the criteria of trustworthiness can be seen to have four elements viz;
Credibility – the essence of research based on good practice and submitting the research for scrutiny to a peer group;
Transferability – are the findings transferable to other situations by being categorised as thick descriptions ie rich accounts of a social exercise?
Dependability – the research base should be securely fixed in an auditable resource with complete records of interviews, meetings and reports.
Confirmability – there has been no overt attempt by the researcher to impose his or her own values on the study.
The test for authenticity, the second of Bryman and Bell’s (2003) framework criteria, rests on more ephemeral matters;
	Fairness – has the researcher fairly represent all views in the study
	Ontological authenticity – is there evidence in the study that some new knowledge has been adduced?
	Educative authenticity – does the research assist others with a better understanding of the subject under review? (after Bryman and Bell 2003)
These matters have been applied to this study which is both an historical chronicle of policing efforts along with a modern analytical review of that work from a management perspective.  That sociological factors seem to be ever present, should not detract from the principle aims of the study – that of analysing the effects of early computerisation in police work and its long term legacy.
To ensure that these and the four main objectives are achieved, a management based legal and social base for the study has been constructed, resting partly on the author’s day to day involvement with police computing over an eight year period, from police sergeant to police chief inspector, the first of the police command ranks. Can fairness, ontological authenticity and educative authenticity be tested by this study? 
These tests for what can be described as verisimilitude, all rest on the author’s capacity to bring to the study knowledge – fairly gained and authenticated, analysis – correctly assembled and argued without bias and lastly endeavour – the 99% of perspiration which allows for the 1% of inspiration to be recorded in this study. Hence this chapter will summarise the available techniques in qualitative studies and will show that the study has been completed according to Bryman and Bell’s criteria.

4.3.1 Different Methods used in this study
This study is a practice base piece of work which follows a historical progression of crime and intelligence recording to almost the present day.  By reflecting on work which was started 30 years ago and is not yet fully completed in the police forces of England and Wales and Scotland, the study will be centred on a number of complementary research methods.  These methods are
Recorded interviews against two questionnaires
Literature review
A form of case study investigation of the implementation of the new computer systems
From an brief analysis of research methods, it would appear that this thesis is unusual in attempting to create a theoretical base which rests on three different research paradigms. Hence the data collection systems which were used throughout the study, were firmly anchored in sound theory – and the combination of three paradigms allowed a realistic approach to the thesis.

4.3.2 PHASE 1 The Interview Stage
Interviews with police officers and other officials
This study used semi structured interviews with chief officers of police, following a set questionnaire. (Appendix One). 
Questionnaires are used in many aspects of social research (Belson 1981,Hughes and Sharrock 2006, Foddy 1994, Atkinson1971). However, in the philosophy of social science, the training given to aspiring scientists, is the mastering of techniques in questionnaires, statistics, computer modelling and other mathematical systems. The analysis and interpretation of results seem to be of little consequence when compared to the effort in obtaining the data. Indeed Foddy  in a 13 chapter book on constructing questions and conducting interviews, gives only 4 pages to interpret the results of interviews. Atkinson in earlier work, based on the national office of Population Censuses and Surveys, also explains in detail the questions to be set to interviewees, the responses and the recording of the replies.  Again very little time is spent on the analysis of the material collected.  Both these works were written pre-computer based qualitative programmes were available and hence some latitude should be made for these omissions. Bryman (2001) and Bryman and Bell (2003) both explain the need for proper analysis of the findings of social research.  Their work is instructive, allows for natural flow of learning for undergraduates and post graduates, and gives examples of how work should be completed and analysed.  From a different discipline, Swanson and Holwood III (1999) explain the processes of measuring results within organisations – especially those matters within the human resource management field.  In many disciplines, this concept of measuring results is given little credence, as the emphasis seem to be on the structure of the work.  Swanson and Holwood III explain the requirement in most fields of change management, whether it be in human resource management, manufacturing industry or elsewhere, that there is a clear and well establish base from which to start the work in progress.  That ability to have a clear starting point is in tune with Garland’s work on crime statistics – which is neatly paraphrased by Garland as ‘we know where we started, we should know where we finished.’  Secondly in each organisation undergoing some form of change, then ‘an environment of results’ should be established by management to allow for changes to be measured.  If these principles were to have any credence in the three case studies which form the base for this thesis, then there should have been a statement of the present state in each of the police forces involved.  As will be shown in the following chapters, there was a Feasibility Study completed in each of the forces which formed the starting point for their computerisation efforts. The difficulty in each police force was measuring the outcomes.
To establish whether there was any possibility of collaborative working with other police forces, Lothian and Borders chief officers instructed the Computer Project Team to seek out other forces with embryonic computer projects, as well as other forces which may have wanted to start some form of computerisation.  The police forces visited are listed in Appendix  Two 
The questionnaire was constructed to elicit information in the following areas;
What benefit will the computer bring to the force in terms of operational efficiency
Is the police authority in favour of the acquisition of a computer system
	What cost is there attributed to the computer project
What professional computer or management assistance have the chief officers sought 
Is the project team circumscribed in terms of seeking solutions in other areas of the United Kingdom or in overseas countries.
These questions were set to establish the strategic programme which the chief officers sought from the projected computerised systems. In terms of theoretical background, open questions, applicable to the area of expertise of each subject, were chosen.  It is important to put the interviews into some theoretical context.  
‘If men define a situation as real then it is real in its consequences’(Merton 1973)
Researchers take as axiomatic the principle that the behaviour exhibited by  actors in any social situation depends upon the way they have defined that situation (Foddy 1994).  Hence it is clear that the respondents should be able to understand the questions and the answer should be understood by the interviewer . 
The difficulty in this situation was quite simple – the interviewer was a police sergeant, from a competitive police force, seeking explanations which the respondent might see as compromising his own force activity.  Thus there was a tension between the ranks – normally an assistant chief constable representing the host force and the inquisitor sergeant – from a scientific academic background.  Often however, the chief officer would seek guidance from the interviewer – either as a means of delaying the answer to the question or genuinely seeking alternative views to his own.  This then would colour the answer and erect an epistemological bias in the set of  data collected from that force.






An interviewer - respondent model of comprehension

                           IInterviewerEncodes question taking into accountOwn purposes/presumption/knowledgeAnd perceptions of the respondents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Own presumptions about the interviewer and the interviewers knowledge and assumptions                  




The theory here is that the respondent takes a set of meanings from the questions which may or may not be the meanings which the interviewer actually meant.  This coding and decoding of messages is based on Blumer(1967) and some years before Blumer, Mead’s ideas, of symbolic interactionist theory. The following are the basic tenets of Blumer’s theory;
1.	Human beings interpret and define each other’s actions.  They do not merely react to each other in a simple ‘stimulus-response’ fashion. Responses are not made to acts but rather to interpreted acts that is the meaning that social actors ascribe to one another’s acts.
2.	 Human beings can be the objects of their own attention. Thus actors can blame themselves, take pride in themselves and become the centre of their attention.  This then poses problems for the interviewer – to see beyond the façade which can be erected by an actor in these circumstances.
3.	Conscious social behaviour is intentional behaviour as human beings construct and rehearse scenarios in their imagination before choosing how to act in different circumstances.
4.	Interpreting, planning and acting are ongoing processes which begin anew at every stage of a social interaction.  This facet of behaviour includes that each actor takes into account the views of the interviewer when constructing or interpreting lines of actions.  This requires the interviewer to be aware of framing questions carefully, in order not to influence the response.
5.	The human brain is reflexive, in part,  and includes the actor ‘taking the role’ of the interviewer – in an effort to determine the interviewers true intention. 
6.	Lastly Blumer takes pain to stress that these processes occur in new and in old and well established interactions. 
These facets of social interaction can now be added to the lexicon of material relevant to the interviews which were completed some 30 years ago.  The inherent dangers were two fold – that of showing another police force that a competitor force was ahead in terms of computer implementation or that the force being visited was bereft of ideas, leadership and guidance in this emerging field. When these interviews were undertaken, there was little substantial guidance for non academic interviewers.  The question formation, was thought at that time to be sufficient to establish a set of responses which would assist the enquiring police force to meet its objectives. The questions were open (Foddy 1994) with all the inherent dangers of open questions being ill received by the rank differential. Secondly, the questions were set to define the topics clearly, in simple non technical English.  The next theme was to further the aims of the Lothian and Borders Police chief officers who saw merit in either some form of collaboration with another force, or the simple plagarisation of ideas. Lastly, the author of this thesis was part of the interviewing team and had been asked by his own chief officers to chronicle the results of the visits to other forces.
 To establish a base for the interviews some structure was required from academia. The academic resources were limited and much depended by the project team on the interpretation of Weiss (1972) and her ideas on evaluation research.  Weiss had structured some plans and ideas into a small text which founded the whole interview and evaluation techniques for the Lothian and Borders officers.  Essentially  Weiss set out the initial criteria
	Formulate the goals
	What yardsticks are to be used?
	What specification of the programme is available?.
In 1976 when these interviews were first considered by the Lothian and Borders 

Police Computer Assisted Policing Project Team, there was only one methodology 

available to interpret the results.  That methodology was to read and analyse the interview notes in order to build some values into a skeletal framework.  The framework itself was constructed from the first few interviews and the crucial questions of ‘ what can computers achieve for the police?’ and ‘have you consulted any other force in order to achieve a beneficial outcome?’.  There was little in the way of interpretive manual systems to assist with the answers to the questions and hence the police officers involved required to make value judgements from the empirical work.  Regarded from the distance of some 30 years  this methodological analysis seems to be amateurish and biased.  It does not invalidate this part of the study however, as the results of this analysis were used by the Lothian and Borders Team to complete a successful implementation of a computerised crime recording system.  Whether the result of the implementation was due to the analysis or to other factors which will be highlighted later in this study, remains an open question, but there was a definite benefit to the team in terms of confidence, knowledge and impetus gained from the manual analysis.
4.3.3 New analytical tools.
The following paragraphs are merely descriptive to include modern techniques which could be used if this study were to be started in 2008.  
The development of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software started in the early 1980s and was driven by the need of researchers to emulate the progress in quantitative analysis.  Quantitative analysis had enjoyed the strong statistical basis which computing brought to academia and there was a perceived requirement to seek new methods to authenticate qualitative data. (Buston 1997)  There are many programs available (2006) for the qualitative researcher and the most recent are based on ‘Windows type’ software models. Produced by software companies to meet the demands of the research industry ‘NUD*IST’ and more recently ‘NVivo 7’ are the latest rollout programs to assist the researcher.  The debate as to whether to use computers to assist in the analysis of qualitative data seems to have concluded with a clear affirmation that without computers much analytical work would be impossible.(Richards and Richards 1994).  The research methodology in computer packages does however constrain the researcher in some way.  The crux of each of the packages seems to rest on the ability of the researcher to find ‘nodes’ and ‘sets’, ‘models’, ‘links’ and ‘classifications’ before the data is collected.  Thus constrained, the researcher enters the data collected – interview results, sound recordings to analyse inflections or other aspects of speech, text segments, memoranda and  any other data which the project has specified.  The ability of the system to deal with such data rest on three main attributes;
	the introduction of the data; 
	the data indexing and
	data retrieval in categorised form.
The introduction of the data can be from any other compatible electronic source such as Word documents containing the texts of interviews or any other word processing package.  Three decisions regarding the format of the interview transcriptions require to be made – the size of the textual units – the content of the header and the use and format of the sub headers.  These are artificial constraints imposed by the software authors, so that the software will be able to achieve its most important function – that of retrieval of indexed information.  Buston’s analysis of the NUD*IST package (Non-numerical, Unstructured, Data; Indexing, Searching and Theorising ) comments repeatedly on the need for the researcher to structure the data headings from two sources – the literature review which should pre-empt any data collection and secondly  the first pass at a manual analysis of the data to form headings and nodes. Buston’s own research was conducted using the NUD*IST package to analyse the answers to questions presented to children with chronic illnesses regarding their treatment and their medicines.  Katie Buston is frank with her admissions in paragraph 13 of her report on the use of NUD*IST in her research.  She concludes that the tool is not neutral to the research methodology, and as with any new technology she concedes that the nature of the work changes.  The changes are hidden in the programs of word processing packages, statistical packages and graphics packages.  These software packages and their descendants, require categorisation of subject matter.  Whilst this is understandable in any research – the structuring of data – as defined in other academic works regarding scientific classification – there is a real danger that the classification may lead to defining units of texts and a too fine analysis of the data. (Lee and Fielding 1991).  The balance of required in utilising packages such as  NUD*IST and Nvivo 7, is that the packages requires nothing – but invites a lot (Richards and Richards1994).  Thus the researcher must be aware exactly of what the package can achieve and should not be seduced into using packages for interpretation unless there is a clear understanding of the manual processes which could be used to define the data.  Lastly the balance must also show that there will be significant time savings in using a package rather than having to manually store, sort and cross reference interview data.  Policing utilised such a sort and retrieve package following the public outcry into the ‘Yorkshire Ripper Murders’ in the late 1979s (Bland 1984).  At that time the Home Office in London, set up a small team of computer scientists and experienced detective officers with first hand knowledge of murder administration, and produce a computer based system called HO(L)MES (Home Office (Large) Major Enquiry System) (Home Office PRSU Minutes 1985).  The system was designed to accept textual information, crucially structured to meet the Senior Investigating Officers’ requirements – as to loci, descriptions of suspects, descriptions of witnesses, vehicles involved, articles involved (weapons) and other categories.
These attributes allowed the police to structure data, and in light of the Ripper Enquiries, to cross reference and then retrieve linked information across a number of networked computer terminals.  The first system in Scotland was commissioned in Edinburgh for the Lothian and Borders Police in May 1984 and was used firstly for a large scale fraud. (Chief Constable’s Annual Report 1985).

SSADM
 Additionally the development of Structured Systems Analysis and Design Method (SSADM) in the early 1980s’ was just too late for the emergent computer projects within the police forces.  SSADM was produced by the Central Computer and Technology Agency – a branch of Home Office, London, to meet the burgeoning computer applications which the Home Office required to control.  SSADM in its first iteration was a paper based system of project management and allowed system designers the ability to see possible problems in the design of complex systems.  Further development allowed SSADM to be computer based and new operating systems have been tailored to incorporate this process within ‘easy to use’ systems.
It is appropriate therefore to explain the similarities between the SSADM criteria and those used by the three police forces in their attempts to procure new computer systems.
SSADM was produced as an attempt to establish a rational approach to the burgeoning number of computer procurement exercises being undertaken by police, fire and other Home Office agencies.
SSADM Defined
SSADM (Structured Systems Analysis and Design Methodology) is a methodology used in the analysis and design stages of systems development. SSADM does not cover issues of the construction, testing and implementation of software.
"SSADM has been used by the government in computing since its launch in 1981. It was commissioned by the CCTA (Central Computing and Telecommunications Agency) in a bid to standardise the many and varied IT projects being developed across government departments. The CCTA investigated a number of approaches before accepting a tender from Learmonth & Burchett Management Systems to develop a method." (Eva, SSADM Version 4 - A Users Guide)
Since 1981 SSADM has been further refined and version 4 was launched in 1990. SSADM is an open standard, i.e. it is freely available for use in industry and many companies offer support, training and Case tools for it.


The Use of SSADM 
Within government departments SSADM has to be used. External contractors producing software for the government also have to use SSADM. SSADM is used by other companies because they expect the use of a disciplined ‘engineering approach will eventually improve the quality of the systems they produce. Many companies have been willing to incur the considerable expense of implementing SSADM (e.g. staff training) with this expectation in mind.


The Control of SSADM in the UK
SSADM is managed by the CCTA, however the Design Authority Board (DAB) is responsible for maintaining and developing SSADM and the NCC (National Computing Centre) produce and maintain the definitive SSADM documentation.
The Major Tools of SSADM
SSADM revolves around the use of three key techniques, namely Logical Data Modelling, Data Flow Modelling and Entity/Event Modelling.
	 Logical Data Modelling; This is the process of identifying, modelling and documenting the data requirements of a business information system. A Logical Data Model consists of a Logical Data Structure (LDS - The SSADM terminology for an Entity-Relationship Model) and the associated documentation. LDS s represent Entities (things about which a business needs to record information) and Relationships (necessary associations between entities). 
	 Data Flow Modelling; This is the process of identifying, modelling and documenting how data flows around a business information system. A Data Flow Model consists of a set of integrated Data Flow Diagrams supported by appropriate documentation. DFDs represent processes (activities which transform data from one form to another), data stores (holding areas for data), external entities (things which send data into a system or receive data from a system and finally data flows (routes by which data can flow). 
	 Entity Event Modelling; This is the process of identifying, modelling and documenting the business events which affect each entity and the sequence in which these events occur. An Entity/Event Model consists of a set of Entity Life Histories (one for each entity) and appropriate supporting documentation. 
The success of SSADM may lie in the fact that it does not rely on a single technique. Each of the three system models provides a different viewpoint of the same system, each of which are required to form a complete model of the system. Within SSADM each of the three techniques are cross reference against each other to ensure the completeness and accuracy of the complete model. 
 SSADM Structure
SSADM consists of 5 main modules, which are in turn broken down into a complex hierarchy of stages, steps and tasks. These are explained below;
 Feasibility Study; the feasibility study consists of a single stage, which involves conducting a high level analysis of a business area to determine whether a system can cost effectively support the business requirements. In the first stage an overview DFD is produced together with a high level LDS. At this stage the DFD will represent the existing system warts and all and the LDS may be incomplete and contain unresolved M:M relationships
(DFD Data Flow Diagrams;  LDS Logical Data Structure)
Requirements Analysis; Module 2 requirements analysis consists of 2 stages; Stage 1 Investigation of Current Environment and Stage 2 Business System Options (BSO). During stage 1 the systems requirements are identified and the current business environment is modelled in terms of the processes carried out and the data structures involved. During stage 1 DFDs and an LDS are used to produce detailed logical models of the current system During stage 2 up to 6 business system options are produced and presented. As a result one of these options (or indeed a hybrid solution) is adopted and refined. During stage 2 DFDs and LDS are produced to support each business system option and the final chosen option. The transition from stage 1 to stage 2 is a key part of SSADM, this is where we move from a logical model of the current system to a logical model of the required system, i.e. this is where the DFDs and LDS have to be refined to cater new/changed requirements. 
Requirements Specification; Requirements Specification consists of a single stage which involves further developing the work carried out in module 2, detailed functional and non-functional requirements are identified and new techniques are introduced to define the required processing and data structures. In stage 3 the DFDs and LDS are refined and cross validated in the light of the chosen business system option. The LDS is enhanced using relational data analysis (normalisation). The DFDs and LDS are validated against the ELHs (Entity Life History) also produced during this stage. DFDs LDS and ELHs are used as input to the subsequent stages of SSADM. 
Logical System Specification; Module 4 Logical System Specification consists of 2 stages; Stage 4 Technical System Options and Stage 5 Logical Design. In stage 4 up to 6 technical options (specifying the development and implementation environments) are produced, one being selected. In stage 5 the logical design of update and enquiry processing and system dialogues (menus etc.) is carried out. 
Physical Design; Module 5 Physical Design consists of a single stage  in which the logical system specification and technical system specification are used to create a physical database design and a set of program specifications.
(A more detailed description of the structure of SSADM can be found in ‘SSADM Version 4 Models & Methods chapter 12 and SSADM Version 4 A Users Guide chapters 1 - 7. (description of SSADM after Bentley and Rudman(1995)
It should be noted that SSADM in its first iteration did not provide an adequate envelope of testing structures for software or implementation for new systems.  


4.3.4 The policing approach to systems management circa 1978
The three police forces involved in this study had constructed teams of police officers and systems analysts to procure the systems.  In each of the police forces involved at least one of the officers had completed the Special Course in England or the Accelerated Promotion Course in Scotland – each course being a full time one year strategic management course.  In Scotland two of the officers completed this course and were admitted to the British Institute of Management as members.  Hence there was a background of systems appreciation – although computer procurement was in its infancy in both local and central government.
Each of the three police forces involved wrote a Feasibility Study.  This study was a review of the systems which were paper based in the police force concerned and highlighted the problems inherent in these systems.  The problems were three fold; the workload was increasing as events reported to the police increased in volume; the number of staff required to maintain paper records was increasing in the attempt to keep pace with the volume and the requirement by central government to establish ‘performance criteria’ (Efficiency and Effectiveness Home Office Circulars 1974-1986); and lastly the internal pressure on paper systems to meet the needs of operational officers, with data often being misfiled and irretrievable.
Thus the first stage of the SSADM model had been established by the police forces involved.
The second stage of SSADM involves the preparation of an outline requirement for the new system.  For the police forces involved this was an opportunity for some ‘blue sky thinking’ -  that 10% of an organisations time which should be appropriated by the analysts looking to the future and new and better ways of completing the tasks.
( Duffy 1986).  Each police force produced a comprehensive document the Operational Requirement which having been seen by the local authority computer staff and the appropriate police local authority elected members, was sent to a long list of computer suppliers.  This document was essentially a ‘shopping list’ of requirements which the computer industry was requested to address.
The logical system specification and system design documents in SSADM terms were addressed by the police forces in the production of a Detailed Operational Requirement.  As explained later in this study, each screenful of information required to be minutely detailed, almost on a pixel by pixel level.  This requirement was to meet the needs of another CCTA document – the 200 page Computer Contract – which detailed all data structures and data levels.
Hence it can be argued that the police forces were at least compliant with the new standards which were being produced by central government and which over the years have been augmented by PRINCE and PRINCE2.
 PRINCE and PRINCE2 are computer based systems which incorporate all the design requirements of SSADM but also allow for the control of the project.  The control element of the system allows for individual tasks to be designed and allocated to a team member with projected end dates and risk criteria attached. These systems require either paper systems of some complexity in their cross referencing or well maintained computer files to the same end. The higher level analysis of a PRINCE project would permit the strategic view of senior managers to estimate costs, completion dates and likelihood of completion to fixed predetermined criteria.  PRINCE was developed again by the Home Office in London from the PROMPT system of project control which had been developed by Simpact Systems Ltd in 1975.  PROMPT was issued by the Home Office to various police forces in 1979 and the initial response was that it was too complex for the introduction of computer systems on a force by force basis. (Lothian and Borders Police Feasibility Study 1978).  PRINCE was eventually established as the prime system for Home Office based projects in 1985. (Home Office Circular)
 Lothian and Borders Police, in their own system design, used Critical Path Analysis, and this system allowed for the input of results from the interviews. Critical Path Analysis is more simple minded that either of the systems and is based on the following simple model;
	Sets out all the individual activities that make up a larger project. 
	Shows the order in which activities have to be undertaken. 
	Shows which activities can only taken place once other activities have been completed. 
	Shows which activities can be undertaken simultaneously, thereby reducing the overall time taken to complete the whole project. 
	Shows when certain resources will be needed. 
Along with Gantt charts which illustrated a pictorial message of progress, the Lothian and Borders system was brought to fruition on time and cost using this system of project management.






4.3.5 Lothian and Borders Police Semi Structured Interviews 1976-1978

The goals were simple and rigorous – to ascertain the state of preparedness of other police forces to accept computerisation.  If this could be achieved then a pragmatic route could be offered  to  chief officers to collaborate with Lothian and Borders Police  at a strategic level to share costs, implementation and thereafter crime data. Further interviews with local and central government officers sought to either substantiate or repudiate the claims from chief police officers that the crime data the police collected was valid, complete and unbiased and that computerisation would bring real benefits to the police forces and by extrapolation to society at large.  Lastly interviews with chief officials of other non governmental organisations sought to establish whether or not the enquiries made by their staff were of events which could be classified as criminal. These were informal triangulated interviews across a range of organisations from environmental agencies, through animal and children charities to local government organisations.
Personal interviews were held in August 1988, when the author was attached to the Home Office Police Scientific Branch as a Police Superintendent.  The interviews were with
-  	the Under Secretary of State and Head of Police Scientific Research, Horseferry Road, London; 
-  	a retired Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police and senior police officer in the Police Requirements Support Unit – who was latterly replaced by
-  	a former Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police and thereafter Chief Constable of a mid England Constabulary;
-	Superintendent, Metropolitan Police, more recently Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police;
-	
The second comprehensive set of interviews was conducted in 1989 when chief officers of all 53 police forces in the United Kingdom were interviewed as part of the proposed introduction of a major incident communications system.(COMTEST 1990).  These interviews were held over an 18 month period with Assistant Chief Constables from all 53 police forces in the United Kingdom.  During the interviews which again were semi structured, the enquiring officer often having to answer many questions from the interviewee, nearly all the responses (90%) were to confirm that computers would bring some benefits to operational policing, if and only if, there was Home Office involvement in the design of the system and some cash available.
4.4.1 Phase 2         Literature Review
Firstly the literature review will highlight the lack of academic work in this narrow field.  As claimed by Professor Harries, the minutiae of crime recording is very often in the hands of police practitioners and few of them have committed their history to paper.  
The few academics who have written on this subject Ackroyd, Garland and Haggerty, as well as Baldwin and Kinsey, all approach the study from different perspectives and a critique of their work is given above.
The key academic themes from the works available, show that there are real problems in assembling accurate and comprehensive crime data.  Firstly the sources from key works display an intransigence for the police generally to open their doors to serious research.  Secondly the police at times tend to under record crime to massage the reported incidences.  There is evidence to show that police forces often target those crimes which are easily solved viz shoplifting and drugs possession – as each crime reported is solved and hence the percentage figures are increased.  However, academics cannot be dispassionate about their own efforts.  There is a reluctance by some writers to view from a distance and only a few actually present to the operational police environment.
These views were assembled from a review of crime related matters from journals, books and articles – covering criminology, criminal law, geography and management.
The searches for information included research in police forces with the permissions of the chief constables at the time; from academic libraries, from the internet and from a reading of original manuscripts in the Edinburgh public Library and the University of Bordeaux.


4.5.1 PHASE 3	Case Studies
The nexus of the study is three separate but linked case studies of police forces attempting to procure computer systems to handle crime recording and intelligence recording data.  The study is based on the original minutes of the forces concerned, the minutes of the Home Office Police Department (F7 and F11 Divisions) along with the three police forces’ feasibility studies and their computer operational requirements.  The detail of this work  is based on case study theory, using the results from one case to be a model against which outcomes from other cases can be compared.  However, because of the variety of changeable characteristics within each case, only broad principles of management theory were found to be tested.   
  In attempting to form an overall theory of research into policing phenomena, five principal features are required;
i)	differences of principle – social research produces answers which assist understanding – policing research produces answers which assist action
ii)	contingent differences – factual occurrences within the two contrasted regimes which differentiate one from another
iii)	the role of explanation and cause – those features sitting within the policing arena more than the social area
iv)	the types of findings which the two areas of research determine
v)	the inescapable fact that policing is driven by political determinants.
(after Hakim (1982))
The concepts of   ‘action’ and ‘understanding’ in I) above seem to indicate that there is a great difference in the approaches to research in these fields.  The ‘understanding’ perspective attempts to establish whether there is a correlation between or amongst data sets;  the research however seeks to quantify any data sets and to reconcile differences to an all encompassing theory.  The persuasive view that Hakim fails to elucidate sufficiently is the last point, that is, that the vast majority of police research is government centred.  This brings with it a set of questions regarding the independence of research – if the government is the main sponsor of policy research – then the ways in which the research is designed and analysed can distort the relationship between the government and citizens.  It could be postulated that the citizens do not need or want the policy to be researched or even the citizens do not understand the problem.  To contemplate basing research on one particular methodology in a multifaceted organisation such as the police, is to strictly limit the possibility of achieving a robust outcome.  

4.5.2 Case Study Theory – from the particular to the general?
Case studies have been used in academic and business study for many years. Bechhofer (2000),  Yin (1994) and many others.  The essence of case study theory, is to examine in detail a set of objects and collect the data within one particular gambit. Thereafter the analysis of the case should produce some elements worthy of either further study or perhaps extrapolation.(Easton 2002).  In Easton’s analysis, the outcome of the case study is the result of many analytical iterations each resulting in finer detail from the original data.  Easton is amongst many academics who structure case study work into five steps viz;
1)	understanding the situation.  This is a descriptive data set which allows the formation of  basic understanding of the area being researched.
2)	diagnosing problem areas.  Within the descriptive arena, there will inevitably be areas of conflict of data or new problems of incomplete data will be highlighted.  The initial diagnosis will allow these problems to be either resolved or a new set of data will be required.
3)	Generating new solutions.       This is the first of the creative steps and in itself can cause the researcher the problem of control.  As ideas are created there requires to be a ranking of the outcomes, so that some initial ideas can be discarded – otherwise the original problem is overcome with alternatives.
4)	Predicting outcomes		This is the first stage of evaluation, as those ideas from the first creative step, are tested for efficacy.  The results are again ranked according to predicted benefits to the original problem.  This step is frought with risk, as outcomes and predictions are seldom coterminous and hence there is the real problem of discarding an effective solution at an early stage.  Alternatively an unreal solution may be followed without due care and thus the whole research project is miscued.
5)	Evaluating Alternatives		This is a formal step requiring strict discipline and real mental ability.  The alternatives are ranked according to a pre determined scoring mechanism which will award points to those attributes which the researcher has deemed the closest to the solution being sought.  This is a strictly quantitative step and as each of the alternative solutions achieve the allotted 	
Case study analysis is frought with danger in attempting to extrapolate from one set of circumstances to others.  Case studies can produce wide ranging holistic descriptions of a single gambit, but they are at best suggestive of causality rather than definitive.  This study will use three case studies to enlarge upon the possibility of some verisimilitude being achieved from the data sets which the descriptive collection has produced.  However, the study cannot attempt to show all the factors being held stationary during the 10 years of the research period.  The changes in personnel, the changes in computer companies, the changes in computer technology will all bring their own attritional edge to the analysis.  Yin(1994) in his excellent discourse on case study theory reiterates the view that case studies have been seen in the past as imperfect research methods.  The inability of the research to control events, as can be found in empirical laboratory experiments, allows the case study model to be seen as a ‘lesser partner’ in research.  However, Yin also states that case studies have an important and often undervalued contribution to make to certain research projects.  The simple example of the five questions to be asked in any case study are;
 ‘why’, ‘when’, ’who’, ‘how and ‘what’
If these questions are adequately posed, answered and analysed, then the case study can contribute to the mix of methods used in any research project.  To set these five questions into a evidence based project, then a set of six different sources of evidence is required. These sources are documentation, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, archival records and physical artefacts.  This study of the procurement of computers in the police, covers all these sources as follows;
Documentation – the records of the computer assisted policing operational requirements from three police forces have been studied;
Interviews – interviews have been concluded with chief police officers, civil servant computer specialists, senior civil servants, senior staff from other agencies;
Direct Observations – the author of this thesis was part of the Lothian and Borders Police team which introduced a successful crime and intelligence recording computer system;
Participant observation – as the Author of the operational requirement for the crime recording system for Lothian and Borders Police, the author of this thesis can claim participant observation
Archival records – the study includes work from the archives of Bordeaux University, France regarding the start of crime recording and
Physical artefacts – the author of this study was appointed officer in charge of Computer Services Branch, Lothian and Borders Police in 1983.






















Case study projects  - strength and weaknesses
Sources of Evidence	Strengths	Weaknesses
Documentation	+stable -can be reviewed repeatedly+unobtrusive –not created as a result of the case study+exact – contains names references and details+broad coverage long time span	Retrievability –can be a problemBiased selectivity if collection is incompleteReporting bias – reflects the bias of the authorAccess may be deliberately blocked
Interviews	Targeted –focus on the topicInsightful- provides perceived causal inferences	Bias due to poorly constructed questionsResponse biasInaccuracies due to poor recallReflexivity interviewee gives the answer the interviewer wants
Direct Observation	Reality – covers events in real timeContextual – covers context of the event	Time consumingSelectivity – unless broad coverageReflexivity event may proceed differently because it is being observed
Participant Observation	Insight into interpersonal behaviour and motives	Bias due to investigator’s manipulation of events
Archival Records	Precise and quantitative	Accessibility due to privacy concerns
Physical Artifacts	Insight into cultural featuresInsight into technical operations	Selectivityavailability

 (After Yin 1994)




4.6.1 Phase Four  The analysis of the Study
This section outlines the methods used to analyse the research.  The analysis is a mixture of using academic tools (Weiss) and methods which are more open to conjecture.
Primarily the research set out to establish the state of each of the police forces with respect to computer projects in 1978.  This was by means of collecting data from the relevant Home Office Department  (F7 division of Police research Division) as to which forces were active in the field, and which forces were considering computerisation.  This was a manual task and lists were formed – these lists form the basis of Appendices Two and Three.
The second stage was to interview the relevant chief officers of police and to form some sort of model from the answers.  This again was a manual task, using the concept of mind maps – a pictorial interpretation of thinking patterns shown on blackboards.  This method was surprisingly effective showing clear patterns of what was required of computers for each force and how the perceived solutions could be achieved.
(All these interviews were recorded and the analysis lay dormant for some years as the author took seriously ill and the research project, firstly registered in Leicester University Scarman Centre, was relegated to a background task.  When the author regained health, his professional career took him to Command level and the research was still dormant until his retirement from the police and his employment at Napier University Edinburgh.)
When this present project started in 1999, the computer systems were working well in all three forces under consideration.  The analysis of the case studies was again manual.  However on this occasion, as an actor involved in the creation of one of the case studies, the author was able to converse with other practitioners in the field to validate the emergent findings.  These conversations ranged from the mundane to the highly technical.  The workings of free texts searching algorithms was particularly difficult with the concept of inverted files taking 150% of normal file and computer memory storage. However, the analysis was again thorough and painstaking, giving the author a clear view of the outcome as defined later.
Drawing conclusions from the case studies was again a manual exercise.  By highlighting particular traits of behaviour in one particular police project team, an overall theory of management of the projects was produced.  This was tested against the behaviour and attitudes recorded in the other project teams as well as the Home Office, and an overall theory was postulated.  Garland (2001) created a theory set that police technology was often hurried, haphazard and ill defined in the United States
and he predicted that the same set of outcomes could be apparent in the British Police.  He was correct in his theory as far as these particular projects were concerned.




4.7.1  Section 3
The ethical issues in the study
This section of the study considers the ethical issues involved in researching police processes.  To ensure a realistic approach to this section, a brief introduction to the concept of ethics will be considered, followed by a review of current  ideas in the ethics of policing. Lastly this section will consider the ethical environment of this study.
The study of ethics is one of the ancient  concerns of mankind, with writings from 350 years BC up to the present day – that is from Plato to Popper (Fisher and Lovell, 2006).  Essentially, ethics is the concept of good behaviour, whilst morality is the concept of not doing anything wrong. (Dejoie and two others, 1991). The difficulty in all ethical and moral arguments is the question – who makes the rules and who decides what is good behaviour?  There are two broad schools of thought – one which states that in any society, there will be an inherent set of values which are acceptable by the majority of that society.  The values need not be learned – they are born with the person and hence are imbued throughout that lifetime.  The other view is that ethical values must be taught to the person, learned and analysed and then applied to make an ethical life. Policing is a social enterprise undertaken by men and women to uphold the peace of the land and to bring to justice those who offend (Gordon 1978). There are other duties which have fallen to the police outwith the crime field and these are well rehearsed by many police commentators. However the quotation often attributed to Juvenal ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodies?’ is loosely translated as ‘who watches the watchers?’ and raises the opportunity to examine the credibility and integrity of policing.
One of the most pungent comments on the integrity of the police was given in 1921 by John Fletcher Moulton in a speech later published in Atlantic Monthly.
‘Doing right when there is no one there to make you do it’
This comment is the foundation of integrity and for those police officers who work alone, it is the bedrock of their professional lives. However, police officers seldom construct a moral algebra in their decision making; rather they employ experiential heuristics – making decisions quickly with reference to what has happened before (after Fisher and Lovell). Further, the concept of ‘unprincipled policing’ as espoused by Alderson (1998), is the antithesis of what British society expects from its civil police.  Corruption, underlying values which do not reflect the expected mores of society have all been seen in some parts of British policing over the years. In calling for a high moral standard, Alderson has been at the forefront of policing ethics for two decades and his work continues in attempts by chief officers to accept the new values of diversity, moderation and proportionality in all their work.
Within this study however, there are real ethical considerations.
The ability to research data and material which was constructed in London, Kent, Humberside and Edinburgh some 30 years ago gives rise  to problems of authenticity. The fact that most of the participants in the early creation of the computer systems under review are either dead or retired, obviates their ability to comment on this thesis. This could allow the author unlimited access to flights of imagination, issues of culpability could be attributed to persons still living and conclusions could be drawn to suit narrow vested interests.  It is stressed at this stage of the thesis, that no one person or organisation is set aside for praise or for censure.  No one is identified by name – only ranks and operational portfolios are listed.  Secondly, no one organisation is either exculpated nor apportioned blame in this thesis.  There will be pointers to management practices which viewed from a perspective of 30 years could be seen as weak or ill defined, but this matter of the first police computers to handle crime data, was frought with anxiety from all the players.
However, the thesis is based on fact – supported by documentation which is in the hands of the author but is the property of the Home Office and the relevant police forces.  These documents will be available for inspection if required.  The documents relating to the police forces (Feasibility studies, operational requirements and detailed operational requirements) are available from the relevant forces but the responses from the computer suppliers are commercial in confidence.
There is no attempt in this study to apportion blame.  There are many issues relating to the early computerisation efforts in the public sector which require to be exposed to public scrutiny and perhaps lessons learned for future information technology implementations. It is important to stress that in this study with upwards of one hundred players from a variety of civil servants, commercial companies, police forces and from other agencies, all involved in a ‘best efforts’ exercise over 4 years – no one person or organisation can claim all the credit or shoulder all the blame.  
The documents have been analysed with care and due weight has been placed on the multifaceted views expressed by the variety of players.  The concept of openness has pervaded this thesis in its entirety.


4.8 Phase Four  Limitations of the study methods

This section coalesces some aspects of previous sections in which an acknowledgment is made of some limitations of the study methods. It is important to note that academic research was an important and sanctioned off shoot of the prime function of the Lothian and Borders Police Computer Assisted Policing Project Team.  The prime function was to collect data, perform manual analysis and then design an operational computer crime system.
 From a thirty year perspective, the interviews and case study collection were rigorous and well documented.  The analysis was manual, there being little available software which could run on micro computers –such as the ITT 2020 – the forerunner of the desktop computers of today.  Hence the Project Team constructed a model from the available data and set this against the aspirations of the working police officers.  The consequent computer system worked for 17 years without modification. 
Were the study to start again in 2007, there would be a different approach, using one of the available software packages suitably arranged.  The difficulty as detailed above would be the field definition and the allocation of data to the different fields to ensure competent matching.
The concept of actor involvement in case study theory is again controversial.  The author is required to ensure that his own views and prejudices were not allowed to affect the outcomes of any aspect of the research.  This in part was triangulated by the conversations with other police officers, and with academics, including the internal thesis supervisors, who allowed the author to explain the thesis in technical and non technical prose.  
Hence it can be claimed that efforts to overcome the early difficulties in this study have been overcome and the thesis will stand scrutiny.

The overall envelope of research methods used in this study  will allow the research to verify the thesis statements and will show the necessity for further work in this complex arena. Research methodology has developed since this study was initiated and had these methods been available in 1978, then they would have been used.  The argument of this study, is by using interviews, case studies and a comprehensive literature review, the thesis will stand utmost scrutiny.
There are many conflicting views regarding the paradigms of this research, It is claimed by Bryman (1988) amongst others, that conflicting paradigms cannot be used to sustain research in the social sciences.  By the first edition of Bryman’s work with Emma Bell (2003), he suggests that multi paradigm research is not only acceptable but may actually produce as good results as single paradigm work.  This apparent change of emphasis, Bryman contends is based on two emerging finding 
a)	that research methods as a means of data collection are not as encumbered by epistemological and ontological baggage as is supposed by academic researchers and
b)	a softening in the attitude towards quantitative research amongst female researchers who had apparently been reluctant to its use.
These emerging findings are supportive to the methods used in this study.  By combining a thorough literature review – along with semi structured interviews – and concluding with a detailed case study, it is contended that the data collection phase of the study is robust.  The analysis is based on manual ‘paper and paste’ systems which in the 1970s were not only acceptable but were the basis of much research in policing circles in this country.
There are many methods available to the researcher to fulfil the obligation to both management and academia to produce a comprehensive analytical review of any project. (Bryman and Bell 2003). Typically research into the soft sciences (which for the sake of this study will include the technological aspects of policing in the 1970s), can fall into two distinct categories.  There are quantitative methods which can use sophisticated computer based programmes to analyse usually questionnaire data; and there are qualitative methods – used to analyse interview data along with other less mathematical data sets. As will be explained later, this study rests on qualitative data to a large extent and comprises analyses of a literature review, structured interviews and case studies of three computer projects in separate police forces.















Epistemology	Description	Utility	Applicability to current study
Positivism	only knowledge collected by the senses is true	objective,value free, knowledge gathered is the basis for laws	peripheral
empirical realism	simple research to find reality	considered superficial’(Bhaskar 1989)	 too narrow in concept
critical realism	recognition of structures of natural order by application of both practical and theoretical work	systematic attempt to express structures which can exist independently of thought	-suits collection of diverse data and thereafter analysis




Ontology	Description	Utility	Applicability to current study
Objectivism	social phenomena independent of social actors	separate hierarchy of  organisational rules from the actors involved	this study relates to the co existence of actors, structures and phenomena
Constructionism	social actors accomplish social phenomena	continual revision or new iterations of previous achievements	a definite impact on this study






4.8.1 Research philosophy and methodologies

This sub section contemplates some of the recent discussion on research methods and reveals the overarching research methodology used in this study.
4.8.2 Introduction
In the pantheon of research methods for the social sciences, business and law, there exists a number of competing philosophies (Tables 4.1-4.2 above). This section will examine some of the most used systems for research and will comment on the development of a new set of theories which seem to indicate a loosening of departmentalised research methods.
Of the models available, one consideration is the need to form a model against which to gauge the success or failure of an enterprise (Weiss 1972). Weiss took her research models quite simply and her work was fundamental to the thinking of the Lothian and Borders Computer team in the mid 1970s. By using a simple three level model, Carol Weiss use what could be called a ‘common sense’ approach to social science research. Her start point was the state in which any enterprise found itself before any adaptation was applied; thereafter some appraisal of the applied facility was constructed and then applied to the enterprise; and finally what outcome could be measured as a result of the adaptation.   However there are further considerations in research.
Fundamentally, it is necessary to establish how society is constructed.  Searle (1995) conjures the image of the world consisting of two sets of facts – those which occur independently of man – wind, sea, tides and other natural phenomena – and those which are manmade.  Within the second category are again two categories – those items which are physical – buildings and roads and the like – and perhaps the most eagerly defined categories are those more ephemeral – marriage, five pound notes and the like.
These facts stretch our concept of society and allow large numbers of people to accept categories of societal structure which then permit society to function.  The five pound note is particularly apt.  A five pound note as a piece of paper is worthless – merely a clever drawing on special paper.  However, that five pound note opens concepts of credit and debt, of promissory notes, of banking, trade, commerce, salary, inheritance and all other ideas and facts connected with money.  Thus into this maelstrom of ideas, the concept of ‘crime’ neatly fits.  As was explained earlier in this study, crime is difficult to define – but yet in most western democracies, there is a general acceptance that crime is well understood and must have several social entities to deal with it – laws, police, courts, prison, aftercare and all the other manifestations of a liberal society. Searle then has set the scene for this study in questioning the way we consider the social and scientific worlds around us.
If society were to be considered in terms of the hard sciences then the use of these sciences as a model, would allow a Popperian approach to social science to be valid. Popper (1967) argued against the empirical-inductive model and refuted the classical scientific approach to further knowledge.  Hence for Popper, there was no ‘new truth’ – merely the ability to falsify theories. As Stephen Hawkins ( 1992) explains, "No matter how many times the results of experiments agree with some theory, you can never be sure that the next time the result will not contradict the theory." While it may be pragmatically useful to accept a theory until it is falsified, this does not solve the philosophical problem of induction. Betrand Russell (1912 ) also stated, "the general principles of science . . . are believed because mankind have found innumerable instances of their truth and no instances of their falsehood. But this affords no evidence for their truth in the future, unless the inductive principle is assumed."
 The pursuit of knowledge has been one of mankind’s greatest endeavours, from Anaximander through to modern philosophers. (Toulmin 1967). The understanding of the physical environment was the primary key to intellectual development and when the physical sciences were able to formulate their results, a deeper understanding of the worlds evolved.  Into this milleau of knowledge seekers came the social scientists. Amongst many others, Durkheim was a principal proponent of the ‘scientific method’.(Durkheim 1890) The concept of sociological studies gained momentum especially in France.
Durkheim was a professor of political science in the University of Bordeaux, France and later in Paris. His seminal work on suicides (1887) was again a first attempt to capture the workings of social ‘misfits’ – those who committed suicide. That early work lead him onto the defining book of the age in “ Les Regles de la methode sociologique”  first published in 1895.  A translation of his work ‘The rules of sociological method’ by Sarah Solovay and John Mueller, edited by George Catlin defines a social ‘fact’.  Durkheim concentrated much of his work on crime.  He considered crime as being an inevitable consequence of social intercourse.  His definition is based on a simple logic.
Within every society there are rules of conduct.   The rules may be explicit or implicit but generally the society agrees that the rules keep the social fabric whole.  If the rules are transgressed then there should be some sanction and if someone has suffered as a result of the transgression, that person should be recompensed.  Now Durkheim takes this model to the extreme.  In a society of monks or others of a high and normally closed social order, few if any will commit a ‘crime’ - theft, assault or the like.  The society has risen above that level of behaviour.  However, one monk may display the habit of blowing his nose during vespers - and a ‘crime’ has been committed.  In normal society this would pass unnoticed but in the particular society in which the event occurs, this action could be construed as criminal.  Durkheim proposed that the study of society should be based on the same model as the study of the physical sciences.  This simple statement was formed in the white heat of the Darwinian revolution – the bases of evolution.  At that time the sciences were systematic, empirical and observational.  The observers were outside the facts being observed and hence there was an argument that these studies were pure science.  The social sciences required the same sort of credence.  The debate then started that by applying observational methods to social facts, then the truth would be achieved.
The other principal amalgam of research work lies in the area of quantitative analysis.  Whereas generally qualitative research rests on interviews, observing work or social activity and then analysing the results, quantitative analysis seems to claim a degree of exactness due to its numerical base.  The interviews in quantitative research along with questionnaires and other numerical gathering techniques, present the researcher with a set of numbers.  These numbers are now set into computer programmes, SSPS _ Statistical Package for the Social Sciences and has been available since the mid 1960s (Bryman and Bell).    There are other newer programmes based on the Windows ™ operating system, but the principle is the same – the use of computing power to manipulate data and produce an answer.  As in all these programmes, the results depend on the programme – and just what parameters are set by the researcher in terms of data validation.  However, as the differences between these disparate research methods begin to blur, by more and more researchers attempting to bring greater width to their findings, the ability to use computers for social research will intensify, as will the ability to understand the reasoning behind the computer programme.
Although there are many other methods available for the researcher, this study will now highlight why these systems have been utilised or disregarded in the analysis of this thesis.
4.8.3 Positivism
According to Bryman and Bell (2003), there are five principle attributes of positivism.  Firstly only phenomena and by extrapolation, knowledge, confirmed by the human senses can be considered as accurate. Secondly the genuine purpose of theory is to generate hypotheses which can be tested against the collection of observable data. Thirdly the collection of observable data is the only basis for new scientific laws. Fourthly science must be conducted in a manner which is value free – ie objective.
Lastly there is a definite distinction between statements which claim to be scientific and those which are normative.  Scientific statements are based on the concepts established by Linneaus (Jarvis 2007), which include methodical observation and detailed recording within a specified classification.  Normative statements require the scientist involved to make value judgements which may or may not reflect that scientists perceptions of reality.




The second research concept to be considered is that of empirical realism. Realism has two aspects in common with positivism.  Primarily there is a belief that the physical sciences, botany, physics and the like, should share research methods and verification with the social sciences. The conclusion of this view is that there is a reality that is distinct from our descriptions of it, and by applying scientific methods, scientists can understand reality.  Bhaskar (1989) objects to this view stating that there are underlying structures in any study which will affect the data collection exercise and thus will alter the view of the scientist. These structures can be latent, tangible or subliminal – but if they exist, then there will be an affect on the study. 











Bhaskar (1975) developed the term ‘critical realism’ from earlier scientists in order to reflect the views which he espoused in the critique of empirical realism.  In essence Bhaskar’s view is that
	‘science is the systematic attempt to express in thought the structures and ways of acting of things that exist and act independently of thought.’
Secondly, critical realists accept into their own theoretical framework the concept that there may be other theories which at that stage of admittance cannot be either falsified or justified, but which should be accepted as another consideration.  This is on the surface a broadminded approach to scientific enquiry which excludes little by way of outright rejection but is open to views and thoughts from many sources. Included in Bhaskar’s thinking is the dialectical materialism of both Hegel and Marx.  Marx refined Hegel’s dialectic view of history from merely being the catalogue of truth  into the explanation of why societal structures are so formed.  Marx’s view – based on his theory of all change being influenced by the class struggle – was one which Bhaskar appreciated – the synthesis of all material which was available at the time of writing – into an all encompassing theory.
The overall intent of critical realists can be adequately aggregated by Pratschke            (2003) as follows;
‘I believe that the choice of methodological approach should be dictated by the nature of the research problem rather than by the preferences of the researcher.  In many cases the most effective approach will involve the application of 2 or more methodological techniques (Philosophica  71 p13-38)’
To fulfil that intent, critical realists can claim a tenuous link to the early empiricalists, whose methods were fastidious rather than evolutionary. Bhaskar develops this theme into the overall critical realism idea by imposing on the social sciences, the stratified ontology which operate in open systems as well as those that work in laboratory condition. These considerations rest on the facility for social actors to coordinate and plan their behaviour which generally means that they act in a socially acceptable and meaningful way.  Without trivialising the many definitions of critical realism, it is generally held that the study method is objective and pluralistic. Additionally the following are key indicators of critical realism (Johnson and Duberley). Firstly critical realism is a metaphysical ontology which stresses that social and natural phenomena exist independently of human intervention or interaction.    Secondly the ability of observers or experimenters in various fields of study will be affected by the observers’ experience, background and training.  Hence different people may see different outcomes from what is in practice the same set of circumstances. The statement attributed to Caius Pretonius is particularly apt 
‘If I march with a different step – it may be that I hear a different drum’
Thirdly emanating from this observation is the claim that there is no theory neutral language employed by academics and others in their pursuit of what is unobtainable – a comprehensive theory of truth.  Critical realists regard science as much too important to be left to scientists alone – as scientists erect language barriers around their work to maintain the mystique of academia. Lastly critical realists identify causation by examining the mechanism of cause and effect which support academic study.
Critical reality as a schema reflects the variety of research paradigms which have been used in this present study along with the ability to accept – without verification or falsification – ideas which may affect the outcome of the study.  These areas have been carefully examined and are stated where necessary and their influence on the study has been acknowledged.
In particular, the original objective of the police based feasibility study was to ascertain from other police forces just what was available or was being planned to meet the perceived needs of the forces involved. By critical examination of other’s work and of their ideas and concepts, the Lothian and Borders Police Computer Assisted Policing Project Team was able to complete a computer project on time and on cost. All this initial study falls neatly into the concepts as listed by Johnson and Duberley and well within the strictures of critical realism – the ability to examine events and structures from an open ended view – trying to establish common language and hence trying to ascertain the outcome of events undertaken by others.

4.8.6 Intepretivism
This subject includes  those writers who are diametrically opposed to the concept of applying  the scientific method – to the study of social science.  Their view is that the study of people and the institutions which they have constructed, is fundamentally different from the study of the natural world.  Von Wright (1971) amongst others claims that there is a difference between the explanation of human behaviour being the positivist view of social science against the understanding of  that behaviour. Within this tradition, the German schools of thought have had great influence.  Schutz (1972) and Weber (1972) both subscribe to the phenomenological school detailed as how humans make sense of the world around them and how the scientist should countenance the preconceptions which surround the objects of the study. These concepts are being changed and modified through time as social scientists refine their collective thinking.  




Objectivism is an ontological position which contends that social phenomena are separate entities which individuals cannot influence. To follow this train of intellectual endeavour, it is evident that for each social entity, there must be rules, structures and formal requirements which are predetermined.  Hence within organisations there is a social order which is quite separate from the individuals who inhabit the organisation.  This implies that the organisation will impress on the individuals certain behaviour based actions reflecting in part the position in which the individuals find themselves. The concept is taken further in that there are standardised actions required of the individuals –they know the job to be done and they follow the instructions to complete the task. This overall cocoon of pre determinism  can have the effect of inhibiting new developments in an organisation and restricting the release of new ways of completing tasks.





The basis for constructionism – an ontological position – is the idea that social actors continually present new facts and positions which have an effect on structures, cultures and organisations. Additionally constructionism as a formal strategy will state that social organisations are an amalgam of agreements – formal or informal- which are continually being agreed, contended, forgotten, re established, fragmented so that the organisation can meet a number of co terminus objectives.  These are the formal statement of action for the organisation – production levels, profitability, care, education levels – as well as the normative needs of the members of the organisations, reward, recognition, social contact and recognisable relationships.  This leads to the conclusion that researchers will have an effect on the base of their research – by some means or other – and they cannot escape the conclusion that their own actions will skew the results of the research. 

4.8.9 Action Research
Action research is seen (Bryman and Bell 2003) as an emergent process in academic research. Basically the researcher will work along side the worker in a social enterprise.  The cross fertilisation of ideas is thus to the fore in the pursuit of the researcher’s goal – the continuous learning of the organisation, the staff and the research. Developments in the Xerox Corporation by Greenwood et al in 1993, started as a ‘consultation’ exercise and developed into a research project.  The cross over from one aspect of work to another is difficult to establish – but the authors recognise a sense of organisational crisis was fundamental to the change.  The crisis was part of the leadership of the organisation willingness to take risks in order to meet some unforeseen and at that time intangible set of objectives. This would allow the researchers to take the organisation in a different direction by changing the way people worked and the way in which the organisation reflected the perceived needs of the workers.
.  The five principle characteristics of Action Research as defined by Reason and Bradbury are;
1)	responding to practical and often pressing needs in the lives of people in organisations
2)	engaging with people in collaborative relationships and opening new communications spaces
3)	drawing on may sources of knowledge both in the evidence which is generated and the many different ways of presentation to wider groups
4)	is strongly value orientated seeking to address issues of significance to not only internal groups but to have an effect on the wider human ecology
5)	is a vibrant evolving process which cannot be predetermined
(Reason and Bradbury 2006).
Indeed these authors see Action Research as a family of approaches and the method reflects the tensions within a family - falls out, reconciliation and basically solution centred but  often containing the eccentric, the egocentric and the plain outrageous.
Perhaps the definition from McNiff and Whitehead (2006) regarding action research is the most appropriate for emerging police projects in the mid 1970s – ‘a form of research that enables practitioners everywhere to investigate and evaluate their work’.
It must be stressed again however, that mere academic considerations were not the over riding priority of the project teams, but the pursuit of knowledge against which new working practices would be built – and which lasted for the next 15 years.

CONCLUSION
As this study develops, it is important to reiterate the emergent theoretical themes which allowed the thesis to evolve.  The use of a data collection exercise, based on Weiss’ work – define the problem, construct a remedy, ally the remedy and measure the result, was the first venture into theoretical study by Lothian and Borders Police.  By adopting this approach, it was anticipated that there would be a broad minded collection of data which could stand the utmost scrutiny in any future years. With this framework firmly fixed there were two exercises completed – firstly  the semi structured interviews with officers from other forces. Secondly there was the construction of the Feasibility Study by means of open meetings with practitioners to assess their requirements and  thereafter brain storming – to test the new technological boundaries. Later in the study there will be further references to methods 






This chapter details part of the research which involved the interviewing of chief officers of police and other police staff.  By way of triangulation there were three sets of semi structured interviews some years apart and thus there was a variety of personnel involved.  The only constant was the author of this study and he was accompanied on each of the interview enterprises by at least one other police officer.

5.1.1 Interviews and triangulation
By way of introduction, the first set of interviews was held over an extended period of some two years whilst the Lothian and Borders Police computer project team were seeking assistance and guidance from external sources.  The choice of officers from the chief officer cadre within the police service was designed to examine the degree of preparedness extant in the service for the incoming technological change.  The methodology in 1978 was based on a qualitative analysis of results of personal interviews.  The research was greatly influenced by Weiss (1972) and her analytical discourse on actor/ respondent theory.  Essentially Weiss’s theory of evaluation research is based on the ability to examine a social problem, propose and apply a solution and then measure the result.
Some thirty years on has the evaluation process changed?  The move from experimental science as a model for social science certainly has accelerated and a number of epistemologies have emerged to influence the social scientist in the search for either understanding or for explanation.(Denzin and Lincoln eds 2003)  Police officers, with a strong pragmatic outlook (Reiner 2002) tend towards a interpretative/ constuctivistic outlook as follows;
Table 5.1.1
The pragmatic police domain
Epistemology	Primary values Promoted	Key audiences	Preferred Methods	Evaluation Questions
Positivism(Cook 1985)	Efficiency, accountabilityCost effectiveness	High level policy makers, funders	Quantitative, surveys, cost benefit analysis	Are intended outcomes attained. Is this program the most efficient alternative?
Utilitarian pragmatism(Patton 1997)	Utility, practicality, managerial effectiveness	Midlevel program managers	Eclectic, mixed, structured and unstructured, observations	Which elements work well and which need improvement? How effective is the program wrt the organisation’s goals?
Interpretivismconstuctivism	Plurarism, understanding, contextualism, personal experience	Program directors, staff	Qualitative, case studies,open ended interviews, document reviews	How is the program experienced by stakeholders
Critical social science	Emancipation, empowerment, social change	Program beneficiaries	Participatory,Action orientated	In what way will the program sustain the status and resource inequalities


5.2 .1 Survey Results from Chief Officer Questionnaires
The first survey took place during the implementation of the police crime recording computer projects.  Chief Officers of police from two separate groups of police forces were interviewed in a semi structured manner.  Group One was that set of  chief officers whose police forces were either implementing or researching crime and intelligence computer systems.  Group Two was that set of chief officers whose forces were not considering computer systems for these applications (crime and intelligence recording) but were contemplating or commissioning computer systems in other parts of police work.




One common response, by all the respondents of those forces where computers were in the process of being installed was ‘ something has to be done’.(Group One)  This response was often followed by an explanation of the apparent unrest expressed at public meetings attended by these officers, in the light of the ‘Yorkshire Ripper’ debacle. (Bland 1984).  The Yorkshire Ripper was the pseudonym given to Peter Sutcliffe who was convicted in 1981 of 13 murders in the Yorkshire area.  Analysis of the police handling of the data in these murders found that index cards had been misfiled, mislaid and were not sufficiently cross referenced between the 13 murder enquiries.  (Bland 1984). Chief police officers interviewed were adamant that they could best answer their critics by the claim that a computer would have not lost the data and that perhaps the accused would have been caught earlier.  It was apparent from the interviews that there was no effort made to work with any other force, either locally or nationally.  Many chief officers exhibited an introspective view of crime in their area often stating that 90% of crime is local.  This view is substantially correct in the analysis of crime reports from many forces (British Crime Survey 1984; Valentine 2000) and there was a reluctance to allow any other police force access to crime data held either electronically or on manual file.  The success of the Police National Computer in holding information which included conviction records and descriptions of criminals and wanted people, as well as missing persons, was always tempered by the need to ensure that each item of data was coded to the force producing the entry.  This detail was required to ensure that if one police force entered details of a person wanted, with  a description, and another force arrested or detained that person, then there was a link to the originating officer.  Many of the chief officers (75%) when interviewed thought that this requirement was inhibiting to their detectives, in that any mistakes would seriously affect the force’s reputation.  
In terms of other questions regarding the strategic future of the crime recording initiative, all forces stated that they would not send their officers to other countries to overview existing systems (excluding England and Wales and Scotland). The concept of accepting especially United States technology was anathema to that generation of chief officers and despite the fact that three major computer firms were American based with manufacturing centres in the United Kingdom, there was at that stage a desire to ’prove we can do it ourselves’. Only one force in Scotland had allowed an officer to visit abroad, and that was to the Italian Financial Police, dealing with large scale fraud and embezzlement.  That visit in 1973 and the resultant report to the then Chief Constable was the start of the most successful crime recording system for the next 20 years in Lothian and Borders Police, Edinburgh.(HMCIC Reports 1980-1995).  The financial element of new computer projects fell to chief officers with responsibility  for budgetary control.  The cost of new systems in 1976-1978 was of the order of £1.5 million - £2.5 million and this would require to be found from tightening budgets.  All respondents stated that their operational detectives required simple yet rigorous systems which would give them control over data – rather than having to depend on clerks with outmoded card filing systems. The contrast with views from other agencies and companies is stark (Sadler 1994)  Sadler claims that the first tranche of information technology was designed to provide senior staff with management information.  Policing systems – although requiring management information – were being designed to provide the working beat and enquiry constable or detective with robust information.  Thus there is a fundamental difference in the design of systems between policing and commerce/industry. This pressure from within the organisation was matched by that from outwith the forces.  Chief officers then required ‘something to be done’  but few were graduates in any other discipline but law.  In 1975 there were three pure science graduates in the Scottish Police (HMCIC Report 1976) and they were all at constable or sergeant level. 

The chief officers interviewed in forces where there was no design to install computer systems relating to crime and intelligence,(Group Two) often (80% of survey) claimed that a ‘wait and see’ strategy was preferable.  This by way of explanation would preclude the force from being ridiculed if the computer failed to meet operational standards and that there was no instruction or inducement from the Home Office.

5.3.1 Second questionnaire Analysis
Second set of interviews
All police forces in  Scotland and England and Wales (53 forces) were visited during the years 1988-1989 as a pre-cursor to the formation of another police computer system which had been proposed to handle large civil emergencies.(Home Office Comtest Report 1989 authors- Naylor and Todd).  The premise in this case was again the standardisation of police systems to assist police forces when a major incident occurred.  By affecting a central control over new computer programs and utilising some challenging telephony solutions, the Home Office sought to assist individual forces when a catastrophe occurred.  The Comtest Report was based on the utilisation of 10 police forces each operating 10 telephone lines with concomitant staffing, to meet the likely influx of telephone calls after a disaster, with perhaps loss of life.  The nation had been affected by the Kegworth air crash, the Lockerbie air crash and the ‘Spirit of Free Enterprise’ shipping disaster at Zeebrugge.  On each occasion there had been an inability of the local police to deal with the telephony and the telephone exchanges in Kent were unable to function for some 4 working days after the Zeebrugge incident.(Report to Kent County Council 1987).  Thus the Home Office, through the aegis of the Police Research Services Unit, commissioned Comtest as one possible solution to the problem.
To meet the possible intransigence from individual police forces, the Police Research Services Unit decided that each force would be visited and each chief officer would be interviewed regarding the technological solutions available to the possible problem. The survey work involved a semi structured interview with 2 Chief Constables, 2 Deputy Chief Constables and 49 Assistant Chief Constables with functional responsibility for police operations along with support staff.  Many of these officers had been either involved or peripheral to the procurement of crime and intelligence computerisation projects in the past 10 years.
The survey questionnaire is contained in Appendix One and as can be seen there was only a brief reference to computers regarding crime systems.
The response to the second semi structured interviews/questionnaire shows that there was an universal police desire to replace outdated and redundant working practices in the crime area.(PRSU /ACPO National Casualty Bureau System  Report September 1990)  The change in attitude to a number of events is in stark contrast to the semi structured interviews of some 12 years earlier. There was almost complete unanimity on the need to head towards collaborative working with other forces; to accept the role of the Home Office as the ‘centre of excellence’ and to allow junior practitioner officers to design a standard set of forms which could be used in this facility.  A review of the questions and their criteria and answers is contained in Appendix One.
Perhaps the most interesting finding of this second and comprehensive set of interviews was the small number of chief officers who were implacably opposed to spending hard earned budgets on new technology.  Four chief officers out of the 53 interviewed took a stand of ‘if I cannot see it and control it - then we will not have it’.  In all four cases this attitude was forcibly expressed in interview meetings where other more junior staff were present.  By so rebuffing the questions which were seen as part of the Home Office efforts to standardise technology over the police service, the chief officers also expressed the view that they would be quite able to manage their own affairs without assistance.   During these interviews it was claimed by the junior officers, when natural breaks occurred in the meetings, that the chief officers concerned had been part of unsuccessful information technology projects in either the force in which the meeting was convened, or else in another force before their promotion.  This robust intransigence to any assistance or compromise as to collaborative working was paramount in delaying this project for some years (Todd Report 1990) and it was only in the recent past (2004) that the Police National Computer took this proposal into a workable system.

5.4 Summary of Chapter Four









Introduction to the Case Studies

The next four chapters form the nexus of this study.  They are the detailed analysis of the implementation process of the computerisation effort in three police forces in the United Kingdom during the decade 1976-1986. To thoroughly understand the processes and analysis, some introductory explanations are required.
Many police forces (Appendix Two) set out in the 1970s to procure a computer system.  The process would normally take about 4 years of dedicated work by a team of police officers – the functional experts, one or two computer analysts– the systems experts and perhaps an administrative backup to document the acquisition process. The formal stages were
	a feasibility study – to detail which perceived functions could be computerised – an internal document normally of 20-30 pages
	an operational requirement – outlining the functions and sent to a long list of computer suppliers usually some 70-100 pages
	a detailed operational requirement only sent to the three or four shortlisted computer suppliers thought able to meet the detailed requirement and consisting of very detailed explanations of how the new system would work, and consisting of 200-300 pages;  
	and finally the computer contract – the detailed documentation which covered all aspects of the procurement of a £2 million  system and again some 200 pages in length.

6.1.2 The Feasibility Study
The feasibility study stage was typically of 6 months duration and police forces would analyse their own working practices by way of interview and workshops. The interviews were with operational officers, those requiring the safe and secure storage, and the efficient retrieval of crime data.  The interviews were wide ranging, from the ability to store marks and scars on particular accused and suspects to the retrieval of ‘likely’ suspects if a crime were committed with a particular modus operandi.  The analysis of the interview findings was again manual with trends being identified from the 300 operational officers who contributed. Lastly brain storming sessions with key officers – not chosen by rank but by function, would allow a consensus of what was required for the new system.  The largely held and strongly expressed view was that the existing system was flawed and no computer should be installed merely to replicate outmoded system.
 This stage typically ended with a presentation to the chief officer cadre in the force augmented by a  local authority computer senior manager or director.
With the authority of that group of senior police officers and computer director, the police project team would prepare an operational requirement.  This consisted of a description of the police force, the workload in each of the functional areas and the outline design criteria. Again this process would take almost 9 months. This document was sent to all those computer supply companies which had responded to the advertisement in the European computer trade publications.  Typically some 20-25 companies responded and from this long list a short list was constructed by the project team.
Then with the authority of the Police Board in Scotland or Police Committee in England and Wales, a Detailed Operational Requirement was constructed.  This could take about one year of constant work and the document was sent to the four companies with a detailed requirement of the responses format. The replies would be assessed and a contract awarded against the Contract, which held all the above documents as well as performance criteria and financial outturns.

6.1.3 The Operational Requirement
The Operational Requirement was the first synthesis by the police force of all the work completed for the Feasibility Study.  The police Project Team now were required to construct a short list of systems which computer suppliers would be asked to implement.  The document would describe the police force in terms of geographical information, crime and operational work loads, force police strength and other statistical information to allow the computer suppliers a first look at the scale of the task ahead.








6.1.4 The Detailed Operational Requirement
Computing enterprises in the 1970s were entirely different to those of post modern society.  In the 1970s, to obtain a computer system required the creation of a 200 page document, the Detailed Operational Requirement consisting of an exact description of the following;
	the functionality of the system – what was required to be recorded(crime, found property, nominal details), how was the data validated and how was it to be stored
	a page description – to show for each transaction exactly where each character was to be positioned on the screen – each screen typically measuring 80 columns by 25 or 28 lines – hence for each screen some 2,240 character positions.  Many functions such as crime recording required 13 separate screens of data, some could be repeatable, for example  if there were more than 5 items of property to be recorded as stolen, giving a crime report of 33,000 characters of information. There would also follow descriptive pages of the results of enquiries made of the system, with multiple results having to be queued in the computer system awaiting to be called and presented on the computer screen. A sample page of crime reporting data collection follows;


Crime Reporting -  information collection  - circa 1978
(Lothian and Borders Police Detailed Operational Requirement  May 1979)


Following the descriptive pages, were the validation rules – the requirement to have alpha or numeric or alphanumeric characters existing with certain of the field of the computer report.  Each field required its own validation table, with criteria clearly established.
Thereafter, the document would detail the communications network required either synchronous or asynchronous (the synchronous interface would allow for intelligent computer terminals to be placed in police stations) to link operational police stations to the computer, the requirement to have half duplex, or full duplex working ( the requirement for the computer to speak to the computer terminal at a distant police station at the same time as receiving messages from that police station).
In 1976, some 13 police forces (Appendix Two) were contemplating the procurement of computer systems with the concomitant expenditure of time and effort across the country being replicated to a greater or lesser degree.
Thus the Home Office sought to take a lead to reduce the redundant effort in the police service.
6.1.5 The Contract
In order to purchase a system which would cost some 5-8% of the total budget for any police force in the 1970s, there required to be some documentation which would allow redress in the event of failure.  The government agency charged with producing these documents was the Central Computing and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) based in London and they issued on an individual basis, a contract for each agency requiring new technology.  The contract was 200 pages long and referred to all the previous documents issued by the client.  Thus some 700 pages of typescript formed the contract.  For the Scottish force involved in this project there was a fundamental flaw – there was no Scottish version.  The Lothian and Borders Police Board had stipulated that the contract would be based on Scots Law – so that any action would be heard in the Court of Session, Edinburgh – and not London.
Thus the author of this study was awarded the task of producing a Scots Law  version of the contract.

6.2 Applying theory to the Case Studies
Using the general ethos of critical realism in the analysis of the case studies,  Yin’s theory  and Hakim’s five step development model,(page 134 above) allow the following case studies to be placed into an epistemological context which is sound. In assembling a theoretical model for this study crucial ideas were found in Hakim’s work – the concepts of ‘understanding’ and ‘action’ assisting the researcher.  That policing is driven by political determinants is self evident, but the aim of research must be to produce work which assists both understanding of the work under consideration but also to give to the practitioner some framework against which action can be measured.  The acceptance of other ideas can be clearly seen in the emerging work and the basic foundation of feasibility study, operational requirement, detailed operational requirement and finally contract shows that the cases themselves were able to fit into the academic model.
6.3 The Home Office initiative to computerise crime and intelligence recording 1976-1986
This section sets out the contribution which the Home Office in England  made to the

recording of crime and intelligence data in the police forces in the United Kingdom 

from 1976-1986. To fully consider the role of the Home Office in policing, 

a brief review of function and scope of some of the pertinent divisions of Home Office is listed below.  An introductory remark is quoted from Nunn-Price the author of a report and of a programme  of computer software, STATUS, which was written to assist operational staff in the British nuclear industry during the late 1960s and early 1970s.  The history of STATUS is valuable to this thesis as it is another aspect of hesitance within central government to adopt new technology until ‘the need to do something’ becomes overwhelming.(Nunn -Price 1974)


‘The U.K. was, as usual, a late developer despite having all the necessary software, hardware and research facilities.  The was no official system, indeed little or no interest from the Home Office or the Lord Chancellor’s Department, so development had to wait on initiatives from the private sector.’(Nunn Price 2001)









6.3.2 Structure of the Home Office

The Home Office is a major ministry of the United Kingdom Government and is led by an elected politician – the  Home Secretary.  In the eighteenth century, the Northern Department and the Southern Department of the Principal Secretary of State were reformed into the Foreign Office and Home Office.  This allowed a division between foreign and home affairs to be more recognisable.  The Home Office was officially charged with maintaining the civil peace by its founding Charter dated 27 March 1782.  As with most parts of government, the Home Office has changed over the years, gaining and losing functions as other departments of state are founded or relinquished.  Gaming, obscene publications, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands are some of the gains whilst children are now within the aegis of the Department of Health. (1978 model). Further changes were announced in the summer of 2007, with a new ministry being formed – that of Criminal Justice – but only for England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

The Home Office is run by an elected Member of Parliament, The Secretary of State for the Home Office.  Assisting the Home Secretary are three Under Secretaries, one with specific responsibility for the police, courts, prisons, and other judicial parts of the civil and criminal justice system.  The permanent staff is headed by the permanent Under Secretary of State (Grade 1) - the Cabinet Secretary - who also heads the Civil Service. Within the Police Division are two quite dissimilar functions - one is the running of the Metropolitan Police, (1978 model) in terms of the allocation of funding and audit; the other is the maintenance of civil peace throughout the country which includes support to police forces in terms of central technology requirements and research (again 1978 model) (Hazzell 1976)

Figure 6.1








Within this second division, an Assistant Under Secretary of State runs the Police Science and Technology Group.  This function consists of the following sub divisions:
F7 Division; the co-ordination of policy on the police use of computers; including data protection; police records; confidentiality and access; police vehicles and equipment and uniforms; police building programmes; co-ordination of policies of the Directorate of Telecommunications; the Scientific Research and Development Branch; the Forensic Science Service and the Police National Computer Organisation
F11 Division; the policy of police use of technology

	Details of F7 Division
Additionally within F7 Division the Appraisal, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, was charged with
 ‘ex-ante appraisal, monitoring and ex-post evaluation of research in the Science and Technology Group of the Police Department’.  






The Scientific Research and Development Branch was staffed essentially by civil servant scientists.  Their role was two fold - to seek out new systems to assist the police in operational requirements and secondly to assess the projects and systems which police officers brought to the Home Office for central Government funding. Alongside that Branch, and working under the Head of the Police Requirements Support Unit, was a cadre of police officers who represented the ‘customer’ – the police officer on patrol in the police forces throughout the country.  The Unit was headed by a Senior Chief Officer of Police – normally of Chief Constable rank – who used the knowledge of the funding mechanism to progress policing technical needs. The other staffing included specialists in radio technology, computing, close circuit television and other communications systems.  These officers ranged from chief inspector rank to chief superintendent.  Their individual backgrounds had often been formed in the white heat of technology as new and innovative police systems were procured. Additionally other officers attached to the Unit were support staff for these senior people – sergeants -  who were on the first step of a police career which would include an attachment to a technical, challenging and exciting Home Office post.

6.3.3 Scottish Police input
The Home Office essentially is an English establishment – and along with the (then) Scottish Home and Health Department, running the government end of the police service.  However, Scotland at that time had no police research organisation and so the Scottish police ‘bought into’ the Home Office scientific base, by an appropriation from the funding of Common Police Services (Common Police Services Annual Reports, 1975-80).  This appropriation allowed chief police officers from Scotland to be represented on the technical committees of the Home Office and hence to have a input to the design of new systems.  Additionally, therefore, police officers from Scotland were allowed to bid for the vacant posts within the Home Office research facility.

6.3.4 View from the Under Secretary of State
This semi structured interview is unique and cannot be triangulated.  The Under Secretary of State is an appointment within the Civil Service First Division category – the most senior people who run large and important divisions of government departments.  Although interviews with Chief Constables are contained in this study whose views were seen to be at odds with the outcome of this particular interview, it is important to emphasise the unique position that the Under Secretary of State holds.  The overall budget controlled in F7 and F11 Divisions was £19 million in 1976.  This sum included the operational running of the Police National Computer and the development of new techniques in police equipment. The remainder was allocated to research projects in police computing, telecommunications and inter-agency working. 
The Under Secretary of State was interviewed regarding the computer projects in three forces to computerise crime and intelligence data.  His view of police research was to provide practical solutions to policing needs within the budget allocated by Parliament.  At that level Parliament knew little of the detail of police research and so the real allocation of funds was at senior civil servant level.  He further stated that as there were senior and chief officers of police within his department, he felt well informed of policing needs.  The allocation of funds to certain projects was within his gift and he responded to the analysis from especially the chief police officers.  Additionally he had computer and telecommunications staff within both F7 and F11 departments and their advice as to the feasibility of projects was based on their professional computer expertise.  He stated that these were top quality computer scientists who were well aware of the trends in computer technology and having overseen the implementation of the Police National Computer – on a phased implementation basis from 1974-1976 – these scientists could actually deliver solutions to perceived police operational problems. The scientists were not averse to pushing technology boundaries but as public servants they and particularly he, was accountable for the public money which was spent on police support. Additionally, he took advice from the Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency, another central government department, where expertise in computer contracts was available.  As the police service was the first Home Office led section to seek computerisation on the scale of crime recording, then it was fundamental that computer contracts were sound.  The contracts would be based on English law and subject to the English courts.  This caveat was to ensure that if a software package for crime recording was established to operational requirements, then the licence of the software to other forces would allow the Home Office and not the computer companies to benefit.
 The need to provide a range of policing support and research was evident from the twin approaches from the police.




6.3.5 Police influences on F7 Division




6.3.6     F7 Division strategy




6.3.7    F7 constraints
It is clear from these interviews that the Home Office had a certain view of police technology which was fiscally driven versus eager pragmatism.

Overall, the Home Office, through a number of sections retained control over crime recording in England and Wales, and the Scottish Home and Health Department held a similar remit in Scotland.  The essence of the control was two fold.  Firstly the Home Departments were charged with producing annual consolidated reports on the state of crime.  The earlier discussion in this thesis regarding the definition of ‘crime’ would be of little interest to the statisticians.  The Counting Rules were amended annually and imposed on Chief Constables.  The definitions also varied according to the political influence exercised by the party in power. The definition of ‘serious assault’ changed in Scotland in 1976. 1983 and again in 1995 (Counting Rules various years).  Apparently the original definition (pre 1976) of this crime was
‘an assault resulting in the effusion of blood or the breaking of bones’ and changed in 1983 to
‘an assault requiring the victim to be detained in hospital’ and changed again in 1995 to
‘an assault intended to seriously harm the victim’(Counting Rules)
Other counting rules were also changed when it appeared that a certain category of crime or offence was likely to exceed what the population at large would accept. The consequences of six youths collectively throwing small stones at parked cars and causing damage to ten cars, would be counted as ‘one act of criminal behaviour’ and hence one crime.  If however, the police caught the youths and they were prosecuted, then 10 charges of vandalism would be preferred, one charge for each car owner. These and other decisions were made by statisticians and were then sent to chief constables for the patrolling police officer to implement.


6.3.8 Home Office initiative
The Grade 4 Civil Servant and head of F7 Division, Police Scientific Branch wrote a letter dated 23rd September 1976 to the Chief Constable of  Humberside Police force to accept an invitation to visit the force.(Minutes of the Home Office Police Computer Projects Volume 1).  The letter shows that the initial thoughts were to talk about ‘command and control’ although at that time the Home Office had been part funding a trial of one of these systems in the City of Glasgow Police for some time.  The Grade 4 specifically referred to the need to examine ‘crime systems’ as ‘command and control’ evaluations were being assessed at that time.  Crime systems were requiring an overhaul and new thinking was being generated in some forces.  
6.3.9 Command and Control systems
‘Command and control’ was a computerised despatch system based on the American Military computers to keep track of events in the field.  In command and control systems a number of personnel would be entered into a computer programme and allocated certain tasks.  As the tasks were completed, the radio message from the personnel would be entered into the computer programme.  The programme would then update its files and show that there were a number of personnel available for other tasks.  By linking this system to a mapping system of some sort, then the spatial distribution of personnel was available on a computer screen.  The available personnel could then be allocated further tasks and the computer updated.  At the end of a particular period of time, say a 10 hour shift, the computer programme could print out management information of the following sort:
	personnel deployed – tasks undertaken; how long each task took;
	overall deployment – how many minutes of unproductive time per person.


6.3.10 Home Office involvement in Command and Control systems
These systems were developed by the USA military to keep track of personnel in fast moving war environments.  The translation of these systems into policing was seen as a first move to ‘manage’ police operations from a systematic viewpoint. (Home Office Minutes, January 1976).  The Home Office senior staff in the Police Science Group were keen to ensure that policing effort was properly directed and efficiently managed and these new computer systems would allow at least part of this evaluation work to be examined closely.  Hence the Home Office selected a number of police forces to pilot the new systems and paid for part of the implementation and staff training for the systems – in return for critical information to process an evaluation package.  Thus the Home Office already had a ‘model’ of police computing which they would hope to translate into the crime field.
6.3.11 Analysis of the Home Office Initiative
The efforts by the Home Office to ‘improve efficiency and accountability’ had a perverse effect on particularly chief officers.  The immediate concern was to establish the level of crime per 100,000 of population and compare with forces in neighbouring areas.  This simple minded calculation was soon overtaken by the ‘family of forces’ a grouping of 5 or 6 police forces of similar size and population profile.  The grouping was Home Office devised and mixed Scottish and English forces, despite the differences in law and procedure.  Chief Officers in interview were immediately defensive of their performance  and sought to ensure that their force was performing better than any other.  This in turn led to pressure to perform better at all levels of the policing organisation – not to serve the public better, but to ensure that no overt criticism arrived from the Home Office.  
One of the consequences of these performance initiatives, was the careful construction of the annual crime statistics (Mayhew et al).  By allowing the force to record fewer crimes than were actually reported, a chief officer could claim that his/her crime prevention measures were working and that the force was performing well.  This simple minded sentiment was exposed by the first of the British Crime Surveys (Mayhew et al) and the concept of ‘dark crime figures’ was introduced to the policing statistical lexicon.






7.1   Introduction to the Case Studies

This chapter sets out in detail the initiatives to computerise crime and intelligence 

data in two police forces in England and one in  Scotland from 1976-1986. By the use of the original minutes of meetings, notes of telephone conversations and the official documentation from the forces and the Home Office, a level of detail of the computer projects will be produced.
Case study theory has already been described (page 139), but by adopting case study theory in conjunction with two other research methods, a literature review and a double set of semi structured interviews,  a pluralist approach to the research has been adopted.  This theoretical model – although not unique in modern research efforts, certainly maps into the overall situation of policing.  Police research can be found in many universities in the United Kingdom – in the Department of Geography at Dundee University; in the Department of Criminology in Leicester University; and in the School of Management and Law at Napier University. It is to be expected therefore that policing will cover many academic research disciplines and hence it is appropriate that research into policing should use as many research methods as are appropriate. As many policing research ventures involve working police officers (publishing mainly through the Home Office Research Bulletins annually – or the Home Office Police Research competition), as was the case in this study, a form of active, overt participation is apparent in the research and full account must be recognised of the strengths and weakness of these positions.(Bryman and Bell 2003)






7.2 The Case Studies







7.3.1 Proposals from Kent County Constabulary and Humberside Police force to computerise some policing functions

This section details the emergence of a common project between two police forces in England.  It shows the slow and methodical way in which police computing developed.  It highlights the practical needs of operational police officers and seeks to explain the pragmatic approach to new technology.  It also shows that fundamental principles were often hidden in the depths of correspondence and could become policy throughout the country almost by default.
7.3.2 Home Office letter
The letter dated 23rd September 1976 in the Home Office files of Police Computerisation, shows that the senior civil servant in charge of F7 Division of the Home Office wrote to the Chief Constable of Humberside Police force to accept an invitation to visit the force. Crime systems were requiring an overhaul and new thinking was being generated in some forces.  
7.3.3 Kent County Constabulary computer plan
Simultaneously, Kent County Constabulary sent a detailed resume of their computerisation requirements to F7 Division, Home Office.  It was received and noted by the Police Superintendent attached to the Police Research Services Unit – a subsidiary of F7 Division.
The resume states paragraph 1.2:

‘There can be no doubt that computers can and will make an important contribution to the job of fighting crime in the next decade.  Indeed already many forces throughout the country have started the pioneering work.  These early efforts have understandably met with varying degrees of success.’
Summary of requests
The report then summarises the efforts made by a small team of police officers to bring together the aspirations of the Kent County Constabulary.   In the section Recommendations:		
‘A team be set up to further develop the following applications:-
a)	Crime Recording and Crime pattern analysis
b)	Crime Information:	- Modus Operandi System
- Crime Intelligence Indices
- Collators Records
c)	Interface between P.N.C. and dedicated the local Police computer
d)	Street Directory














Computing in Kent County Constabulary 1976




7.3.5 Perceived limitations of these systems
At paragraph 4.12 a set of comments are attributed to the Assistant Chief Constable (Administration and Supply) in that the county council computer held the data but did not supply a 24 hour 7 day a week service to give out information.  That meant that the police had to ensure that all their enquiries were completed by 1700 hours on a Friday as the local authority computer system closed down over weekends and public holidays whilst the police service worked 24 hours 7days per week.   If a house were to be searched for a criminal during the weekend - there was no way of knowing if there was a registered firearm in the house - as the information was held by the county council.  Thus there was an argument that the police themselves would need their own computers - not linked to the local authority and thus be masters of their own information.   This was a crucial turning point for Chief Officers - as the fiscal considerations were immense - as was manpower.  The running of a 24 hour 7 day a week computer system would mean normally ‘two of everything’ running in hot standby - if one system failed then the other would seamlessly and transparently take over.  The Mean Time Between Failures - the computer industry standard of computer availability for one main frame computer was normally 1000 hours - about 6 weeks - then the computer would be likely to stop.(IBM contract outline 1978) A detailed explanation of computer reliability was sent to Humberside Police force  from a research scientific civil servant in the Police Scientific Development Branch, Home Office, London on 13th February 1979.  At paragraph 2 of the report the following advice is offered:
‘2. Reliability
No computer system will operate for 24 hours, 7 days a week without ever breaking down.  A single processor can expect to fail on average once every 900 hours or so;  with duplicated equipment this may be 5000 hours or more. depending on the quality of the maintenance service.  The length of breakdown again depends on the quality of the maintenance but exceptionally may last for several days.  The greater the standard of reliability you demand, the more equipment you need and the higher your maintenance charges will be.’

If the systems were set up properly then there would be minimal  downtime.  However, if there were to be a problem and human intervention was required, it was necessary to have a trained member of staff in the computer room at all times.  Computer technicians were a rare breed in 1976 and were expensive - and few wanted to work shifts within a police headquarters.

‘Factors such as possible industrial action by non police force personnel must not be overlooked when deciding where data is to be held’. (Note -  Under the Police Acts it is illegal for police officers to take any sort of industrial action).

7.3.6 Long term strategic view of these proposals
The ramifications would be felt for years to come.  Local authorities were running large scale computers for a variety of ‘batch processes’ - payroll, personnel and fixed penalty tickets - making use of computer power to manipulate data in an orderly way in strict rotation.  The police need as Kent County Constabulary analysis stated, was to have 24 hour access to interactive data - data which changed perhaps by the hour.  Criminal Intelligence is one aspect which is indicative of the need for interactive computing.  Criminal Intelligence is that information which would assist the police with their enquiries.  It can be graded into a number of categories dependant on the source and estimated reliability. (Kinsey 1982).  ‘A1’ is that information which is irrefutable and will allow police officers to swear a warrant to search premises or apprehend wanted people.  The grading then reduces to D4 which is speculative, perhaps the result of gossip.  Some police forces in the 1980s had publicly declared policy on the retention of this information.  For example, Lothian and Borders Police ‘would analyse and retain information on active convicted criminals’ (Force Operational Orders 1980). 
For example a known criminal is seen in a car by a patrolling constable - the car number is noted,  a wireless message is sent into a computer operator and the information is recorded on computer.  An hour later the car is seen by another constable in suspicious circumstances and an enquiry is made of the computer operator.  In an interactive system that information is immediately available.  In a batch system, all the observations are stored until they reach a predetermined total, and the computer is then updated.  The Kent County Constabulary resume documentation held at page 21, paragraph 14.2 headed Crime Information the following seminal words:

Crime intelligence at divisional level by collators records can be made more efficient.  A single one step system could be introduced thereby avoiding double handling of information both centrally and at divisions.  In this area there are probably savings in manpower that can be made.  The relating of crime reports and the information by computer is a simple task but requires some fairly advanced free text editing facilities by the computer.  It is not likely to be profitable to develop these facilities from scratch as there are already some systems available on the market.’ (author’s italics.)

It can be seen that computerised batch systems were of limited attraction to police forces in that the information could be seriously out of date by the time it was available.  Thus chief constables began to question the assistance given by local authority computer departments regarding the availability of information.  Although the Police Scientific Development Branch letter of February 1979 was sent to the Humberside Police, there is no evidence of a similar letter to any of the other 53 police forces, warning them of the consequences of running their own computers – and the eventual cost of these systems. Operationally chief constables were being pressured into data handling solutions, but nowhere is there any evidence of a 5 year or 10 year plan or cost benefit analysis within the Home office or the three forces’ files.  Strategically the computer crime initiatives were virginal. 
The need for the police to access data on criminals – either the conviction record or the intelligence record – is seen in retrospect to be self evident.  However, in 1976-1978, these were indeed monumental changes with police forces starting to ask for complete control over their data.  The consequences were not fully understood at a strategic level, as the ramifications were sourced from the Home Office to middle ranking police officers. (Home Office PSDB minutes 1976-78).  There is no evidence, either from the interviews held with the chief officer group or  from the documentation of the computer projects that any sort of strategic view was concocted or even contemplated to meet the challenge of 24 hour 7 day computing in the police service.
7.3.7 Critical Decisions in police computing
The minutes of a meeting, held on 30th June 1977 in Humberside Police between the chief constable and his senior staff and the head of F7 Division from Home office, and members of the Management Services Department of the local authority, show a review of the police computerisation project report. The Minute at Paragraph 2 (by the senior civil servant ) states:

‘The report was well received by the (police) senior officers who seem disposed to agree collectively that a degree of computerisation of criminal intelligence should have priority over other possible applications.  They were attracted to the idea of having a dedicated computer – or rather a number of mini computers or micro computers as was proposed in the report.  Not surprisingly the Management Services Department representatives were less keen; and a long argument developed between the two sides about the report’s assertion that the weight of evidence was in favour of having dedicated machines for most of the applications proposed in computerisation.  The Management Services’ view was pushed to the point of their asserting that  the local authority installation (Honeywell DPS 66) could be expected to give sufficient security and privacy to allow sensitive criminal intelligence to be put on the computer.  The Chief Constable opposed that suggestion vigorously; there was no need for us (the Home Office) to intervene.’ 

Hence it can be seen that the police in this exchange had the tangential support of the Home Office in the procurement of a dedicated police computer system - rather than use the local authority computer. Secondly and for the point of this thesis, the computerisation project would centre on ‘crime information systems’. This is a fundamental and crucial discussion as it was the fulcrum with which may other police forces levered to acquire their own computer systems in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
7.3.8 The Home Office perspective
The Home Office view is contained in paragraph 6 (ibid):
‘He (the Chief Constable) asked for Home office help in the presentation to the police authority in September.  I said we could not appear in the role of people persuading the police authority to spend extra money but that we would be glad to be represented to provide background information about applications in   other police forces and about plans and costs.’
Thus although in private the Home Office were willing to support the police in obtaining their own computers for crime systems, there was no public assurance to council committees that this support was direct , accountable and sustainable.  Councils would then have to assess the cases as prepared by their own chief constables.  In Merseyside, the council’s assessment of their chief constable’s crime recording proposals were coloured by their views on data protection. In that force computers were not permitted to hold crime information about people who had not been convicted.  This meant that complainers details (those who are the victims of crime) would be held on card indices and other information on computer (Minutes of police computer project Liverpool 1980)  This impasse lasted for 3 years until Merseyside Police Committee attended a demonstration of Lothian and Borders Police crime recording computer system. Both local authority police committees were Labour controlled, and the Merseyside committee left Edinburgh knowing that the non convicted information was as secure and as vulnerable as paper systems. The Home Office were conspicuously absent from giving advice to forces other than those ‘chosen’ for the pilot studies.
7.4 The Projects start
Both English police forces were then sent on their way to develop outline operational requirements of their computer needs - with the tacit agreement of the Home Office that they were on the correct path.

A review of the Kent Police progress was summarised by a research computer scientist in the Home Office to a colleague in Police Scientific Development Branch in an internal memorandum dated 14th March 1979.  
‘Compatibility with South Yorkshire;
Only 25% of the Kent (sic) requirement is in common with South Yorkshire (Police).  However PSDB (Police Scientific Development Branch) can and should through normal week to week contact during the preparation of the OR (Operational Requirement) try to keep Kent as close as possible to the South Yorks model within this common area.

Co-operation between Forces
In the other areas mentioned I do agree that our aims should be simple but attainable. However if we can find two or maybe three forces whose implementation plans and time scales are sufficiently similar, we should surely encourage them to work together.  Some financial inducement from the Home Office  together with the prospect of lower software charges from the supplier should help to engender the spirit of compromise that is needed. Indeed it may be that from a pilot study there can emerge a standard software package for what is essentially a simple collection exercise of crime data. ...  Attempt has been made at this stage to investigate differences that may be apparent but Kent and Lothian and Borders would seem to fit the bill at first sight  Humberside have a similar set of requirements but I am not sure that they will react favourably to the prospect of a joint project’
7.4.2 The vision takes shape
This shaft of insight from a computer scientist in the Home Office was seized upon by the Home Office managers with uncharacteristic alacrity.  
The following section reveals the detail of the joint project of the three forces.  The continuation of the project was to seek some sort of joint working with a Scottish police force where there was some commonality of vision..




7.5 The Joint Project Proposals
7.5.1.Initial proposal
In January 1979, the Home Office invited Lothian and Borders police force to join the Joint Project (Letter to the Chief Constable from the Head of F7 Division dated 14th January 1979). There was no commitment to financial or other assistance, merely the aspiration that some meeting of minds in what was essential a common problem  ‘the recording of those crimes made known’ could bring some benefits to the forces concerned.
7.5.2 Initial reaction from the forces

The reaction from the chief constable to the Home Office  was a qualified acceptance of the proposals.  The exchange of correspondence shows that Lothian and Borders Police had already started on systems design and that any slowdown in the impetus by working with other police forces would not be tolerated. This is an interesting aspect of the process and reflects the pressure under which the chief constable of Lothian and Borders Police was working.  The operational officers in his force had already started a police enquiry into the murder of Susan Maxwell.  This incident (along with the abduction and murder of Caroline Hogg in 1982) was seminal in the way the force conducted large scale murder enquiries.  The need for fast and accurate information turn around was rehearsed in senior officers’ meeting and detectives in particular were becoming impatient with the lack of technical support from the experts (interview with retired Deputy Chief Constable 2005)
On 26th March 1979, the Head of Police Scientific Branch formally wrote to the Chief Constables of Kent County Constabulary, Humberside Police and Lothian and Borders Police suggesting a joint project.  The letter was copied to all HMIs (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary) as well as the Technical Committee of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). This would ensure that all forces at senior level were aware of the proposals – a Home Office supported computerisation project.
7.5.3 Description of the forces
Without loss of generality, the three forces, Kent County Constabulary, Humberside Police and Lothian and Borders Police, were different police forces in many ways.  Although subject to the same constitutional strictures, through the Police Acts and the Police (Scotland) Acts, each force was physically different.  Kent is a large southern English county which acts as a feeder to the metropolis of London.  Indeed there are some areas of the force which are more urban based around London and hence the police force has a somewhat  ambivalent outlook - having the Garden of England as well as the capital city to police.  Humberside on the other hand is a county force with a largish town, Kingston upon Hull as its main centre.  Lothian and Borders Police as the last part of the triumvirate, is situated in south east Scotland, has the capital city Edinburgh and some 800,000 inhabitants scattered over (then) two Regional authorities.




The minutes of the Senior Officers meetings of the forces show that in 1976 for both Kent and Humberside, and 1978 for Lothian and Borders, there was an interest spawned to examine the potential benefits from computerising some aspects of the operational police workload.  The Kent and Humberside forces were already working together (see above) .
7.6.1 Initial meeting 9th May 1979
All three forces reacted favourably and sent one page resumes of their computer projects, including staffing, to each other during April 1979.  The Initial Meeting of the Collaborative Project (as the scheme became known) was held in Queen Anne’s Gate, London (the main office of the Home Office) on Wednesday 9th May 1979.  Eighteen people attended the meeting;





Kent Constabulary	Assistant Chief Constable 
			Two operational superintendents
Kent County Council	Deputy County Treasurer

Lothian and Borders	Assistant Chief Constable
Police			An inspector 

Home Office HMI	Assistant to HMCIC

Home Office	F7	The head of F7 Division and one scientist and one police    
	officer
Home Office PNCU	Head of the Police National Computer Unit

Home Office PSDB	Four computer scientists
Minute of the meeting
The minute of the meeting was compiled as follows – dated 9th May 1979

‘Record of the meeting
7.  The Home Office undertook to prepare and circulate in draft a note of the meeting.  Scottish Home and Health Department would continue to be kept informed.’
Initiative for the meeting

It is crucial for this thesis to detail the minutes of the meeting.  The Home Office took credit for calling the meeting;

‘Purpose of the meeting
1.	The meeting had been arranged at the suggestion of the Home Office.  The purpose was to consider the possibility of co-operation between the three forces to procure the computer systems they were contemplating.’

2.	Home Office representatives said that their motives were
A	to encourage economy of effort and money
B	to help forward the process of establishing standards for police operational computers – something they were discussing as a matter of policy with ACPO and
C	to encourage contractors to produce specifically and economically for the police market’

‘Agreement in Principle
  The representative of the three forces said they agreed with the principle of the proposition.  However before agreement in principle could be converted to agreement in practice, each force wished to know the constraints that co-operation would place on them.

Constraints
The constraints appeared to be some diminution of force project control; possible delay where one force had progressed further than the others with their project and;  a degree of compromise over requirements.

Next Steps
It was therefore agreed that representatives of each force should meet in Maidstone (Kent) in May to carry out a closer examination and prepare a short report (Kent Constabulary would take the chair and Home Office Technical Services would provide support) 
and
The full meeting would reconvene in Edinburgh (if possible in June) under the chairmanship of Lothian and Borders to consider the report and decide how matters could be taken forward.’


7.6.2 Analysis of the meeting
In terms of novelty and new thinking these were radical steps.  As has been alluded to in previous sections, Chief Constables are powerful officers, running multi-million pound budgets and free to chase their own operational agendas.  The move to work with one another, under the aegis of the Home Office, was indeed momentous. Operational policing often requires ‘mutual aid’ between forces – some forces have underwater units – others mountain rescue – others specialist criminal investigative officers and these and others are called on by neighbouring forces when required.  However, the basic building blocks of policing – the control of crime data was a different matter.
The control of data is a difficult subject.  If ‘police force A’ creates a record of a criminal and includes a variety of detail including say information about tattoos on the criminal – then that information is available to other forces.(PNC Operations Manual 1976)  If ‘police force B’ then arrests that criminal and amends the record as the criminal has a new tattoo, - then who is responsible for the information?  Clearly a computer can create an audit trail of which police force amended the record and when.  However, considering that 9% of the adult population of the country has been convicted of crime, with another 10% being suspected but not convicted of crime, then data integrity is paramount.  Chief Constables were becoming aware of the need to be responsible for the data collected in their own names and there was a move in some forces to be independent of all other influences.  Hence this move of three chief constables to progress to a detailed meeting was a significant and seismic shift in police thinking


7.6.3 Administrative initiatives to progress the Joint Project
Thereafter in May 1979 a number of letters were sent from Kent County Constabulary to the Home Office and the other forces, dated 10th May 1979; 15th May 1979; 21st May 1979 and 23rd  May 1979, which included suggested agendas for the meeting in Maidstone.  The letter of 23rd May 1979 was a record of a meeting including Home Office officials and gave an outline methodology for the tri-partite meeting to be held in late May. 
Proposed methodology
 The method to be adopted was:

-	Overall Plan – a summarising session where each force would outline the proposals for an information system;

Then technical advisors from the forces and the Home Office would comment on the feasibility of the proposals and abstract the cardinal points of convergence and divergence between the forces.

To achieve this outcome the timetable was suggested as:
1 	Summaries and identification of applications	5 days

2 	Group studies					2 days
3 	Group results and discussions			5 days
4 	Managers’ review and final presentation		5 days
5 	Action plan

The Group Studies section was subdivided as follows
Objectives of computerisation	brief textual statements
Envisaged procedures	mostly annotated logic diagrams
Data	list of data items
Operational manipulation	statement of updates, amendments, 
		searching, weed dates
Estimated volumes	initial estimates of data volumes
Transaction levels	initial estimates of transaction volumes 
		and associated operational tasks.
 Application Groups
To allow these parameters to have meaning, the projects were to be broken down into three main Application Groups:
-	Crime – the recording of crimes made known
-		Property and message switch-the ability to replace Telex and provide a property index
-	Nominal – the holding of information on persons convicted or suspected of crime

These headings are more fully described later.

The outline plans of the joint meeting was approved by the two other forces and the meeting started on 29th May 1979 in Maidstone, Kent.

7.6.4 Details of the Joint Meeting
The Joint Meeting was fundamental to the progress of police computing in the United Kingdom, as police forces were at various stages of computerisation and the model of inter-force working had not been established. (HMCIC Annual Report 1978 (England and Wales).   The Home Office was keen as seen earlier to reduce costs and risks to police forces as other high profile government departments had fallen foul of complex high risk computerisation projects.
7.6.5 Technical address to the meeting
Accordingly a Home Office computer scientist addressed the meeting reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of a joint project.  The possibility of a joint procurement would save the costs involved in a software house providing three sets of application programming.  Additionally there could be savings in buying three sets of hardware from the one supplier if enough time was spent on the specification.  He continued with three considerations;
-	Pooling the experiences and ideas of the three forces should be a benefit;





-	If the project is to succeed  then no one must feel pressurised.


He continued with the Home Office commitment to supplying a full time technical advisor to the joint project.  This would be of assistance to the police forces but the Home Office would also learn from the experience.  The management of such a project with forces at some 500 miles apart, would cause logistical problems.  There were some methods of managing the joint project - from the formation of a team in some location with representatives from all the forces contributing to the research and operational requirement production - through to one force taking the lead in one set of applications and completing the work on behalf of the other forces.  


7.6.6 The Forces’ Proposals






Projected crimes(1988 figures)	80,000 10% growth	54,000  5% growth	137,000 9% growth
(after Hazzell 1978)






1 Superintendent;  1 Chief Inspector; 2 Inspectors; 2 Sergeants; 1 Data Process

 Manager; 2 Analysts (on loan part time from Kent County Council); 1 Office

 manager; 1 typist. 11 staff

Humberside 	
1 Chief inspector; 2 Inspectors; 2 Sergeants; 1 Constable (office manager)	6 staff


Lothian and Borders 	
1 Inspector; 2 Sergeants; 1 Constable; 1 Analyst (on loan from local authority); 1 

clerical assistant; 1 Office Manager.	7 staff.


It was clear that Kent County Constabulary had responded to the computerisation project with some 30% more staff and hence apparently more effort than the other two forces.  In terms of status therefore, Kent with a Superintendent in charge of their project team would be the major player.  Despite this rank differential, Lothian and Borders Police, had a higher crime rate per thousand population and a higher constable rate per thousand population than either of the English forces.  Again these are historical accidents and some attempts to rationalise work levels and force strengths were contained in the Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency Circular of 1967 (Home Office Circular 114/ 67).  These anomalies would play a part in the final decision making process in a later meeting.






Network	VDUs and printers all subdivisions	VDUs and printers all sub divisions and selected departments	VDUs and printers all sub divisions
Criminal/Nominal	Multi factor search all terminals	Multi factor search all terminals	Multi factor search all terminals
Input	All terminals	All terminals	Central except stop checks
Nominal	1. all PNC fields  2) additional Kent fields	Basic fields, name, date of birth, description	6 basic fields
CRO Records	Summary of conviction only	Conviction summary	Separate Scottish system (SCRO computer project)
Collator’s Records	Current information	Current information	Specific current information –active convicted criminals
Crime Intelligence	Current information	Current information	Active convicted criminals
Vehicles	Owned/used by criminals	Owned/used by criminal	Active convicted criminals

Note VDUs = visual display units  - the ‘non intelligent’ precursor of desk top computers.

From the table it could be seen that generally there was a degree of similarity between the three forces.  Obvious differences in criminal records were apparent  where all forces had access to PNC (Police national Computer) Convictions for those crimes which carried a specific penalty or were of such a nature as to require the keeping of information for the safety of the public.  In Scotland the Scottish Criminal Record Office was undergoing a computerisation project to allow all Scottish forces access to all convictions within Scottish courts.  Hence Lothian and Borders Police required an interface with that system as well as an interface to the PNC system.

The methodology of crime recording was again different - Kent would not have a central input of crime - whilst Lothian and Borders were undertaking a sizing and timing experiment in with one division to gauge the benefits of centralised input.
7.6.7 Centralised input of crime reports
The quality of data was paramount as far as Lothian and Borders Police were concerned.  The computer maxim of GIGO – Garbage In – Garbage Out -  was fundamental to the thinking of the Project Team.  Early computer work on an ITT 2020 microcomputer had shown that unless there was expensive and comprehensive fuzzy matching algorithms constructed, then spelling of names, addresses and dates of birth, then any wrong data would be lost in the computer.  There was no facility in these early systems for spell checking but there was a development of drop down lists for specific areas of the computer record.  Hence Lothian and Borders Police were evaluating a data collection service in which a team of computer operators dedicated to the function of data collection, worked a 24 hour 7 days per week cycle of shift patterns to provide a standardised and consistent library of crime data.  
Lastly, the main difference was in the attention to future details of data protection legislation.  Lothian and Borders were mindful through the proposed weeding policy outlined in the Nominal File application, that keeping of information would be circumscribed sometime in the future. The reports by the Younger (1972) and Lindop  Committees (1982) on what  became known as ‘data protection’ – the right of the public to examine what was held on computer about them (unless national security were involved), exercised the Project Team in Edinburgh. Hence a weeding policy, where the computer would search indices  for the date of the entry for the information, and then provide an automatic copy of the information.  This requirement was an absolute for the ‘Stop Check’ facility within Nominal File.  A patrolling constable may be suspicious of a person because of some exhibited behaviour.  The law in Scotland and England allows for a degree of questioning of the person and the confirmation of name, date and place of birth.  However the difference in record keeping was stark. The  information would be held for 30 days in Scotland (and without limit in England) and then printed off as a weeding policy requirement.  If nothing further came to the notice of the police then the information would be destroyed in Scotland.
Record keeping divergence
Both Kent and Humberside had no such requirement and thus there would be additional software costs specifically for Lothian and Borders.
7.6.8 Detail of the applications
With this preliminary outline, the project teams split into three main groups, with one officer from each force in each of the functional groups along with technical support from Home Office.

The next 2 days were spent in detailed discussion by the three groups to establish further details of the forces’ requirements and to highlight further differences which may affect software/ hardware contractors. The results of these discussions were then presented to the full meeting;
7.6.9 Team Report -  Criminal Information Systems
Chief Inspector  (Humberside); Chief Inspector  (Kent); Sergeant  (Lothian and Borders).

The team set the objective for criminal information systems for the three forces as:

To receive and collate all criminal information held within the force, making it locally available on a 24 hour basis and providing multi-factor search facilities with rapid response, having regard to the particular application to which the enquiry is directed’








Thereafter the team specified the detail of each of the major files giving the few areas where there was disagreement between the forces.  The major area was that of weeding.  

Lothian and Borders were mindful of the need to meet the aspirations of the Lindop Committee which required the safe keeping and regular weeding of computer files.  Hence any system would require to be programmed so that when a specified weed date was met, then the computer would alert the operator that the file had to be reviewed.  Thereafter force procedures would allow for the destruction of the information, or the safe keeping on computer of the information with a supervisory note that the information was required. 

Kent and Humberside considered that these precautions were an unnecessary burden to an already complex system.  The proposal was that when the system was finally approved, then Lothian and Borders would require to pay for the additional software. 

This was the first major test for the Home Office.  From another part of the same government organisation, the Data Protection Act 1984 was already taking shape.  That the Joint Project Home Office senior staff were unable or unwilling to influence a clear dichotomy of outlook between non technical police officers was a manifest problem. The information regarding speculative and real information was already being discussed within Home Office – although not in the Police Science Division but in an adjacent section.  The outlook even at this stage looked bleak as the forces representatives’ struggled with technical detail without assistance.
 However as both Kent and Humberside required a direct link to the Police National Computer (PNC Interface) and Lothian and Borders had decided to access PNC through the oncoming Scottish Criminal Records Office Computer interface, then the additional software costs for the two forces would be required to be funded by them.  
The last major area of disagreement was in the area of ‘Stop Checks’. The notes in the minutes reads as follows:
STOP CHECKS
(Place, time, date, officer dealing and free text)
Area of Disagreement Lothian and Borders – who, where no file  exists require this information to be entered on a temporary file – raised as an unsolicited message for confirmation and not searchable until confirmed.’
Further under the heading INTELLIGENCE which included Place, time day date Officer and free text, the minute reads that Lothian and Borders are not prepared to allow items of intelligence which can not be proved to be entered.
These early considerations were a view of the Chief Constable of Lothian and Borders to maintain a system which would be able to be inspected and found to comply with threatened legislation.  This reflected the work with Richard Kinsey an academic in Edinburgh University School of Criminology who had been researching the use of police computers. (Baldwin and Kinsey 1982).  Kinsey had met with the computer project team and had actually been taken on police patrol to Craigmillar, Edinburgh to allow him to gather ideas and facts for his forthcoming book.  His interviews with senior officers in the force and with the computer team centred on the ‘free text’ facility.  Kinsey was concerned that civil liberties would be usurped by the police being able to search large databases for information - where the current practice of index cards did not allow this to happen. This subject is examined in greater detail  below.
Lastly the notes on file in handscript show that the Home Office recipient of the notes – Superintendent  Police Research Services Unit and dated 7th June 1979, was discontent with the Lothian and Borders position regarding free text.  His note shows that the Home Office would not support any additional costs to meet free text protection systems as required by Lothian and Borders. However as a police superintendent, his word was placed alongside those of an independent academic – and the chief constable of Lothian and Borders appealed to the Home Office for a definitive answer to the ‘free information’ problem.  No answer was forthcoming and Lothian and Borders Police were left to decide whether to use free text in the system. The decision by the Project Team was influenced by meetings with Nunn Price – the author of the free text programme STATUS – which was in use in universities and the nuclear industry.


7.6.10 Team Report Crime Reporting System 

The second report was on Crime Recording

Superintendent Kent; Inspector Humberside and Detective Sergeant Lothian and Borders.

The team reported that Kent and Humberside both had identical systems but Lothian and Borders required to meet different criteria;

1	 	Kent and Humberside will immediately record a crime on receipt of the initial information;  Lothian and Borders will verify a crime by having a uniformed officer attend at the scene;
2	 	Kent and Humberside will hold descriptions of unnamed suspects on the Crime Recording file;  Lothian and Borders require an automatic link to Nominal File of any suspects in the system.  This in turn would generate an automatic search through the nominal file information to allow for any matches to be highlighted to the operator.
3	 	Lothian and Borders required an updating process on the crime report which would allow the enquiry officer’s particulars to be associated with the crime. Additionally that force required a 40 day reminder that the crime had not been either solved or written off as unsolved.  These systems were not required by the other two forces.
This disagreement showed that one force was trying to use computers to assist with the administration of 60,000 crimes per year.  The other two forces were content to maintain their present systems of card indices and office ‘pott books’ to administer all crimes reported.  Again the Home Office had an opportunity to speak to the benefits of computerised administration and the potential saving of manpower along with increased accuracy – but no such advice was presented to the team.




















Time day and date of incident

Sex of injured person

Name of injured party

Date of birth of injured party

Address of injured party







Investigation Officer(Lothian and Borders only)






















These additional items were not significant in terms of system design as they were 





7.6.11 Team Report Police National Computer Interface

The final report to the meeting was on  PNC Interface and Message Switching





The objective of this team was to provide a transparent interface from the local computer to the PNC which would  allow a computer operator one single enquiry to examine both local and national data.  The report showed that the differences in the approaches of the three forces were marginal with Kent wanting a ‘wrap round’ facility.  This would allow incoming messages from PNC – in response to an enquiry from the local computer, to be included in a Kent Constabulary screen format – allowing VDU operators a ‘same screen’ facility.  Within the Message switching facility both Humberside and Lothian and Borders required addressable printers – i.e. synchronous rather than ‘dumb’ or asynchronous.  This facility would allow the central computer to confirm that a message sent to the printer had arrived.  The packet switching system used in these computer allowed for ‘polling’ of terminals - with the computer sending a question ‘are you there’ and the synchronous terminal responding ‘ yes I am’ or no answer in the case of a fault.  The networking solution required would have to be more resilient to allow for this traffic up and down the lines.  However, Kent did not require this facility -  hence suppliers would need to design two different networking solutions or provide Kent with the same solution but hide the networking protocol under a different programme.
7.6.12 Conclusion of the Joint Meeting
Generally, there was agreement that the systems proposed were similar if not analogous – the recording of crime was a national requirement as was the provision of crime statistics – and so there was a commonality of purpose in this area.  The Interface to PNC was also a standard issue and if properly designed and resourced could be made available to other forces.  Lastly the keeping of information on convicted and unconvicted persons was standard – names, addresses and physical details were all common to the three forces – the only difference was the length of time the information were to be kept.

7.6.13 Record of the joint Meeting
The results of these deliberations were reported to all concerned in a minute dated 7th June 1979 constructed by a Superintendent of Kent County Constabulary -known as the Kent Report.
7.7 The Edinburgh Meeting
Thereafter the crucial meeting to decide the future of the tripartite project was held on 28th June 1979 in Police Headquarters, Edinburgh.






	Lothian and Borders Police
	Lothian Regional Council
	HMCIC England and Wales
	HMCIC Scotland
	Police Scientific Development Branch
	Police Research Services Unit




The chair was assumed by the Deputy Chief Constable Lothian and Borders Police.  He welcomed the delegates and asked for an open and honest discussion as the matter was of vital importance to the police service. He recognised the initiative of F7 Division in the creation of the Joint Project thus far.  He referred to the report of the joint meeting of the project teams – the Kent Report and congratulated the teams on the timeliness of their endeavours. 

 Thereafter the team leaders from the three functional areas gave presentations on PNC, Nominal File and Crime Recording respectively, highlighting the similarities and differences between the proposals.

  The Lothian and Borders Police Deputy Chief Constable then asked PSDB to introduce the PSDB Addendum to the report.  A scientist highlighted the severe difficulties faced in trying to estimate the proposed saving from a joint venture.  Based on the Kent Report, he estimated that each force could save between £150,000 - £250,000 on software.  It had not been possible to estimate the savings in hardware but a savings of 10-15% could be negotiated from the successful bids for three sets of computers.  However there were add on costs for project management and the logistics of the police officers travelling to complete the Operational Requirements.  He further estimated that the timescales would be of the following order;

	Operational Requirement		6 months
	Detailed Operational Requirement  	9 months
	Software Development			18 months

	Trials and testing			8 months

Giving a time delay of 41 months from a start date of August 1979.  Lastly the scientist noted that a Joint Project with a single contract would be easier to handle that three separate contracts with a diminution of central support and control..
Discussion ensued with the Deputy Chief Constable emphasising that Lothian and Borders required a decision that day and that approval to circulate an operational requirement had already been received from the Joint Police Board in Edinburgh.  The major problem for all forces was the distance involved.  A number of scenarios were proposed, from a Joint Project Team being centred in one force with officers travelling each week - to each force taking responsibility for one aspect of the Requirement and meeting monthly to adjudge progress.  
7.7.2 The Home Office thoughts
The Home Office view was that although this project could assist the police throughout the country, no development funds were available. A senior computer development officer could be seconded to the project - but not to three locations. Although it had been a Home Office initiative, no management for the project could be forthcoming from Home Office staff.  A senior manager would be tasked with the oversight of this project, along with other projects in the computer field. The limit of some £10,000 per annum for 4 years would not be exceeded.  
This parsimony was to be ill founded. The total projected spend for the three forces would exceed £8 million, and the projected management assistance for the Home Office initiative was £10,000.  At that time, £10,000 would fund a junior grade civil service scientist with minimal project management experience but with good academic credentials. 


7.7.3 The Joint Project Decision
After a prolonged discussion, the Deputy Chief Constable on behalf of Lothian and Borders Police stated that although the attractions of a joint project were evident in costs savings, the timescale of 41 months was unacceptable.  Secondly the logistics of having officers away from home for the best part of 4 years – to ensure continuity – was not a route that the force could countenance.  Lastly he reminded the meeting that an outline operational requirement was to hand for his force and the local authority had consented to its circulation.  Accordingly Lothian and Borders could not be part of the Joint Project.







The  Lothian and Borders Police Sole Project

This part of the thesis analyses the development of Lothian and Borders Police Computer Assisted Policing project. This section is divided into the following subsections;
	   Reasons for the new system.
	The Operational Requirement dated July 1979
	The negotiations with contractors
	The Detailed Operational Requirement dated June 1980




8.1 Reasons for the New System







Force			Gross expenditure   Population      Expenditure/Population
Central Scotland Police	£4.3 million	273,000	15.75
Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary	£2.4 million	147,999	16.22
Fife Constabulary	£5.1 million	346,500	14.72
Grampian Police	£7.6 million	515,600	14.74




(Source HMCIC Tables 1978)

This simple comparison shows that the pattern of expenditure is not equitable across the Scotland and the reasons are not for this thesis.  However, the Home Office and the Scottish Home and Health Department  in issuing the documentation sought to bring ‘new thinking’ to one of the principle public services -  policing - and this trend was continued by other ministries - health and education being the most well recognised -  for some 20 years.  The comparison was meant to show the ratio spent on each person for policing services and to make the police accountable for the spend of public money (Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency Circulars 1967-1980)

 There were for the first time in the police service a series of simple minded comparisons of crime rates (crimes per thousand of population), of fatal road traffic accidents (per ten thousand of the population) between forces.  This was new ground - with performance issues of ‘solved crime’ being compared between forces as a matter of pride or contempt.  So the scene was changing and Chief Constables were being issued with new challenges from the centre.

Information from Chief Constables to the public is contained inter alia in the report of the Chief Constable, which is published annually according to the terms of the Police (Scotland) Act 1965, as amended.  The Act states that ‘in a form and by a date to be agreed, the chief constable of an area shall report on the state of crime and other matters to the police authority for that area’.

In order to assuage the pressing needs of operational detectives for reliable information; to meet the government’s needs for efficient policing and to meet the expectations of a public keen to know that the local police were fighting crime effectively, the chief constable, called a small team of junior officers to his office in August 1978.  His brief to this team was short and pointed.  The team were young in service and what they would achieve, they would live with for the rest of their service; the team was energetic and keen; the brief was
 to buy a computer within 3 years.
  The team’s response was swift – a computer to do what?
Just make sure that there is a computer running in this force in 3 years and especially before Kent Police have theirs.(Lothian and Borders Police Computer Project Minutes 1978)
This true anecdote is symptomatic of high ranking police officers who had served their country through the Second World War and were operational pragmatists.  They knew something had to be done but were not sure what.  The team of young officers included one of the three pure science graduates in the Scottish Police at that time, as well as a future Inspector of Constabulary – was perhaps a wise choice.

The reports of the Chief Constable of Lothian and Borders Police for the appropriate years show the genesis of the computerised crime recording system as follows:

1978	Report of the Chief Constable, p.7 
published March 1979
‘Computers can offer a means of supplying speedy information to operational policemen and directly support police operations.  During the year a full time Project Team was formed to prepare a concept of a complete computerised information system to serve the Force’s needs.  A Feasibility Report has been prepared by my officers assisted by a Senior Systems Analyst on secondment from Lothian Region Computer Division and are now preparing a Detailed Operational Requirement’.

This statement was contained in the general introduction to the Annual Report and consists of only the one paragraph.  The intent is clear - to provide a speedy means of supplying operational officers with information to allow them to complete their policing tasks.  As an aside, the language of the 1970s would be considered improper now- the use of the term ‘policemen’ rather than ‘police officers and support staff’ - as would be the accepted syntax of today.
8.2.1 The Feasibility Study
The Chief Constable’s report contains reference to the Feasibility Report.  This report was commissioned by the Chief Constable directly with the Project Team.  The team was issued with a roving commission to examine the workings of Lothian and Borders Police and to recommend what areas could benefit from computerisation.  The Feasibility Report indeed touched on the whole gamut of police administration and operational support but the decisive issue was that of crime.  The force had already been involved in many major crime investigations including child murders and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) felt that their needs were not being identified and addressed. The Feasibility Study utilised questionnaires, personal interviews and researched other forces (listed in Appendix One) as a means of coming to their conclusions.  

In terms of output, the Feasibility Report was a slim 20 page document but it contained copious references to the paucity of crime information available in the force.  The crime recording system was staffed in force headquarters by 18 people – some police officers and some support staff – all under the charge of a chief inspector. At each Divisional and sub Divisional headquarters at least 6 staff at each of the 14 locations were involved in crime data management  The detail of the crime recording indexing system is rehearsed elsewhere in this thesis. However, the rate of ‘mistakes’ – either crimes being misfiled, lost or replaced in the wrong category, reached 28% of searches made during the Feasibility Study period.  The conclusion of the Feasibility Study was that a
‘crime centred computer system would supply operational officers with the information they required and create a paperless system – saving on administrative manpower by 50%. It is considered that 45 staff throughout the force will be released from administratively redundant posts by the inception of a crime based computer system. If this is achieved then the computer will pay for itself in 5 years.’
The achievement of the staffing solution proved to be more of an illusion that a fact. The unknowns of running a star network of computers and printers over 1.6 million acres of the south east of Scotland proved to be more manpower intensive than had been projected.  Further the running of a large scale main frame computer required two persons per shift over the 24 hour day – and this alone came to 14 staff.  Thereafter the research which followed (Lothian and Borders Police Headquarters Efficiency Scrutiny 1993 completed by the author of this study) showed that the cost of the crime based computer was not met by the projected savings in 1978 and that costs involved in staff training and support were greatly underestimated.
8.3.1Computer Procurement Commences
The launch of the procurement process was based on this analysis – and the reality of the promise of a paperless system is exploded below and the hope of a release of 45 staff to operational duties was proved to be over optimistic.  However, the Project Team who wrote the Feasibility Report and oversaw the introduction of the new computer were not held to account for these claims.  Indeed, one officer became a Deputy Chief Constable, then Assistant to Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary and latterly Director of the Scottish Police College; another team member became a Divisional Commander –at Chief Superintendent level and at one time a computer adviser to the Home Office, and the other team member – a Detective Chief Inspector.

However, the Feasibility Report was examined by the Director of Computing in Lothian Regional Council – and he agreed with the conclusions – recommending a full Operational Requirement be constructed.  The Chief Constable seized on this approval and issued a strong lead in the next Annual Report.
p.6 published March 1980
‘In last year’s report I mentioned the formation of a computer project Team, whose remit was to analyse the needs of the force in terms of computer aid.  Such equipment is absolutely essential in providing speedy and accurate information to assist individual officers in the investigation of crime and with dealing with modern criminal techniques.  I am pleased to say that the analysis part of the exercise is now complete and a comprehensive programme of future needs has been identified.’

Again there is an emphasis on the need for speedy information but this year  there is the addition of the adjective ‘accurate’. 

  This subtle change in the report mirrors the correspondence which the Chief Constable had with Richard Kinsey (Baldwin and Kinsey, 1982).  Kinsey had been allowed access to operational policing in the Craigmillar area of Edinburgh during the summer and autumn of 1979.  During that time the Computer Project Team was forming its research into an Operational Requirement and met with Kinsey on a number of occasions. 

Richard Kinsey and the author of this thesis discussed the ramifications of ‘free text retrieval’.  This function would allow a computer to search the records of all crimes for single words; multiple words or even phrases.  The technical elements of this system is considered later and it fell to the author to champion this element of the system against the academic doubts.  Kinsey was concerned about the use of ‘free text’ to search large databases (Baldwin and Kinsey page 61) and so the change in the textual report to the Police Authority contained a reference to ‘accurate’.  The definition of ‘accurate’ is not considered in the Chief Constable’s report as it is clearly assumed that ‘accurate’ means ‘without error’.  However in dealing with crime information as shall be shown later, ‘accurate’ cannot always be thought of as ‘without error’.


1979	Annual Report pps.39 – 40 
‘Design work for a police dedicated computer system continued and the Force Project Team gave a presentation to Elected Members on the recommended facilities. Following this presentation the Police Board approved the circulation of a Detailed Operational Requirement to potential suppliers.  When complete, the system will provide computer links through the force area and will provide operational officers with accurate and relevant information when they require it’.

This is an extract from the Annual Report of a two page entry of the work of the police computer project team.  The significance of this annual report, is that this element of police work, no longer occupies  space in the Chief Constable’s foreword to the annual report.  On this occasion, for the first time, the project team is an entity in itself - a self sufficient police department with a full time staff, administration and funding.  The second significant issue is that of approval.  The Police Board gave approval to the force to issue a tender document to the computer trade following a presentation of the proposed system.

  In an unusual step, the Chief Constable invited all elected members of the Lothian Regional Council and the Borders Regional Council, to the presentation by the project team.  The constitutional position is that the Police Board - made up of elected councillors from the constituent local authorities, -  has the financial authority to fund this sort of venture.  By inviting all councillors to a presentation, the Chief Constable saw that the fears of elected members, that the police would have their own ‘dedicated’ computer,  would not lead to a surveillance state being instituted by the police.

1981  p38   
1982 p39    
In these two annual reports, the Chief Constable refers to ‘The implementation of a dedicated computer system based on a Honeywell DPS 8/20 started in January 1981’ and ‘The implementation of the police computer system continued in 1982.  The first system Crime Reporting deals with the recording of crime made known to the police.  This system  went ‘live’ in all Divisions by mid December 1982 and all divisions were recording crime on computer by then.  There have been some noticeable successes in solving crime – especially in the field of stolen property being used to trace culprits for their criminal acts … New work has now started on a Code of Practice for all the police systems in view of the impending legislation which will be headed Data Protection’.





8.3.2 The Operational Requirement dated July 1979

With the collapse of the Joint Approach towards crime recording with Kent County Constabulary and Humberside Police on 28th  June 1979,  Lothian and Borders Police decided to progress alone. 

The Project Team remained intact led by a police inspector, two sergeants and an computer analyst from Lothian Regional Council Computer Department.  The team was augmented by a Chief Inspector on ill health duties who was appointed as Office Manager.
8.3.3 Project Management 
The structure of the control mechanism for the project was:
The Policy Group, headed by Deputy Chief Constable, with the Director of Computing, Lothian Regional Council and a number of representatives from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (Scotland) – a Superintendent and from the Home Office and from the Scottish Home and Health Department, the Grade 5 civil Servant – from Police Division
The Management Group consisted of the Project Team along with representatives of the police staff associations - The Scottish Police Federation, The Association of Scottish Police Superintendents and the National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO).

The purpose of these two groups was to keep the project team on course and to ensure compliance with the Standing Orders of Lothian Regional Council regarding the purchasing of equipment. It is clear that these structures were affected by the project management package PROMPT, which had been issued by the Home Office for forces to follow.  PROMPT was later subsumed by SSADM and then enlarged to include full project control under PRINCE and even later PRINCE2.  The detail of PROMPT was considered too intricate for Lothian and Borders Police, especially in the method ‘change control’ if a specified item of software required to be altered.  The record keeping of these systems would have required additional administrative staff. As the project was initially priced at £1.5 million, (Lothian and Borders Police Board Minutes, July 1979), it was essential that the police followed the purchasing rules, despite the Regional Council’s own ‘sole supplier’ contract for computer equipment.  This point was important as explained below.
8.3.4 Distribution of documentation to the computer industry






This format was chosen with the advice of CCTA - the Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency of the Home Office, (correspondence November 1978), in order  to meet purchasing requirements which were Home Office based.

However, the advice from Lothian Regional Council Computer Department was quite different.  The Regional Council was in a ‘sole supplier contract’ with ICL -International Computers Limited - and the Council - as advisors to the Chief Constable  - would have preferred a sole supplier contract. The sole supplier contracts were found by the police officers dealing with the procurement to be open ended and allowed a degree of flexible working which was unusual to strict police control procedures.  By adopting a sole supplier situation, the police would require to learn many of the computer techniques in a ‘knowledge transfer’ basis, to allow the computer system to meet the strict performance criteria. In comparison with a ‘turnkey’ contract where the computer company bid against a set specification










Running of the software

Whilst the apparent dichotomy between the two organisations, Lothian Regional Council and CCTA, seemed to be insurmountable, the Project Team took the central government advice.  This decision was based on pure pragmatism, the need to meet competitive tendering rules - as a means to achieving ‘best value’.  Best value was deemed to be the best price matched with the nearest fit to the perceived needs of the force.  This was an important step for the police service as never before had a force contravened the direction of its’ local authority on such a scale.  The Project Team however, was keen to examine all aspects of this ‘new world’ of computing to try to meet the aspirations of the operational officer – rather than to construct an administrative replica for an outmoded paper system.

8.3.5 Operational Requirement detail
The Operational Requirement documentation consisted of the three documents which had a foreword as follows:

‘The attached Operational Requirement outlines the needs of Lothian and Borders Police in terms of a dedicated Information System and is circulated to all suppliers who might have an interest in submitting proposals as a result of the detail contained herein.  The Phase I developments described may form the basis of requirements under preparation in other Forces.’

Even in this brief introduction of what was destined to be a two year £1.5 million pound procurement process, the authors of the Operational Requirement were trying to entice computer suppliers with the blandishments of either joint developments – or onward sale of ideas and software.  The correspondence between the Chief Constable and the Director of Computing at Lothian Regional Council (May and June 1979) showed that the Director was aghast at the apparent business acumen or as he later said, the ’animal cunning’ of what were comparatively junior police officers.  Despite the fact that the joint venture had collapsed, there was the obvious spin off for other forces to follow the lines of Lothian and Borders Police.  Indeed this point was emphasised at Section 6 of the Operational Requirement;

‘Suppliers are free to propose a bespoke system written in standard languages,   one based upon standard packages,  a modification of a system developed elsewhere, or a combination of the three, which ever they believe to be the most cost effective’.

So computer suppliers were being encouraged to share expertise to try to reduce the costs of developing ‘leading edge technology’ for the police.
In terms of strategic thinking, this was new ground for the police.  The English forces were very much constrained by the Home Office view that the licensing of software would be in the name of the Home Office and any new developments would be controlled by either a licence or by a patent.  The Scottish force on the other hand were virtually free agents with no central government dictat to straightjacket their thinking or application.  By trying to entice computer suppliers to utilise expertise developed elsewhere, the project team sought two strategic views – firstly to speed up the commissioning of the new system and secondly to attempt to encourage other forces into buying into the new system.  As the project team at that stage was led by a police inspector – answerable directly to the Deputy Chief Constable – the same officer who had been rebuffed some three years previously in correspondence and personal visits to the Home Office regarding computer development – there was a perverse enthusiasm at chief officer level to bring to fruition a new crime recording system – ahead of anything in England.  However, there was still a reluctance at that level of policing to actively seek out development partners (ACPOS Council Minutes 1978)
8.3.6 The Functionality








Phase II applications were:
	Report Formats
	Major Incident Contingencies
	Burglar Alarm and Key Holders





P.N.C. is the acronym for the Police National Computer which had been an operational system since 1974.  The PNC system held details of some 33 million motor vehicles and their registered keepers (and owners if different) along with a list of persons wanted or reported missing and this information was available to all police forces through a computer star network.  An interface was the ability to use a Lothian and Borders computer terminal to interrogate the PNC.  Similarly the S.C.R.O. (Scottish Criminal Records Office) computer was a development in Scotland to hold information on convicted and processed persons.  This project was designed to be co-terminus with the Lothian and Borders Computer Assisted Policing Project.  In reality the local force went ‘live’ some 18 months before the national project and indeed supplied that project with computer assistance. (correspondence between Lothian and Borders Police and SCRO Computerisation project regarding the Back record Conversion of 500,000 criminal names for the SCRO computer May – June 1982).

Whilst this thesis is centred on Crime Recording, a note of explanation will clarify the relationship to the other applications.
8.3.7  Police System Detail
The core of the system was the ability to send messages of whatever kind around the force area; to other police computer systems and to replace the outdated Telex system thereby allowing computer communications with the outside world.  Hence the term Message Switching.  Indeed the Operational Requirement at page 5 states:

‘The basic objective of the message switching application is to improve inter-force communications by providing a more extensive terminal network comprising of V.D.Us (visual display units) and associated printers and incorporating an inter-divisional link and automatic store and forward facilities’.

In comparison with twenty first century computer technology, the language seems heavy handed and the differentiation between ‘inter’ and ‘intra’ had obviously not been established.  However in comparison with the Telex system of communication, this was indeed a quantum leap.  The Telex system is described thus;

‘1.2.3 A number of factors mitigate against full usage of the network viz;
-	 	the preparation of messages, using torn tape, is open to interruption and possible message loss, although this could be overcome by the provision of stand alone tape editors
-	 	the ‘edit’ facilities on teletype machines are not particularly efficient or easy to use
-	 	Teletypes are situated at Divisional offices where a multiplicity of tasks exist and the time spent in message preparation cannot readily be spared
-	 	In the past there has been a dearth of teletype training and the operators are largely unskilled in using the machines.
-	 	The growth of P.N.C. broadcast messages and ease of transmission of these message by computer terminals, is somewhat defeated by the need to cut 5 track tape for re-transmission to those Divisional Offices without P.N.C. facilities.

1.2.4 ... The Central Computer will be required to act as a message switching centre and provide an automatic store and forward facility’

Hence the real need here is the pragmatic and reliable transfer of messages - of information or data - to allow the police service to communicate in a reliable manner.
8.3.8 Crime Recording
The Operational Requirement at page 11 states:
- 	‘The objectives of the Crime Reporting System are to store all details of crime  reported in the force area;
- 	to provide multi-factor searching on the stored data and




This section of the Operational Requirement includes the real reasons for the system at paragraph 2.2.10

2.2.10 ‘The projected (crime) workload within the force area for 1990 is an estimated 161,797 crimes reported and an estimated 53,932 amendments to these reports, each crime report and amendment will need to be accessed subsequently to permit the ‘action taken’ to be recorded.  It is obvious that the present recording system could not cope with such a volume of information without seriously impairing operational efficiency.

2.3.	Proposed System
In order to improve input and retrieval while reducing clerical effort, all crimes falling into Scottish Home and Health Department Classifications I – VI, and some falling into Classification VII, will be held on file.

2.3.1	Input and retrieval will be available at all terminals on a 24 hour, 7 days a week basis.
2.3.2	All reports will be held on line for 12 months and thereafter dumped to magnetic tape and retained for a further period of two years.  Thereafter they will be micro-filmed and held for a further period of 10 years.
2.4	Basic Facilities
The following on line facilities are required
	Input of crime reports and amendments
	Multi-factor searching on data from such input
	Automatic matching with Lost and Found Property
	Automatic notification of the ‘suspect’ section of the crime report to the Officer in Charge Nominal File
	Production of ‘tagged’ incidents
	Production of lists of reports not completed within certain periods
	Production of magnetic tapes for the Scottish Home and Health Department Statistics purposes.’

The Operational Requirement then follows with a ‘method statement’ which was crucial to the ‘new ideas’ surrounding this project.

 The capture of crime information through the recording system extant in 1978, has already been described.  The decision making was subjective and at times patronising to the public who were kept far from the recording system.  It was a tenet of the new idea, that decision making should be supported by technology and should be removed from the ‘vested interests’ of operational CID officers.  Following extensive research regarding the capture of information,  the Computer Project Team decided on the following system;
8.3.9 Data capture proposals
All data would be telephoned to a central point, the Input Bureau, where V.D.U.s would be clustered.  The staff would be (young) (female) clerical assistants, working on a 24 hour 7 day per week shift system.  They would be trained to answer police officers and at times take direct crime information from members of the public.  In the event of a crime being committed in a dwelling house, the police officer attending was encouraged to phone the ‘Input Bureau’ from the dwelling – and put the crime on the computer immediately.  This pattern of reporting would show to the public that the police were taking every effort to record the crime and catch the offender.  If there was a particular problem, perhaps with the description of an item stolen, then the householder could speak directly to the Input Operator, with first hand details.
8.3.10 New techniques involving the public
This was a cosmic shift in police behaviour allowing members of the public an insight to the mechanics of crime recording.  The ‘hard sell’ of ‘it’s on the computer’ was another attempt to encourage the public to be speedy in their reporting of crime.  However police attitudes were at times slow to change and the training effort to provide 2,400 police officers and 1,200 support staff with new facilities was immense.
(Lothian and Borders Police Computer Training Manuals 1980).

In essence the details of the crime were telephoned into the centre and a clerical assistant answered the call.  The information was elicited from the caller by a question and answer system which led the caller through the information required for the completion of the report.

The use of technology was to be innovative.  ‘Drop down’ menus were requested which would assist the clerical assistant in the completion of the report.  For example, if the crime type – Theft - were to be chosen, then the system would look for a minimum number of fields relating to theft, to be completed.  These would include the complainer – the person who had the article stolen and a property description.  To assist the operator a sub menu of property type was requested to be  constructed and formed into an alphabetical list from which a corresponding article could be chosen.

8.3.11 Property data
Computer suppliers were warned of the dangers inherent in property matching.  Stolen property was normally of value and could be disposed of within the criminal fraternity; found property on the other hand, very often was a single glove; miscellaneous keys  and other items of little value.  Hence although computers were able to match lists of articles from different sources, the concept of ‘fuzzy matching’  was developed. The concept according to page 27 of the Operational Requirement was to allow computers to match articles found by the public and handed into a police station - with articles reported as having been lost by a member of the public - but also with the articles reported stolen from scenes of crime.
As far as found property was concerned, Lothian and Borders Police was organised into the pre - local government reorganisation model (1975) which centred these activities on Livingston, West Lothian, police headquarters for the City of Edinburgh, Dalkeith for both East and Mid Lothian, and Hawick, for the Scottish Borders.

Hence property found in Hawick was administered locally and the likelihood of any link with the City of Edinburgh was considered remote.  The concept of the new computerised system was to allow enquiry police officers to search multi databases from the computer terminal at their desk – and hence link with any crime in other areas.  The ‘fuzzy matching’ development arose out of the need to describe articles in a uniform way.  Either a constrained list of approved nouns would be constructed - with constrained descriptions - or officers and support staff would be allowed to use the full range of the English language.

The Detailed Operational requirement set a scenario for the computer suppliers
Consider the proposition that an article of jewellery is found on the street.  It is a brooch, circular in shape, made of yellow metal with on the obverse 20 light coloured stones in a fish like design.  The reverse is hall marked and is mounted with a clasp and clip to hold the brooch in place.

The constrained language - ‘yellow metal’ rather than gold;  ‘light coloured stones’ rather than diamonds, reveal the pedantic method used by the police service to hold information.  However, there is no real difficulty in this case as these descriptors can easily be subsumed in a ‘list’ facility within a computer..

Now consider the description of a youth leaving the scene of a crime when an article of clothing is dropped from his hasty getaway.

‘Sports top’;  ‘jersey’;  ‘shirt’; ‘cardigan’; ‘top’ ‘hood or hoodie’; could be used to describe the article.  How does a computer know which to look for?

The Detailed Operational Requirement at p.105 outlines the proposed system

3.7.2.3	MATCHING OF PROPERTY
4	For each Found or Lost report added to the system, an automatic match will be attempted against the corresponding Lost or Found Property reports, taking into consideration the major property items involved, the time, date and locus of the find or loss, and the minor property items. These factors will produce a hit list which the system will display as a series of summaries sorted so that the first will have the highest level of confidence.  The operator will have the facility to examine each record on the hit list in full, return to the hit list or amend the record displayed,  to direct the system to send a standard letter to the loser.

Thereafter within the Detailed Operational Requirement p.109 an outline is given of the matching criteria;















3.7.5.3 	The above is a suggested method of dealing with automatic matching although any system should be based on the search criteria specified.  Suppliers should detail their approach to this particular aspect of the property system and are required to specify;
i.	what level of response times can be anticipated from a property search on all fields on the database as outlined earlier and
ii.	what facilities are available to tune the proposed system.

Within the ‘fuzzy matching algorithms’ were built synonym chains - words which referred to the same type of article but could be classified as similar or analogous.  The computer algorithms were based on Cobol, the high level computer language commonly used in the 1970 and according to Shave (page 128) were code inefficient for this type of work.  The structures of the files and records were not dynamically variable which caused the inefficiency.  This meant that much computer effort would be used in synonym matching and although the concept was sound, the practicalities were considered by the leading computer companies of the time to be costly. (correspondence with Burroughs, Honeywell and Software Sciences 1980). 

The police were not alone in considering the problems of lost and found property.  Under succeeding governments the police had tried to rid themselves of the administrative burden of many ‘minor tasks’ such as found dogs, dog fouling, dog licences, found property and other minor matters.  The police in their effort to become administratively efficient were in danger of loosing contact with the public – many of whom saw these services as crucial to a well balanced society.  So the review of lost and found property began in Scotland at the same time as the Lothian and Borders Police computer project started.
8.3.12 The Scottish Law Commission Report on Lost property





Returning to the main theme of this section, allows the examination of one of the most contentious areas of police work - the holding of criminal intelligence - or Nominal File.  This thesis returns to this topic on a number of occasions as the case study progresses.  It is vital to the disparity of thinking at the higher levels of the police service and the lack of clear and decisive guidance from the Home Office.
The police hold information on convicted criminals - by way of conviction records.  These are events which happen in open court and can be reported by the press - they are in the public domain.(Oliver et al)  The police service uses these convictions as a searchable database to illicit information when a particular crime occurs.  This may give the detective enquiry officer a number of starting points for the enquiry to trace the culprit.  The conviction record also holds items of information which are not readily apparent to the public - details of the criminal’s height, hair colour, eye colour, weight, facial hair, posture, home address, vehicle used, method of crime pattern (modus operandi), associates, descriptions and weapons used in the crime  -  although all these details would have been available at the court hearing the public and the press rarely make use of them..  

However, if a person is apprehended and processed for court and found not guilty - all the descriptive information above should be destroyed apart from the nominal facts that the disposal at court was that of acquittal. If a person is not reported but it is evidenced that he/she is involved in criminal activity albeit on the edges of criminality, then the police in 1979 (Lothian and Borders Police Board Minute June 1979) stated that they would keep that information on file.  

The research work undertaken at that time by Richard Kinsey and Robert Baldwin included visits to Lothian and Borders Police, the results of which were included in the text.  At p.61 Kinsey states:

‘the greatest threat to liberty, is witnessed by the immense amount of public money presently being invested in ‘police dedicated’ computerised systems throughout the country.  In particular the power to process free text – despite the concerns of the Lindop Committee – will allow vast quantities of factual information to be held on convicted criminals – as well as information on suspects who have not been convicted.’ 






The Lothian and Borders Police Operational requirement states at paragraph 2.5.1;

Nominal File; to provide an index of convicted criminals of active interest to the police, multi factor search capabilities are required.  It is intended to encompass within this file a number of wanted and missing persons who do not qualify for inclusion on the relevant P.N.C. files.  The ability to record ‘stop checks’ will also be required.  Updating will be restricted to certain terminals although all terminals will have interrogation facilities. It is intended to provide a ‘flagging facility’ so that checks on nominal file subjects will be notified to departments having a specific interest in them.  This area will also include a comprehensive vehicles index, cross referenced to the nominal file and providing partial and exact matching facilities`.

The Operational Requirement was a public document and the proposition to hold information on people who were not convicted, on police dedicated computer systems, was certainly controversial. Kinsey, (1982) in his review of the proposals stated that there was no need for two of the main proposals:

-	The holding of information on non convicted people and
-	The free text searching facility.





In 1979, the computer industry consisted of IBM (International Business Machines) an American computer manufacturing company, which supplied main frame computers to some 85% of computer users world wide. Other main frame companies were obviously of smaller scale, although still international - Honeywell, ICL (International Computers Limited), Burroughs, and McDonnell Douglas.  Each had a share of niche markets with Burroughs holding the contract to supply hardware to the Police National Computer in Hendon with Software Sciences providing the programs and technical support. 

By its very nature, the Police National Computer was a ready source of quick information to the police service.  By indexing car numbers into a database, along with owner and registered keeper information, a patrolling officer could be informed of these details by a radio message to a control room.  The index was structured on a simple database which was updated three times per day over the 24 hour clock.
PNC files were simple but large. A registered number was filed according to the letters and numbers in a sequential manner:
ABC 123 would be computer filed before
BAC 123





‘find the person who lives in Perth or Dundee, has a Ford car, blue in colour, a scratch along the bonnet, and the partial registration number contains the letter H or U.’

could not be answered quickly by PNC.  Such information could come from a number of witnesses who saw say a ‘hit and run’ accident where a person was killed. An overnight run against the database of criminal names was authorised for one enquiry of this nature each night by PNC  and usually reflected the needs of a murder enquiry  (PNC Operations Manual 1978).  Hence for ‘normal’ police enquiries of this nature, another form of search engine or programme was required

The requirement of course was not limited to police officers. The need for sophisticated analysis of operational data ranged throughout many organisations. Samet, in one of his monographs on database query systems stated;

‘6.5.1 Performance
A quick response to user queries is clearly important psychologically.  It depends obviously on such things as the efficiency of the query language processor, the underlying DBMS (database management system) or file management system and the physical design of the database itself as well as the power of the host computer and the number of users being catered for.  It is also dependant on the ease with which perceived records can be derived from stored records.  Whilst most comments about performance of software functions are self evident, some comments can be made about the design of the underlying database.  With a fully associative store such as may be available within a few years many of these considerations may disappear or be reduced in significance. In the meantime however it is a fact of life that sequential searching  or matching of files will not in general give an adequate response to the user.

If the academic centre of computing wisdom in Britain, had these doubts and concerns regarding sequential searching of computer files, what difficulty did the end user face?  It is clear from the academic effort which was published in the next few years relating to this problem, that universities were hard at work to provide a solution. For example,

‘Database theory and Practice, by Lars Frank, Privatbanken, 1984 Denmark for International Computer Science Series, Addison Wesley Publishing Wokingham, England ISBN 0 201 18041 3, p.150,152 -  Inverted List Organisation’.

4.3.2 Inverted List DBMSs
... However a disadvantage of this  (inverted file) solution is that the record length may be very large if a record has many relationships to other records.  A big firm for example often has several hundred relationships to accounts.  Thus in an inverted list DBMS we can build up a secondary index over the variable contents of a repeating field.’

These statements were obviously crucial to a police record keeping system  The relationships between a person’s family name, forename(s), age , addresses, relationship to the accused person (who also had these relationships) formed a nested or subset relationship system.  The fact that there were nested relationships, made sequential searching impossible for accurate record finding.  This meant that for a free text system, then some search engine was required.  
8.4.2 The Inverted File concept
One such searching facility was the inverted file.

‘Inverted file of database
A file or database in which a number of fields have been inverted – that is all the values of a field are placed in an inverted directory along with a pointer to each record in the file or database that has that particular field value; fast access is then provided to the data on the basis of the inverted field contents.'

It is vital for this thesis that the date of publication of these and many other texts on database design are noted carefully.  The publication dates are the mid 1980s - the research was ongoing for some time beforehand.  Hence when Lothian and Borders Police sought to find a search engine - they were few and far between.

Perhaps the most pungent comments of all this academic effort are contained in the 1981 title:
‘File techniques for Data Base Organisation in COBOL’, After the instructions on how to construct an inverted file on p.264-266, and the need to have the extra space required for the indices to these files, the authors add the cautionary note.

‘In our view many programming systems fail or are very unsatisfactory not because of insufficient technical knowledge but because of lack of discipline and understanding of the relative importance of the many facets of a project to the objectives of the enterprise.  Computing as a relatively new discipline attracts those who enjoy the freedom to innovate, attendant on a new era that does not have a rigorous body of knowledge that must be painfully acquired by a long apprenticeship.  Until programming changes from art to craft, the artist programmer will abound.’(p360) (Johnston 1981) .
Thus it can be seen that the state of programming in the early 1980s was that of experiment and excited entrepreneurship.  There was little in the way of substantial knowledge – new techniques and indeed new computing languages were springing up. A new company - Microsoft - even brought out a new operating system to combat IBM and the perceived wisdom of the day was that it would not last.
Lastly, in these general comments about file structure it is instructive to reveal the expertise in the text by Johnson and Cooper (1981) which delves into Boolean algebra. Simple enquires set to a computer such;

	‘find me a blue car with air conditioning’ would be written as
	Q( blue ^ air-conditioning)    the ‘^’ being the Boolean operator ‘and’
The result from the computer would not be priority listed but would be presented in a ‘find first and display mode’.  However, for longer and more complex enquiries – known as multi factor searches – the number of Boolean operators could be up to 10 and then the computer would be asked to sort the possible replies in priority order.  The priority would be the nearest match to the factors – in the order they were specified. (pps. 266-270).

So the excitement of these years was intense.  The solution to the multifactor search problem promised the golden egg in computing whilst the corollary held true – those who invested in this enterprise and failed ran the high risk of being permanently excluded from further projects.

In the case of the Lothian and Borders Police who had, by the time the project had started, great expectations of  two fundamentals – instant information and dispersed communications – then the Project Team was under pressure to achieve a result which would meet these expectations.

Hence some solution to the data structure problem was sought for the new systems.
A simple minded example is shown below:
Consider a table of hotel accommodation and assume that it is arrange alphabetically by the name of the hotel.  Then a typical enquiry might seek information about 
Question 1		a particular hotel or
Question 2 		a hotel in a town or
Question 3		 a small hotel which has a lift and in a specified town.

Location	Name of hotel	Town	Size of hotel	Lift
1	Avonside	Bath	Small	No












Clearly question 1 can be answered by a simple binary search of the list but as far as 

questions 2 and 3 are concerned every entry must be examined to find an answer.





Town Index	Size Index	Lift Index
Bath                      1	Large                 4	No                         1
                              6	                          5	                               2
                              7	Medium             6	                               6
Bristol                   4	                          7	                               9
                              8	                           8	Yes                        3
                              9	Small                  1	                               4
Wells                      3	                            2	                               5
Weston                  2	                            3	                               7
                               5	                            9	                               8


Hence for Question 3 which has more than one attribute, the list of small hotels is the set (1,2,3,9).

The lift list is (3,4,5,7,8) 
and if the town is Wells
then record number three the Gatehouse Hotel is the unique solution as for all other towns the solution set is empty.  One disadvantage of this method is that the number of entries in each section is non uniform.  Another disadvantage is the need to change the data when one of the attribute changes and hence a re-ordering of the data is required.

However, it can be seen that to keep all this information in its place requires multiple 

indices (Cardenas 1981 p.373-408).  Each index consisted of pointers to data with 









Each inverted file then required more space in the computer than a sequential file.  And computer space cost money.  Hence in a complicated system like a crime report, with multiple indices and sub indices, the cost of inverted files would be much more expensive than say a PNC type system.

To overcome this potential problem, another solution was sought and which was found in the work of the Atomic Energy Authority computer division at Harwell Oxfordshire and is explained in the Implementation section below.


8.5.1 Negotiations with contractors

The Operational Requirement was publicised in the European Journal as well as national newspapers and the computer press.  The intent was to ensure that as wide a body of computer contractors as possible would declare an interest in the project.
There were 43 requests for information including two from continental Europe but also including a man who built new table top computers in his garden shed and sold confectionery as a full time occupation.

After initial discussions with all those who had declared an interest, a long list of 19 companies was constructed. Each company was sent a copy of the Operational requirement and initial replies were sought in 3 months.  Additionally each company was scheduled two working days to meet with the project team to affirm its concept of what was being required.

Quite simply some companies, although national in structure were simply unable to conceive of a free standing ‘police’ computer.  Some thought that a computer run by an experienced local authority or nearby industrial facility would be preferable.  It was only by stressing that information relating to terrorist activities and which could affect national security, that the project team was able to persuade these suppliers that a police computer was required.

It was clear that there were only a small number of companies which could deliver a million pound project with any likelihood of time and money constraints being achieved.  The meetings to decide the short list were obviously secret and commercially confident.  Even the typing of the minutes was entrusted to the Office Manager, a Chief Inspector on long term ill health – who brought stability to the young team of officers who were keen to progress.








8.6.1 The Detailed Operational Requirement
The nineteen suppliers to whom the Operational Requirement had been issued were set the timescale of 30 November 1979 to respond with outline replies.  The replies were then assessed by the Computer Project Team using the following criteria:









	Software Sciences with Burroughs
	Honeywell

Each of these major suppliers had manufacturing plants in Scotland and hence they all had local software design teams.  In June 1980 a Detailed Operational Requirement was issued to the above companies with a Foreword as follows:

‘Suppliers are invited to submit their detailed proposals for the supply of equipment and software to meet this Detailed Operational Requirement.  Detailed proposals and prices are sought on a fixed price basis. These prices should be regarded as firm apart from any changes which might be made to the proposals during subsequent discussions.  It is likely that Lothian and Borders Police will enter into a leasing or rental agreement for this contract.’

A response dated was stated on page 4 as 31st August 1980 with a formal invitation to tender being issued to suppliers in September 1980 with a start date by the chosen supplier in October 1980.  Thereafter detailed instructions are listed for the format in which the reply to the Detailed Operational Requirement should be made.  This format was an attempt to rationalise the decision making process as follows:
	
p.4 	Form of Proposals




1  [a] suggested length is specified for each section of the response viz:
	Introduction
	Interpretation of requirement					2 pages
	Summary of costs						6 pages
	Computer equipment						6 pages
		- Terminal equipment				
		- Pre delivery training system			
		- Back Record Conversion system
		- Communications equipment
	Proposed Hardware Configuration
-	Diagrams and description of proposed 
methods of operation  				6 pages

	Terminal Network						8 pages
		- Program development and testing			2 pages
		- Costed list of equipment				5 pages
		- Recommended spares holdings			2 pages
	Loading Estimates at Peak Volumes




-	Operating system and T.P.
(transaction processor) monitor  			10 pages
		
		- Detailed system design				60 pages
		- Other standard software packages			5 pages
		- Data security, fault detection, restart and recovery 15 pages
	
Installation Reliability Availability Maintenance
		- Floor plan of proposed hardware			1 page
		- Environmental and power supply requirement	2 pages
		- Hardware reliability specifications			4 pages
	Implementation Plan
		- Project Management					5 pages
		- Proposed Team members including curriculum vitae 12 pages
		- Acceptance Testing					5 pages
		- Proposed Timescales				2 pages

II  12 copies of the proposal should be submitted

It should be noted that the Detailed Operational Requirement asked for full curriculum vitae information.  All those working on the project would be subject to a full police vetting as regards their antecedents and criminal history, as well as those dealing with interface work with PNC would require to sign the Official Secrets Act.  Some suppliers found that they had staff who would not/ could not meet these requirements and so they changed their Implementation Teams.

The Detailed Requirement then described the police force and reiterated the 

Reasons for the new system.  They were in outline:

	To replace the communications system
	To record and interrogate data on crime
	To hold and access burglar alarm information

To hold and access firearm information
Lost and Found Property matching

Additionally and for all applications - the production of management and statutory statistics.
8.6.2 The Home Office concerns about the Lothian and Borders Police Project





8.6.3 The Evaluation Process
The 2 months between the four companies receiving the Detailed Operational Requirement and the response date, was filled with meetings to discuss possible solutions to some of the more complex requirements.
In particular, all four companies centred on Crime Recording as the ‘flagship’ application.  As all forces in the country were required to submit statistics to the relevant Home Department, in an agreed form, the use of a standard statistics package could be used to sell the concepts to some 50 other police forces. The question of Scots and English law was irrelevant to their thinking – as a named list with the appropriate software would be able to sum up classifications regardless of their ‘name’.  The companies with USA bases, IBM and Honeywell in particular were keen to develop some of the work which had been undertaken in the United States and thus save development time and costs.  The notes of the two months of meetings, where each company was strictly allocated the same amount of time as all three other companies - with no exceptions - show the different approaches being taken by the suppliers.  Software Sciences as a software house with previous police experience in the running of the PNC saw themselves as favourites.  They were confident of success and this was reflected in their submission.  IBM as the largest supplier of mainframe computers in the world had decided on a ‘skills transfer’ approach.  They would sell the computers and peripherals to make the system work, and the police would develop the software to run the applications. ICL on the other hand as the sole supplier of computers and software to the local authority - Lothian Region, felt that they had the prime position.  The last firm, turned out to win the contract.  Honeywell was a major hardware manufacturer with factories in Bothwell and Newhouse Scotland.  They were used to working in the States with small police departments and their international division invited the Project Team leader to visit these sites to see systems in operation.  They had an attentive and inspiring team.  And they were not the most expensive.

The four proposals were received on time and the evaluation process started.  The evaluation was undertaken by the Project Team and lasted 4 weeks.  During that time question and answer sessions were held with the suppliers to elucidate information relating to specific points.  The Project Team then gave a presentation to the Policy Group – chaired by the Chief Constable and including some members of the Police Board.

A formal invitation to tender was issued to all four companies in early September 1980 and 4 weeks were allowed for the replies to be submitted.  Again all appeared on time.

The evaluation was constructed around a simple array structure.  Points were awarded (out of five) to each company for each of the criteria which included those listed in above.  The formal evaluation of the bids showed a result wherein Honeywell were the best fit to the requirement with the second cheapest bid; ICL were the cheapest but had missed out on the crucial area of ‘fuzzy matching’.  IBM were second dearest but had made no allowance for software on the ‘transfer of skills’ theory - and Software Sciences were the most expensive.  This fact is crucial to the Kent and Humberside story - related later in this study.

At the end of the evaluation, following extensive contract negotiation where leasing terms were considered along with purchase options for the peripherals and the Contract was agreed.  The contract was a CCTA model – running to nearly 200 pages and showed in minute detail, just what was expected of the system.  The detail included where each letter would appear on a screen for all 14 of the major applications.

The Police Board agreed to award the contract to Honeywell.

8.7.1 The Implementation Process

In January 1981, Honeywell set up a Design and Implementation Team of 12 people, systems design, operating system, network solutions, peripheral acquisition and project control.  Each of these teams had permanent staff augmented by experts in particular fields.

The peripheral acquisition team is a case in point.  The police project team required a 30 line display on the visual display unit.  This would allow for the concept of two frame working – a novelty at the time of implementation. 

In 1978, computer memory was mostly contained ‘at the centre’ with ‘dumb terminals’ at police stations.  However, the project team required more than one image or reply to a question to be stored on the terminal – a multi page facility.  The concept was that an enquiry could be sent firstly to the PNC and secondly  to the local system from one set of enquiry criteria.  The answers from the two systems would then be queued, with the first one received being displayed in full, with a notification of the second – or subsequent replies being placed on line 30.  As the Honeywell computer terminals only had a display of 25 lines, it was agreed that synchronous terminals from Lynwood Computers would be used for the system.  Lynwood was a fast growing peripherals company with strong design qualities.  The problem with using these particular terminals was that they were addressable (synchronous) whilst the Honeywell network was designed to be asynchronous.  Secondly, the Lynwood internal clocks were factory set and could not be adjusted on site. This posed problems during periods of ‘down time’. If the central computer stopped for any reason, although the internal clock kept going, an interrupt was sent to the network to tell the network of the fault.  Although this took microseconds, the terminal clock could then be out of synchronisation with the central computer.  Lastly, the central computer ran on 60 hertz power - not 50 hertz as is the British norm.  

Hence uninterrupted power supply and cycle rectifiers were required to ensure a stable power supply to the system.  These were additional power boxes which required space, cooling and maintenance - all part of the logistics with which the project team had to grapple.

Now these three ‘opportunities’ were recorded in the Project Diary and were addressed contemporaneously with the application design.
8.7.2 The Pursuit for a suitable search engine
As was stated earlier, Crime Recording was the ‘flagship’ application and the design team started work with enthusiasm.  The first quest was to find a search engine.  A number of programmes were examined and found to be lacking - either they were memory greedy - taking up too much of the central computer memory during searches - or they were single threaded.  The earlier section on database design and inverted files is important to this section.

Multi threading is the name given to programmes which will allow more than one user to deploy the programme at the same time.  As the concept of exact contemporaneousness does not apply in computers of that age, no two (or more) users would press the ‘send’ button on the computer at the same time.  Hence there would be microseconds of a delay before the next user came along.  The multi threading concept allowed for however many  users the network could support, to use the central computer at the same time.  The other problem was that of software licences - if the network contained 80 VDUs – would the force allow 80 concurrent users of the system and hence pay for 80 copies of the software?  This was answered when STATUS was unveiled.
8.7.4 The Implementation of STATUS
A multithreading program was found in the Atomic Energy Authority IT Division at Harwell Oxfordshire, England. The programme was called STATUS.
STATUS was developed by the IT division at Harwell in the late 1960s and early 1970s to allow the fast access of information for the nuclear industry where operational manuals ran to thousands of pages of text.  The first conference of lawyers set to discuss computer applications within the profession was held in Edinburgh in 1970 and the Scottish Legal Computer Trust was inaugurated.  This in turn led to the setting up of the Society for Computers and Law in London in 1974. (International Review of Law Computers and Technology Volume 15 No.2 pps 129-139, 2001 article by Norman Nunn-Price.)  The impetus by lawyers to enable the finding of words in the mass of documents to which they had access, was presented to the computer scientists as a challenge.  Computers were small and ran slowly – compared to the 21st century.  The computer research department at the Atomic Energy Authority ran on a computer with a 48 bit word memory and 10Mb of disc storage.  Working on the principle of free text searching, the STATUS team developed a system which could locate documents in seconds. Personal correspondence with the author of the STATUS package – Norman Nunn Price, of Ruislip Gardens, Middlesex had included the reception of a number of monographs on the subject.

The principle document is the HMSO publication – ‘The Status Project Searching Atomic Energy Law by Computer’ by G B F Niblett and N H Price, Culham Laboratory, Abingdon Berkshire, 1969 reference CLM R101.  This twenty page resume of the development of the STATUS details the construction of the language and outlines its principle benefits.  The project started when the lawyers in the United Kingdom  Atomic Energy Authority were researching the possibility of certain work being undertaken by the Authority – and whether it was permissible by law.  The research was long and complex – as atomic energy production was (and is) heavily regulated.  The ability to find text rather than numbers, as solutions to problems, was taken up by the computer department where Norman Price worked.  

The project quickly developed and a computer programme was written in FORTRAN  - a high level computer language which allows for non specialists to complete interrogations of databases.  In essence STATUS was an inverted file system of some complexity as follows;

-	CONCAT this sub programme generates chained dictionaries from all the 

words used in the text.  All words are counted along with the total number 





-	CONCORD this is the main repository of all the text.  Each word in the concordance is provided with a sub chain which gives the precise location of every occurrence of that word
-	CONQUEST searches the full text by combining it with the logical functions of keywords
-	CONTEXT the programme for producing key-word-in-context indices to the text and
-	CONFAB programme for the on-line interrogation of text from a computer console.

Hence STATUS required much more computer space that sequential searching programmes but the ability to retrieve text from documents was crucial for a number of uses.  However, the method of asking questions of the computer was complex in 1974. To find all the documents in the European legal database where
	 The words ‘temporary and imports’
Were stored,  was written as follows in Boolean logic
	?:oj temporar + :title & import + :title

which was fine for computer scientists but of little use to lawyers and others.  So the development of STATUS continued with an enquiry facility based on ‘free text’ and  with a copy being sold by the Atomic Energy Authority to Manchester Royal Infirmary and to the Safety in Mines Research Establishment.  Further copies were sold to Oslo University who quickly developed the system to form NORSK - DATA.  Further work continued with some government money being made available in 1977 for the development of the system (letter from Norman Price dated 4th February 2003) and the programme became commercially available later that year.

With the purchase of STATUS, the Lothian and Borders Police project accelerated beyond the agreed plans.  A ‘front end’ was created by the Honeywell team to allow the interrogation of the crime recording database by operational police officers with limited computer experience. This piece of software was integrated into the system just before the training manuals were devised in the summer of 1981.

By this time Honeywell had a system up and running for trialing for crime recording.  It was clear from the outset that the system was much larger than had been anticipated and the police officers were faced with a dilemma;

Crime recording, message switching, PNC and SCRO Interface were available and were undergoing trials;

To meet the performance criteria, Honeywell at their own expense had increased the memory of the pair of DPS8 computers, and had increased the disc storage by 25%.  Partly this reflected the requirements for STATUS and hence was clearly a contractual matter which Honeywell addressed without demur.  However to add any further applications to a system which was already heavily loaded would degrade the performance.

The Chief Officers of the force took advice from the Lothian Regional Director of Computing.  His view was that the flagship application was performing ahead of schedule – which was almost unknown in developments of this kind.  The Director had heard through the local authority  computing network, that there was no chance of a satisfactory result in the Kent and Humberside project.
His advice was to allow only small additional systems to join the crime recording set.  (Project Minutes, September 1981).

8.7.5 Additional use of the new search engine

However, police officers being the pragmatists which this thesis claims, found solutions to problems where none were apparent.  The detective sergeant in charge of the Photographic Laboratory within police headquarters, Edinburgh required a filing system for the photographs taken at scenes of crime.  As stated earlier in the critique on Hester et al. work regarding the formation of drink driving laws, the police considered every unexplained death or fatal road traffic accident as suspicious.  If there were a requirement to progress the enquiry, a set of photographs would be taken.  The filing consequences were large.  Each photograph had to be traceable through any of the following criteria:
-	 	Name of deceased
-	 	Name of locus  - and at a 5 road junction – 5 index cards
-	 	Name of accused if any
-	 	Registered number of vehicles involved
-	 	Date and time of event
-	 	Police officers involved
-	 	Name of forensic scientist if any

If then some 40 photographs were taken for a ‘normal’ suspicious death and some 120 photographs taken for a murder, then the filing system was time consuming. (personal interview with a Detective Sergeant, May 1982).

Hence Honeywell set up a small STATUS Based programme with a keyword facility which allowed the location of a computer record and a reference to a physical photograph location. The keyword facility was a refinement of the STATUS programme and allowed for certain words to be highlighted on input to the computer to allow for faster retrieval. The system was delivered tested and installed within a month – again an unheard of timescale in computing development in these days.  The flexibility of the STATUS programme allowed this progress and hence the  Detective Sergeant estimated that she saved one officer’s afternoon each day from manual filing – a 4 hour daily saving.  This small initiative – run alongside the crime recording system – blossomed into a set of facilities in which all seven police divisions developed a correspondence filing system.  This system was again produced by Honeywell in the space of some 3 weeks and was a mirror image of the Photographic Index.  Essentially each piece of correspondence received by the police in the early 1980s was receipted to the sender within 7 days and a reply to the problem was sent within 28 days – unless there was a protracted police enquiry when a 28 day holding reply was sent.(Lothian and Borders Police Standing Orders 1984)  All this happened before the advent of ‘performance indicators’ and was seen as another means of assisting the public.  Again the manpower required to index all the possible links to each piece of correspondence was large. The new computerised system allowed the release of one member of staff in each territorial division (7 officers), Headquarters CID, Headquarters Traffic and Central Administration.  In total 10 officers were redeployed from office duties to operational duties during this period. These systems met the operational needs of police divisions in 1983-1984 to the satisfaction of the police commanders – and more so than the proposed facilities which had been specified in the computer contract.  
8.8 Major Policy Meeting
At a major policy meeting, chaired by the new chief constable and attended by  the Chief Executive of Lothian Regional Council, as well as police project team members and Honeywell representatives in October 1983, it was agreed that these new systems would replace the contractually agreed and outstanding facilities.
8.9.1 The practical use of the new system
By this time crime recording was proving to be a most valuable operational tool in two operational areas as well as the fundamental arenas of recording and providing Scottish Home and Health Department Statistics.
The operational areas were;
The facility to hold the particulars of persons accused of the crime which had been reported – allowed for a nominal file type system to be available to working detectives. 
and
the facility to hold details of stolen property which could be rapidly checked when a person was arrested and the vehicle or dwelling searched. These were of particular importance to operational officers and met in full the frustrations which had been evident in the Feasibility Study issued some 3 years previously.  The new and sophisticated search facility permitted detective officers to trawl the large database (80,000 reported crimes each year) to seek for patterns of crime, patterns of behaviour, descriptive changes to accused persons, vehicles being used in crime and the whole panoply of enquiries which were now only limited by the imagination of the working officer.

Lastly the production of the statistics for the then Scottish Home and Health Department  - as far as reported crime was concerned – was now reduced to the running of the programme – – a Honeywell produced programme which was a computer tape machine readable by the SHHD computer system.  The production of automated statistics from the Courts however as far as the disposals of crimes was still a number of years away.

8.10	     Footnote  -  Longevity of the STATUS system











9.1.1 Introduction 4 July 1979

The Kent Constabulary and Humberside Police Joint Project (Part 2)

This section deals with the joint computer project with the two forces, Kent County Constabulary and Humberside Police.  The minute of a meeting held in Queen Anne’s Gate, London on Wednesday 4 July 1979 holds the comment by the head of F7 Division Home Office and chairman of the meeting,

‘Disappointment was expressed that Lothian and Borders had decided not to continue with a joint project at this time’.
9.1.2 The development of an Operational Requirement
Thereafter the meeting set about a management structure for the joint computer project.  In essence  each force would retain its separate identity, coming together for joint project purposes in accordance with a proposed working schedule. As Kent police had an accommodation facility at its Headquarters it was agreed that the main work venue would be Maidstone, Kent.  It was anticipated that not more than two Humberside officers would be in Kent at any one time.  Long term accommodation of a detached house in the grounds of police headquarters would become available in September 1979 for the use of visiting officers.  The vision of the project was still ambitious;

‘If the system was to be offered as a ‘package’ for the police service, it was considered that it was essential that the specification should include the capability of enhancement to include Conviction Records, there being the strong possibility that host police forces would probably require this facility.’
Thereafter for the next 18 months or so, the records of the Joint Project show a slow and deliberate progress towards the publication of an Operational Requirement. The detailing of data fields, the specification of screen layouts and the performance criteria were the fundamentals involved.  
9.1.3 Performance Requirement of the new system
In particular the Joint Project required a computer  performance criteria of:

	80% of single factor enquiries answered in 4 seconds
	50% of three or more factor enquiries in 20 seconds
70% of batch enquiries in 30 minutes.

These were ‘policing’ criteria, in that operational officers, standing face to face with a member of the public, required an answer to radio transmitted  questions with seconds – not minutes.  So a 4 second response time to the question of :
	‘is this person known or wanted’

was a requirement of the system.

Each of the fields in each of the applications was detailed to the level of;
	‘family name  up to 26 characters, mostly alphas, some punctuation allowed
			some numericals’

These conditions were to tell the computer that the family name
	‘Wilson-Smith III’
was an acceptable combination.

All other data fields were similarly defined.
The work continued with police officers and computer specialists travelling from Humberside to Kent on a weekly basis.
9.1.4 Lack of progress note dated 2 February 1981 from the Home Office
  However the Home Office was not satisfied with the management progress of the project.  In a note from a civil service project manager dated 2 February 1981, a complaint was made to the superintendent in Kent constabulary, that the management committee of the joint project was not meeting regularly – and hence no minutes of progress (or lack of progress) were available.  It was suggested from the Home Office F7 Division that  a new structure would be implemented  as follows;
Joint Policy Committee (meeting quarterly)– the Project Leaders from the Forces and F7 Director
Joint Management Committee- (meeting monthly) – the project teams with Home Office representation
Forces’ individual meetings (weekly) Project Teams with Local authority representation and Staff Associations

A meeting held on 13th February 1981 in Queen Anne’s Gate offices, shows that the suggestion of a new and recorded management system would be adopted following the Home Office suggested  model.  The meeting also shows the timetable for computer suppliers to meet with the Project Team.
9.1.5 Police reaction to the criticism
It is clear from these notes that the police officers were either unwilling or unable to take or agree a leadership role in this project.  Police superintendents all attend management and leadership courses to enable them to take decisions regarding operational and administrative matters.(Olisa 2002) It is indicative at this early stage of the project that leadership was an issue and that the Home Office required a more structured format to the joint project.  
9.1.6 The Operational Requirement is issued to the computer industry














Some of these suppliers were software houses, who would run their software on a list of computers – others were hardware manufacturers, who normally bought in applications software designers and writers to complete the contract. The Project Team was  set the task of selecting a short list of 3 suppliers with which to work in a detailed manner towards an Invitation to tender.
9.2.1 The selection of a short list

The Project Team assembled on 8 July 1981 in Horseferry House, London to short list 

the three suppliers from the proposals received.



















After much debate regarding the Honeywell bid, a short list of two companies, SSL and Data Logic, was constructed – the other suppliers were informed that they were no longer part of the police solution.
9.2.2 The problem of free text searching
One aspect of the Requirement which started to cause dissension between the forces was the capability of free text searching.  The choice according to the notes of meetings held on 11 June and 18 July 1981, showed a clear division in views. Kent Constabulary along with the Home Office scientists, favoured a ‘constrained’ vocabulary whilst Humberside favoured free text facilities.  The differences were immense in terms of flexibility and in supplier’s costs.  Indeed one prospective supplier, Honeywell – who by this time had started to install a system for the Lothian and Borders Police contract – had proposed a full free text system for all the proposed applications.  The constrained vocabulary approach would require a degree of coding of variables so that the computer could retrieve them in sufficient time to meet the requirement.  
9.2.3 The problem of addresses
In order to fully reflect the implications of the decision, a systems designer , who worked in the Home Office, Police Scientific Development Branch, was asked to produce a working paper on ‘addresses’.

Her paper ran to 10 pages and considered the following headings as possible solutions to the ‘problem of addresses’
	Each address to be coded with a new system yet to be designed
Each address to be Post Coded if the forces could afford to buy the system from the Post Office
Each address to be entered in free text and search by a suitable search engine.

The discussion which ensued on 4th September 1981 at a Joint Project meeting virtually discounted the paper.

9.2.4 The imposition of a Kent solution to the addresses problem
 The Kent systems designer stated that Kent Constabulary had already addressed this facet of the system design and had decided on ‘area codes’ for addresses  - based on a newly design system.  The new system would consist of concentrically named circles around criminals’ addresses and around complainers’ addresses.  Then police officers wishing to research the environs of a criminal would be able to search on these areas codes to find their answers.  The construction of the area codes would take 12 man months of effort for each police force.  This effort was not costed but was weighed against the Post Office post codes system – and 





These are interesting facts and reflect the independence of the Project Teams and the reluctance to consider any suggestion from another source.  This decision would have ramifications for the whole system design.  The fact that a decision to exclude the free text experts – Honeywell – from the project, had been taken some months ago, was not alluded to by the meeting – as if the decision had been made on purely technical merit.
9.2.5  Background to the Kent Decision
It is important to note that these decisions were made by middle ranking police officers, each with particular experiential backgrounds in terms of policing.  The lack of a strategic view, which could have been more forcefully proposed by the Home Office was singularly lacking.  The Home Office had used expensive system designer time in the work concluded by the system designer , and this work was excluded.  
There is no reference in the Working Paper or yet the Kent Constabulary decision to fashion the research on any theory.

9.2.6 Background to the theory of addresses from Chicago
 The Chicago school of thought in the early part of the 20th century was based in the University of Chicago. One theory which emanated from the School was that each city or town was made up of different zones, loosely in a pattern of circles, with the central business district as the epicentre. The concentric circles around a town held various social groupings of people – and the zone in transition held the possible sources of delinquency.  These social ecology theories were based on empirical studies in Chicago and seemed to reflect the organic growth of North American cities (Rock 2002).  Rock’s work was based loosely on the economic model of van Thunen – a 19th century north German farming economist who developed a model of concentric rings of agricultural enterprise.(Papageorgiou 1990).  He later turned to the economic development of cities and used the concentric ring theory to argue how cities would grow from small villages into large urban conurbations with the central business districts emanating from the cluster of poor immigrant communities. These studies show that the modelling of addresses in spatial geographies can be centred on specific activities, including the activity of crime and of crime relating policing.  Hence the work completed by the Home Office, showed that there was a clear link between the academic work of geographers and economists, with the practical need of police officers to detect criminals. The decision to allow Kent County Constabulary to fashion an untried and homemade system which could have been the model for 43 police forces, is difficult to understand from reading of the minutes of the meetings.
This is one example where early computer projects in the police were driven by ambitious officers who sought results to questions which had troubled academics for some time.  In this case, the ‘area coding’ of all settlements – including neighbourhoods -  was a geographic exercise – the spatial distribution of settlements.  There was no recognition however of boundaries.  In most western cities, areas of opulence abut areas of multiple deprivation.(Valentine 2002 pps.208-210).  Hence area codes were largely a blunt instrument in an area where some specificity was required. The area coding system would produce sets of results which would include many dwellings which were not required for the detective enquiry into the crime.  This would lead to difficulties in the future as often the results to questions asked of the computer produced a ‘hit list’ of unmanageable proportions. To overcome this large list a new sub system was required.  The new sub system had the capability to ‘refine the hit list ‘ sub system – another programming cost and more computer processing time. These were new innovations and the computer suppliers were keen to reach solutions – as all branches of commerce and some parts of industry required the same or analogous systems.
9.3.1 Joint Project - slow progress




Humberside are slightly biased against such a facility and feel that overall it would not be justified.  Humberside policemen(sic) would like the PNC transaction to dominate which tends to cut across the preferred PNC style of working.  In principle PNCU could not see any reason for this facility not being used.  However it was agreed to recommend to the Management Committee that this facility should be withdrawn from the Detailed Operational Requirement.’

Taking these comments along with the area codes situation, a letter dated 2nd December 1981, from the  Detective Chief Superintendent, Head of Crime Group, Police Research Services Unit, to the Assistant Chief Constable, Police Research Services Unit, Home Office reveals the unease in the centre.  The letter is an update report and contains the following:
‘In view therefore, of the lack of progress being made in this project, discussions took place to in an effort to find the causes.  Clearly the appointment of an independent chairman would have an effect on the protracted discussions taking place at the management level.  Also the fact that there is not a common requirement makes scheduling of work to be done by the teams very difficult. The suggestions are as follows:
-	 	split the project and let both forces continue independently
-	 	take a requirement from another force
-	 	drop an application so that the Detailed Requirement can meet the June 1982 deadline.

Each of the options has been discussed at length and hence a new scientific officer of PSDB has been appointed full time Director for the Project.’


9.3.2 The Home Office solution to Project Management
Hence the appointment of a 
	Home Office official
	A computer scientist
	And not a police officer
was thought to be the solution to the delay in producing a comprehensive Detailed Operational Requirement.  The fact that both forces had agreed to this change – the project essentially being run by the Home Office – and not by the police officers, was an immense act of faith by the Chief Constables.  As has been explained earlier, Chief Constables have great operational independence. Further  as Butler (1984) and Oliver (1997) state in their texts, they have the operational ability to promote, demote and transfer officers to meet their needs.  Hence if ‘things go wrong’ new police officers could have been seconded to the projects with remits to meet specific performance criteria.  In this case however, the correspondence between the Home Office and the Chief Constables, shows the police officers in a state of meek acquiescence in accepting the new Home Office Director of the project.




Part of the role of the Home Office during these years was to advise Police Authorities on the ‘establishment figure’ – the number of officers for which Police Grant would be paid. (This requirement has since been rescinded under the latest local government re organisations wherein Chief Constables now ‘meet the budget’ and can employ as many or as few officers as they think fit within the allocated budget.)  To meet the needs of a computer project, officers would be removed from policing duties and typically would spend four – five years of their service in developing the system .  In the case of Kent Police as has already been stated, the force had 4 officers detached full time from their police duties.  The Home Office, in the shape of F1   (Finance and Administration Division) corresponded with the Clerk to the Police Authority (in both Kent and Humberside) to authorise the officers as Supernumerary to establishment – and police grant would be paid on their salary and expenses.  The exchange of letters in February and March 1982, was typical of these years of the project and the authority was clearly granted by Home Office to the local authority to allow payment of these additional officers.  







(letter dated 5th March 1982 from Chief Superintendent PRSU to the  Assistant Chief Constable Head of PRSU)
9.3.4 A new Project Director 25 May 1982
The new Project Director,  reported to both Force’s Senior Officers meetings in May 1982.  His report dated 25th May 1982 shows that progress had been made in writing the Detailed Operational Requirement although there was still some degree of friction between the two forces.
‘paragraph 4
The requirements expressed in the DOR are comprehensive.  It may be that in order to remain within budget the project will require either to simplify or to remove complete requirements from the system.  The areas of concern are the inclusion of the production of CRO74B and the lack of support from CCTA.
The policy meeting in Kent on 18 November 1981 expressed concern at the implications of the PNC facilities and the production of the CRO74B.  The concern was well founded and without reference to the Project Director and without consultation with the Policy Committee, this requirement was inserted at a late stage into the DOR by the Kent Project Team.  It is considered unfortunate that normal working practices were not followed in this instance.

CCTA
Whilst the forces in the project have access to technical support of the highest calibre, it is considered that because of the complexity and  novel features of this project, that it must be labelled ‘high technical risk’.  Hence in contractual terms the experience of CCTA would be invaluable – unfortunately it does not appear to be forthcoming.’


9.3.5. Changes to the Operational Requirement
These changes must have been a devastating experience for a computer scientist and project director.  To be faced with police officers changing a document surreptitiously, without regard to either personal relationships or even professional courtesy, must have been unsettling.  The change related to the automatic computer production of a set of forms CRO74 A and B, which were required to be sent to PNCU when a suspect was arrested and charged.  It is a crucial by-product of a criminal nominal system to have such a facility.  However, to be handled in such a cavalier manner, was a reflection on the Kent Constabulary Team.
9.3.6 Support from CCTA
The second point – that of support from CCTA – as mentioned in the Lothian and Borders case study – was a cry for help.  The CCTA as the prime contractual agency for the British government in computer and telecommunications procurement, was heavily involved in a raft of competing work at that time. (Report of CCTA to the Home Secretary May 1981).  However, the need for professional solicitors to draft a watertight contract for the joint project was, according to the notes of the meetings, beyond the scope of the local authority legal departments.





9.3.7 The Detailed Operational Requirement is issued to two suppliers
The Home Office Project Director continued with the project and the Detailed Operational Requirement (with the Kent changes) was issued to the two suppliers, Software Sciences and Data Logic on 7 June 1982 – only 4 days late.  The required response date for the suppliers to come forward with their proposals was 26 August 1982.  The forces each produced a set of Selection Criteria for the proposals as follows;
-	 	Value for money, cost versus specification
-	 	Suppliers contractual history with police forces
-	 	Suppliers innovation to meet the requirement
-	 	Suppliers performance criteria
-	 	Suppliers manpower requirements and team members

On 21st October 1982 a presentation was made to the Chief Constable of Humberside Police, by both of the suppliers and they both expressed a keen interest in supplying the new system.
9.3.8 The Invitation to tender is issued October 1982
At that meeting the police team leader a Superintendent from Humberside Police , told all concerned that an Invitation to Tender would be issued to both companies in early November 1982 and that subject to satisfactory contract negotiations, a contract would be signed by Christmas 1982.

As a co-terminus exercise, Kent County Constabulary settled for a formal evaluation of the proposals, with an Invitation to Tender being issued in late October 1982.

Contractually, each police authority was required to meet the local authority computer procurement processes – unless the Home Office were to buy the systems and sell them onto the forces.  This proposal was fiercely resisted by both Chief Constables in correspondence in September 1982.  Hence each force would buy separately. Again this intransigence proved to be costly – not in the short term but strategically.  The separate purchasing could lead to separate systems – and where was the commonality for which 41 other police forces were waiting.  The fierce independence of the chief constables would bring a heavy price in the future.

However, the contract negotiations and invitation to tender took considerably longer than was planned.  The detail required by CCTA (who had been persuaded to give some support to the two forces by the Home Secretary) to make the contract legally binding was such that parts of the Detailed Requirement had to be re written under the guidance of a senior Home Office computer scientist.  This took some 4 months of detailed work.

An update report to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary dated 17 February 1983, from PRSU on the Joint Project shows that the Invitation to Tender replies were still being assessed and that a contract would be awarded by March that year.
The evaluation of all the documentation was then completed and a contract could be awarded.

9.3.9 The contract is awarded to Software Sciences/ Burroughs May 1983
  In fact the contract was signed in May 1983 and was awarded to Software Sciences Limited (SSL).  A report by Tim Ring in the computer press ‘Computing’ dated 13 May 1982 states;
‘Software Sciences has beaten off fierce competition to a £3 million contract from Kent and Humberside police for computer systems which may become the standard for forces throughout the UK. But the systems incorporate features which have been barred by Merseyside Police.  That specification includes ‘crime reports’ details of crimes where no one has been convicted – which Merseyside has dropped from its own computer plans.  Merseyside Police dropped this use to win the support of the Labour controlled police committee for its own computer system.’










-	 	Lothian and Borders.
(note of a meeting on Major Crime Computerisation, by a chief superintendent, PRSU 14.7.1983 to discuss the future of statement recording in serial and major crimes)
Only Lothian and Borders Police had been part of any concerted effort by the Home Office to obtain a standard system and hence all the other forces were at different stages of development with a variety of miscellaneous systems and computer programs.

9.3.11 Project Progress
Joint Project now seemed to settle down to real progress with the supplier SSL and the Project Team detailing the systems.  Again as in the Lothian and Borders experience with Honeywell, Crime Recording became the flagship application. The detailed discussions reflect the level of attention which computer suppliers required.  One discussion note dated 12 December 1983, reflected the spacing between answers on a computer screen if more than one record fulfilled the search criteria.  Although apparently trivial to the police officers, the computer designers had to know where to place the data on screen.  The discussion took the morning of a Project Meeting. Other items being discussed were changes to the Detailed Requirement and the contractual situation for payment of changes.
9.4 Computer Training for police staff
As a corollary to these minutes, the training needs of the forces had been addressed.  These are the Training proposals, which will need to be put in place before the system can go live.  The proposal was that dedicated teams of police officers would be sent on Applications Training courses to the premises of SSL to learn the system.  They would return to their forces, write appropriate documentation for police officers and support staff and some 3 months before the system was due to go live, would commence training.	A paper dated October 1982 from an Inspector in Humberside Police contains a comprehensive training review.  Every contingency is considered including the prices of cables for power, the power upgrade required in classrooms to meet the needs of 24 computer terminals, new desk and chairs, as well as the manpower, meals tea and coffee costs.  This report was used as the model for Kent County Constabulary’s own training proposals. 
9.5.1 Implementation Plans 28 February 1983
The minutes of the SSL proposals to the Joint Project on 28 February 1983 shows an updated Detailed Project Plan.  In essence the writing of the software was well underway and the delivery of the mainframe computers was scheduled for 
	End March 1983 both computers delivered to Kent and
	By end July both Burroughs B5900 computers commissioned in Humberside.

The computer terminal networks would be installed in Humberside in October 1984 and Kent by February 1985. 

The software trialling would commence in February or March 1985 with 6 weeks allowed for debugging and re-testing.

This was a conservative plan with plenty of time allowed for the set up of a prestige system. However, with no plan to import a ready made search engine to speed up procurement, the writing of the software had to be completed manually.  In view of the complexity of the system, this took considerably longer as there was no off the shelf software to assist the system designers.
 By this time off course Lothian and Borders Police had been running their system for some 18 months and were receiving the kudos and benefits of a live system.  The pressure to meet the timetable was immense as was shown in minutes of the Progress meeting on 27th June 1984.

The Home Office Project Director took the chair as was normal and then told the meeting that he had been promoted to another post in Home Office.  His role would be fulfilled by a lower grade officer.  However, with the representative of SSL present, the senior scientist expressed his displeasure that the Project was not meeting the timescales.
 ‘4.2 Slippage
Dr.......expressed the concern of the Joint Computer Project (JCP) following receipt of the news that there is to be a delay in meeting key milestone dates.  The project had been lead to believe that good progress was being made and that timescales were being maintained.  The  JCP was proud that things were running to time and were looking good.  The JCP was most disturbed and embarrassed when news of the slippage was broken.’

Hence a reviewed set of Project dates were released by SSL and a final testing date of end May 1985 was promised. The minutes of the meetings during this period show increasing anxiety between the police officers, the Home Office representatives and SSL with regards to finalised ‘go live’.  However not all faults could be attributed to SSL.


9.5.2 Testing of the system May 1985
  On 26 January 1985, the electrical power at police headquarters Invincible Road, Maidstone, Kent was lost and the scheduled  PNC factory test had to be abandoned for two days.  This loss meant that the entire test was rescheduled for 4 March 1985 along with that of Humberside.  The testing schedule was now in full flow from January 1985 - March 1985.  The notes of  the Progress Meeting dated 13 March 1985 show that there had been 130 system crashes in the three months of testing.  A systems crash is where the computer stops working - normally due to software incompatibility.  The new Home Office Project Director, undertook to write formally to SSL complaining of the poor quality of the software.  The letter and answer are professionally toned and almost bland. Notes also show that Humberside Police  postponed its training so that officers were required to be redeployed for a period of weeks. Whilst this was not a major problem in itself, it was another blow to the credibility of the Joint Project - which was by now seriously late and still not within sight.
9.5.3 Another new Home Office Project Director 23 May 1985
The Home Office decided to promote the new Project Director and appoint another lower grade scientist as Project Director during this period and this new officer chaired his first meeting on 23 May 1985.  His first act was to question the competency of SSL as the PNC testing had shown a serious fault in system design. The system had been designed with a communications protocol which was half duplex whereas the BT line connection was full duplex.  ‘Duplex’ is the protocol which describes the ‘handshake’ between messaging on communications lines.  Full duplex is the ability to send and receive messages on a line at the same time.  Half Duplex is either send or receive.  In a packet switching network with bundles or packets of information being sent according to the line speed, it is essential that both ends, the PNC computer and the local force computer can ‘handshake’.  SSL decided to implement a hardware solution to the problem – another computer box would be introduced into the system – rather than rewrite the software.  This solution was accepted by the forces as the need to obtain a solution was paramount.  This short term ‘fix’ was symptomatic of the state of the Joint Project in the spring of 1985 but was also a crucial point in the Home Office desire to have an ‘off the shelf’ PNC Interface available for other forces.  The hardware solution meant that all other forces would be required to buy a Burroughs computer ‘box’ in order to run the system.
9.5.4 Yet another new Home Office Project Director July 1985
However, despite all the problems and yet another change of Project Director by the Home Office being appointed in the summer of 1985, the system went live in stages as follows
	18 November 1985  	Message switching
	1 January  1986	Crime Reporting 

Because of system crashes, the back record conversion of criminal names to form the Nominal File application had not been completed by end January 1986 – and hence that application could not run.  The PNC Interface was ‘crashing’ once every two or three days and hence requiring a ‘reboot’ (restart from a known position) for the whole system – a process which took two hours.

The situation was so serious that on 28th January 1986, the Head of PSDB chaired a meeting in Hull at which the Deputy Chief Constable Humberside Police and the Assistant Chief Constable Kent County Constabulary were present .  The agenda was to discuss the state of the Joint Project and to seek remedies for what was by now a discredited attempt at computerisation. The Home Office Director talked briefly about the successes of other systems throughout police forces in the criminal information arena and the implementation of the HOLMES (Home Office {Large}Major Enquiry System), which was Home Office designed  (with police assistance), Home Office contracted and local force implemented.  He asked what was the state of the system now.
9.5.5 Progress meetings 1986 -  lack of a credible system
The systems were in and running but not performing well.  There were still system crashes and letters had been sent in the previous November to the Managing Director of SSL and signed by the two Chief Constables.  The replies from SSL had not addressed the problems the two forces were facing.  The Home Office Project Director spoke of the looming contractual battles with SSL as the outstanding monies had been withheld until the system performed as to the specification.  SSL had informally told the project director that the performance issue was not contractual and that the payments should be made.  The meeting then spent the rest of the agenda time discussing 'performance versus payment’ and concluded that expertise from CCTA was required. Letters would be drafted by the Home Office to SSL stating that the system was not performing and that no further payments would be made.

Progress meetings in February and March with the Project Team and SSL were dominated by discussing expenses claims by SSL.

A meeting minuted as 21 April 1986 between the Project Team and CCTA, sought a solution to the performance problems.  The minutes show the level of conflict between SSL and the forces, with each of the forces now counting the number of telephone calls made by SSL whilst on their premises and sending them accounts for them.  CCTA sought approval to raise the matter at Under Secretary of State level – which was agreed.
A ‘Breach of Contract’ meeting was held in The Home Office on 7th May 1986 when the Home Office staff paraded all the Project Directors, a senior CCTA civil servant along with the police officers from the forces, in front of SSL.   The CCTA officer stated that there were three grounds for the Breach of Contract
-	 	Full site acceptance had not been achieved
-	 	The retention period had not yet started and
-	 	Contractual deliverables were not available (the test database)

SSL retorted that informal meetings in July 1985 had agreed that these factors would not be considered as a Breach of Contract.  The meeting then dissolved into a thrust and riposte situation and no resolution was achieved.  Further meetings were held to try to resolve the situation of performance.  The most telling comment was on 30 May 1986 in the Home Office when a Superintendent from Humberside Police stated that a ‘background’ search of the crime recording system – due to be answered overnight was still running on the computer -14 days later.  In terms of credibility officers were refusing to use the search capability of the computer and being pragmatists, they were storing paper copies of crimes in police offices so that they could retrieve their own information.  The situation was almost farcical now and the system was totally discredited.


9.5.6 Meeting with the contractors 24 June 1986
Hence the Under Secretary of State met with SSL on 24th June 1986 in the Home Office London.  The meeting was apparently short and to the point in that the Under Secretary of State required an answer to the problem of performance.  He stated that his scientists thought that the computers were too small for the workload – which was just as had been predicted when the project started some 10 years previously.  SSL went off to seek an answer.

Their reply on 29th July 1986 was for each for each force to have installed two larger Burroughs computers.  Burroughs however wanted full payment - up front - for these computers at a cost of some £400,000.
9.5.7 ‘This unfortunate project’ by the Under Secretary of State 31 July 1986
The Under Secretary of State’s reply ends this part of the case study with the system still not working to specification on 31st July 1986.


Dear Mr ...(Managing Director, Software Sciences Limited)
Thank you for your letter and accompanying quotation of 29th July 1986.  As I told you on the telephone yesterday, I am most disappointed with your so-called ‘offer’. I am particularly annoyed that it has taken 5 weeks to put together these most ungenerous proposals.

At our meeting on 24th June 1986, it was generally accepted that the two systems were not working to specification and it was the responsibility of your firm to resolve the problems.  You appear to be willing to make every effort to do so and I was very encouraged by your approach. I therefore said that in order to expedite matters and to put an early end to the disruption being caused within the two forces, I would try to find a way for the Home Office to make a financial contribution towards the costs of a solution.  I find it incredible that you should now be suggesting that that the forces (and the Home Office together) should find more than £400,000 to get you out of a hole.  Frankly I am amazed at the audacity of the proposal!

In the circumstances I have no option but to advise the two forces to make no further payments under the supply contract and with the support of CCTA to seek legal advice in order to make Software sciences Limited to meet their contractual obligations.  I shall also ensure that the rest of the police service are fully aware of the outcome of this unfortunate project.




The ‘unfortunate project’ continued with a note of a meeting on 15th August 1986 stating that the Lords Commissioners of HM Treasury would act for Kent County Constabulary but that the contractual position was not strong and the likelihood of redress was small.
Both forces continued to make administrative arrangements to circumvent the slow computers.

9.5.8 Brief Analysis of the Case Studies
The theory relating to the use of case studies has already been described in this study but it is important at this stage to reiterate the thinking behind the use of this paradigm in coming to a conclusion.  The case studies have been approached as an adjunct to the other two research methods used in the study.  This analysis of the actuality of the police introduction of computers was focussed on sceptical examination of the records of the meetings, conversations and documentation from the three forces.  There was a determined effort to look below the published documentation to see if there were hidden meanings or hidden agendas. This theoretical structure was of great importance as it was evident from the minutes of the meetings in which the Home Office scientists took operational control of the writing of the Requirements  that the English  police officers felt emasculated.  This was only one of the results of the analysis.
This brief section draws together some of the salient points of the detailed case studies.
Primarily the attempt to have three police forces work together was a sign that the Home Office had clear ambition to circumvent the isolationist views of some chief constables by providing the impetus to have computerised crime and intelligence recording systems based on common systems.  These efforts should be recognised as far reaching and reflect well on an oft maligned central government department. 
The detail of the systems was allowed to develop independently despite the fact that the law in Scotland and England, required chief constables to report the state of crime to the relevant Home Secretary/Scottish Secretary of State.  This aspect of the projects was the weakest part of the project for each crime has several constituent parts – the complainer, the locus (temporal and spatial), the property involved or injury caused, the witnesses, and the accused – only some of which require to be reported by law.  The remaining elements of the crime report are intelligence information, required for working detectives to examine in an effort to trace culprits.  The design of these factors should have been common to all police forces, but the perceived local needs overcame any collaborative requirement.  From a thirty year perspective, it should have been insisted by a strategic view from both the Home Office and the chief officers from the three forces, that commonality was achieved.







10.1 Verification of the thesis and recommendations

This thesis set out four main objectives in order to examine and analyse the introduction of computers into police crime recording 1976-1986. By adopting a critical realism approach to the study, the thesis has sought to examine beneath the apparent surface of the accumulated data in order to establish a version of the truth. This recurring theme throughout the thesis has enabled the study to examine in detail the evidence from case studies, interviews and literature review so that firm conclusions can be reached.
 To vindicate the thesis this chapter will consider each of the four objectives in turn and will conclude with an overall statement of future research requirements and the possibility of success in that research.
	
10.2 Objective One
to identify the main issues in the start of computerised crime  and intelligence recording  systems 1976-1986 with emphasis on the legal and social environment in which the implementation took place.


The main issues which affected the start of the computerisation of crime recording in the police were legal, social and operational.  There was and still is a requirement at law for Chief Constables to collect and forward the number of crimes made known and the number of persons charged with these crimes.  This work will continue and the redundant manual effort in this work in the mid 1970s was disproportionate to the end result as far as the police were concerned. Additionally the law in Scotland ensures that Chief Constables are mere collectors of data regarding crime – the decision to prosecute is in the hands of the Crown Office through the aegis of the Procurator Fiscal Service.  The social pressures on Chief Constables were immense – from the political statements of the Prime Minister in granting the police a 50% pay rise in 1979 – and the need for accountability of these new monies – to the inability of the police to manage the data collected in the so called ‘Yorkshire Ripper’ murders. Thirdly the ability to use the data recorded by the police by operational detectives, was circumscribed by the manual systems failing to provide an accurate and timeous response to working police officers.  All these factors were shown by proper research to be valid for the years of this study.
10.3 Objective Two
to identify the risk factors in the implementation of computers for police forces in that decade

The Home Office had set out to assist the police service with the immense task of computerising crime recording.  The 43 forces in England and Wales and the 8 in Scotland as well as the Royal Ulster Constabulary (now the Police service of Northern Ireland) all required to record crime.  Thereafter they were required in a stated format to report these crime and offences to the relevant Home Department.  So strategically any common system either developed or acquired would be able to  be made available to the other forces in some way or another.  The early thoughts were that if there were a working system, then either by a licence from the computer supplier, or by the Home Office buying the intellectual rights to the software,  all the forces would be able to benefit.
ACPO/ACPO(S) view
Many of the chief constable cadre at the time were still of the ‘old school’ with one chief constable  serving some 20 years in the ranks of chief officers. Few of these officers were aware of the advances in computerisation and certainly had no thoughts that collaborative working in this field could be cost effective.  The ‘mutual aid’ between forces normally consisted of operational contingency in times of crises and the idea of sharing systems was alien.  Hence there was a need to educate the chief constables – and the Home Office manifestly failed to take the opportunity.  On an individual basis – and only to those forces with ‘live computer projects’- the Home Office would give middle rank support with the Assistant Under Secretary of State attending the annual meetings of ACPO Technical Committee, where the minutes show him answering questions in a constrained manner. Additionally those chief and senior staff who were interviewed during the period 1976-1980 regarding the procurement of computer systems were 80% agreed that the cooperation between forces should not involve the sharing of local force data.  Despite the apparent conundrum that the presence of the Police National Computer allowed all forces to share data, especially on conviction records as well as missing persons, the interviewed cadre refused to contemplate any collaboration.  Many of the forces as refused to discuss the procurement process with their local authority police committee or even allow feasibility studies to be completed with or without the assistance of their local authority computer department.  Thus it can be argued that despite all the pressures from within and outwith police forces, the vast majority of chief officers failed to grasp the strategic importance of the new technology, at least for that decade, 1976-1986.
Management Shortfalls
The management shortfalls in the computer projects can be attributed not only to the Home Office but also the police organisations involved.  The Home Office instigated the computer project and for that they must take everlasting credit.  Although acknowledged by their own staff as a ‘high risk venture’ the Home Office did not provide adequate leadership to the project – both before Lothian and Borders declared independence and during the Kent County Constabulary/Humberside Police Joint Project.  These shortfalls can be clearly seen in the narrative above and can be summarised into the following categories;
1)	Shortfall in leadership.
In management terms, the Home Office staff encountered a group of police officers from disparate backgrounds – but all charged by their chief officers with procuring a crime and intelligence recording system.  These officers ranged in rank from constable to superintendent and as in any group of police officers displayed a variety  of personal traits.  What they all shared however was the burning ambition to have their own force recognised as the first to achieve a working system.  The Home Office middle ranking management had not encountered a group of police officers with such determination before.  The inability of the Home Office managers to lead this group was manifest in a number of specific incidents;
A)The inability of the Home Office to persuade the police officers in the project teams that a joint project of all three forces would have been to the altruistic benefit of the nation’s police forces. 
B) The Kent County Constabulary insertion of the new address searching system into their operational requirement.  This aspect of the Operational Requirement should have been removed at the instance of the Home Office to ensure a stable software solution for both forces.




Failure in the Tri partite Project
 Interviews with senior staff in the Home Office since the projects’ completion, show that the Home Office felt subservient to the enthusiasm and endeavour of the three police project teams.  Without exception the project teams were young and ambitious officers –some of whom reached senior and chief officer ranks in the service following the completion of the computerisation projects.  The Home Office staff were mostly middle ranking computer scientists – they were not professional managers.  On the other hand some of the police teams had attended the Special Course in England and the Accelerated Promotion Course, in Scotland – both one year long full time leadership training and management courses.  These officers were able to circumvent the efforts of the Home Office scientists.  The most obvious example was the change to the Kent Operational Requirement which the police officers inserted just before the document was published.  The Home Office managers were oblivious to the change until they read the document and felt unable to withdraw the document.
Continuity
The police officers were detached from normal police operations for the duration of the projects with one exception in Humberside.  Within the Home Office, staff came and went according to the needs of F7 Division and indeed in one 5 month period, there were three Project Managers appointed by the Home Office.  There was a clear learning curve for these officers to climb – not only to be aware of the details of the computer systems, but also to get to know the strengths and weaknesses of the people involved.  This lack of continuity allowed the police officers free rein to change and alter the computer requirement – as well as to reject basic research from trained social scientists on fundamental matters – an example of which was the ‘addressing’ issue – when Kent Police insisted that their own system – untried and being designed from scratch – would be preferable to the proven academic system on offer.
The Police Strategic View
It is self evident from the results of the interviews and the lack of formal agreements between police forces, that the ‘police service’ had not addressed the benefits of computing.  Individual forces, Lothian and Borders being amongst the foremost, were able to offer a complete crime and intelligence recording system to the other police forces and indeed had a variety of visitors in the spring of 1981.  However, as each police force is required by law to provide criminal statistics to the relevant Home Department, then there was an obvious benefit to computerise at least this administrative task.  Feasibility studies from each of the three forces included in this study  indicated that each force could save redundant manpower effort of some 1,000 man days annually. This equates to almost 10 full time officers per police force and hence taken over the 53 forces in the nation, could provide the savings required to fully fund a small police force – as Fife Constabulary.  This was clear to the project teams but despite presentations to their respective chief officer group, there was a fundamental refusal to allow collaborative working – apart from Kent and Humberside.  The collapse of that project allowed the more reactionary chief officers to trumpet the benefits of ‘freedom of the constabulary’ (ACPO Council Minutes May 1987).  However, at that time the strain on chief officers to meet societal demands of solving serious and serial crime, allowed the Home Office, with assistance from career detectives, to introduce HOLMES – the cross referencing software package for use in investigating offices.  The strategic view here was Home Office led and reflected their failure to introduce the crime package.  HOLMES was offered as a licensed package – the force purchased one set of computer hardware from a shortlist of four – ICL, Honeywell, McDonnell Douglas and Burroughs – and then ran the software to national standards.  This allowed the interoperability of crime investigations to be transferable between forces where there may have been geographical links of loci.  The full HOLMES analysis is not for this study but this synopsis clearly demonstrates that the Home Office was able to meet the police demands when they undertook a project on their own.  When the Home Office tried to manage the first crime and intelligence recording projects, there was limited success.
Police Use of computers 
The decade 1976-1986 was a frenzied turmoil for rank and file police officers and support staff.  The computer revolution changed working practices and required massive training sessions.  The training for the working beat officer in Lothian and Borders Police and in Humberside Constabulary consisted of 4 one week courses – just to retrieve data from the crime system.  The collection and input of that data required more intensive training. The addition of the Police National Computer, Fixed Penalty Tickets Computers, HOLMES, Command and Control systems, alongside small administrative systems, all required staff to be trained.  The entry tests for police staff at that time did not involve keyboard skills or even finger dexterity.  Hence, training was an immense effort to allow access to data.  The running of the actual computers, the maintenance of computer terminals, modems, printers and switching gear at times many miles from police headquarters where the mainframes were located, was an additional task for the police officers.  Eventually as trained staff from other backgrounds in commerce became available through the natural rotation which affects the job market, police officers were released back to operational duties.
Despite the lack of real academic research into this area, the sparse work available shows that the police service did not fully embrace computer technology for some considerable time.(Ackroyd and Manning)  The strides being made in financial and local government computing was not mirrored in the police service.  Indeed some officers were openly hostile to the new systems, and claimed that police supervisors could imply from computers that certain officers were not meeting the new management targets. Additionally the freedom which beat officers had enjoyed for many years were circumscribed by the command and control systems which measured the time available for being despatched to new tasks – and measuring the time which each task took to be completed.  For some officers this was a major threat and hence any computer system was perceived as a threat.  Ackroyd’s work shows these attitudes in one force and although not triangulated, his study is the only one available which shows contemporaneous attitudes within Lancashire Constabulary.  The availability of new message switching computers – the 1970s equivalent of email – was a huge step forward in secure police communications – but again many operational officers saw the computer system as a threat.  As each message was timed and dated as it left its origin and timed and dated as it arrived, there was no opportunity to use excuses of previous years for inefficiency – or plain laziness.  Hence that decade was one of transition of attitude and for the new generation of officers, brought into the forces with some computing available in schools, there was a belief that the computer systems had been there for many years and were part of the fabric of policing.
Computer Supply Industry
The computer supply industry saw the development of police systems as a commercial golden egg.  If one force could design a system then all 53 other forces may be able to take the same system either by purchase or licence.  The major suppliers were based in the United Kingdom – but were owned in the United States.  These companies, Honeywell, IBM, McDonnell Douglas, and Burroughs all had experience of the implementation of similar systems in the United States. (Home Office Minutes 1978-1980).

10.4 Objective Three
to examine and evaluate the procurement and  immediate post implementation usage, of  these systems

The procurement phase of the police projects was long winded and has been explained in detail.  Overall the attention to detail in the process troubled the police officers. Reiner has called senior police officers as ‘eager pragmatists’ and the ability to achieve quick results was paramount in the mind set of these and their junior staff.  The delay of 4 years from initiation to completion was frustrating but in the case of Kent County Constabulary and Humberside Police, where there was no effective system after 6 years of effort, there was bitter disappointment. 
The systems used to procure the new computers were based on the experience of the Home Office F7 and F11 staff –assisted by the Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency.  These systems were long winded and detailed – the production of 300 pages of the Detailed Operational Requirement taking some 6 man years of effort. These efforts were designed to ensure a strict compliance with the contract to acquire a system which would meet the aspirations of the serving police officer.  Despite all this preparatory work, some systems were unacceptable.
In the case of Lothian and Borders Police, the Chief Constable’s report of 1982, included praise for the new system in ‘solving crime and returning property to its rightful owner’.  This system was working and working well.  The statistical element of the new system allowed the compilation of the annual return to the Secretary of State to be completed by the computer in some 30 minutes of overnight work – against the many man days of effort previously required. This element alone allowed 5 officers to be released from the office environment to operational duties.
Additionally, other forces visited Edinburgh to examine the new system and many took copies of the Detailed Operational Requirement away to plagiarise ideas and concepts.
Lastly in 1984, in an apparent volte face, the Home Office accepted the use of STATUS, the free text system as one search engine for the newly created HOLMES (Home Office {Large} Major Enquiry System).

10.5 Objective Four
to consider how implementation of large scale computer systems in the police can be managed successfully to meet predetermined performance criteria.

This objective is more speculative than any of the others and rests on the need for the police service to have open, accountable and proportionate responses to their operational needs.
Modern computer systems hold many pre determined programmes which are available ‘off the shelf’ and have been developed to meet a variety of needs.  For the police the primary concern is to determine the actual need.
The need made be a combination of speed of response, validation of input, operational credibility and cost.  The cost is not so much the actual acquisition but the backup of uninterrupted power supply, air conditioning, training, power supply for the communications network and finally security. Security again is not merely the physical confines of the computer but the systems required to keep the data secure and free from either contamination or theft by artifice or by disgruntled staff.
Once these needs have been defined, then as each police force is a viable commercial unit ranging in size from Dumfries and Galloway Police with some 600 officers, to the Metropolitan Police with 33,000 officers, all with commensurate support staff, there is sufficient enterprise with the force to procure systems to meet their own needs.
At a national level, the workings of the new agencies to meet the increased risk of international crime, of terrorism and of internet crime, these system require to be designed to a common standard using the same criteria which the Home Office used 30 years ago for the Police National Computer.  The Home Office established teams of police officers on secondment from their parent force, along with computer experts and communications technicians to develop the new system.  The police officers brought the apparent needs from their own forces and the experts sought commercial solutions to these needs.
This model worked well for both PNC and HOLMES.
Hence, the procurement method must be to leave police forces to obtain their own local systems and for the Home Office to arrange the national systems.
10.6 Verification of the thesis
This study set out four specific objectives regarding the introduction of crime and 

criminal intelligence computer systems in the police during the decade 1976-1986;
	to identify the main issues in the start of computerised crime  and intelligence recording  systems 1976-1986 with emphasis on the legal and social environment in which the implementation took place

to identify the risk factors in the implementation of computers for police forces in that decade

to examine and evaluate the procurement and  immediate post implementation usage, of  these systems

to consider how implementation of large scale computer systems in the police can be managed successfully to meet predetermined performance criteria.


These objectives were supported by introductory information relating to the nature of crime, the start of crime recording in Napoleonic France and its consequences in terms of the new study of sociology, to ensure a thorough background to this important phase of policing.







10.7 Future Research projects

This thesis has highlighted the lack of research into the business and management of computerised crime and intelligence recording. Accordingly this short paragraphs lists the possible projects and the possibility of success.

10.7.1Crime Data Collection.
As was highlighted earlier (Chapter Two), the police are recipients of crime reports from members of the public who wish to report the event for a variety of reasons.  There is listed in Appendix Five, legislation which allows duly authorised officers of a variety of organisations to submit reports of events to the Procurator Fiscal, for consideration of prosecution in the Scottish Criminal Courts.
To this end, a useful study, lasting no longer than one year, should be able to examine all local authorities in Scotland, the non civil police forces in Scotland as well as the charities charged with investigation events reported to them and all other sources of crime reports, to amalgamate all crimes reported in Scotland. To accomplish this proposal, a web based programme should be constructed which will passively examine the internet based pages of each of the agencies which record crimes.  This programme could then be run on an annual basis, allowing for year on year comparisons of all reported crime in Scotland.




10.7.2 Research Methodology in HOLMES Computing 
As stated in the analysis of research methods, the base for new computer based systems which analyse qualitative data, is the formation of a set of core domains, into which data is added.  These domains are pre determined in HOLMES and academic research to date has questioned whether by presetting the domains and thus constraining the data into tight definitions, there could be some degree of confusion in data entry into, for example N-Nivo-7 and other similar programs. There remains more work to be completed in this field regarding the introduction and use of HOLMES computers in crime investigations particularly in view of the academic comments regarding the use of computers in qualitative analysis. The research question of whether the pre determining of domains actually restricts the investigating officer, could be addressed by questionnaire to the 100 or so Senior Investigating Officers who conduct murder enquiries in Scotland annually.
This research would be difficult to achieve, as it would question the formation of the Home Office leading program for major crime investigation, and access to original documents would be at Queen Anne’s Gate, London.  Secondly, it is likely that funding for this research which could take some two years of data capture and later analysis, would not be forthcoming easily. The success possibility is low.
10.7.3 Use of new crime reporting technology
The last possible research project which this study has alluded to although not examined, is the use of new technology for crime reporting by the civil police.  Reports on web based pages for Lothian and Borders Police, (www.lbp.police.uk) and in local news reports, show that certain officers are using hand held computers to capture crime data as it is reported to them, rather than writing in script in pocketbooks.  Thereafter the data is downloaded to a central computer and amalgamated within the force crime data.







10.8 Recommendations for the future, dated August 2008

Lastly it may be useful to consider the wider implications of this study as it relates 

to other large scale organisations contemplating new information technology systems.

Within local and central government there are over 400 organisations with quasi independent constitutions from police forces, through health boards, prisons, schools, government tax and credit systems as well as airports and many others. Many of these organisations are now (August 2008) introducing replacement systems or additional large scale information technology systems to reflect the changes in computing power and systems availability.
It is important to categorise the lessons learned from this study into three main tranches;
	pre contract
	contract stage
	implementation, training and evaluation
Pre- contract

According to management texts,  the introduction of  new systems requires a careful business case to be established alongside a tight systems specification.  These cases are well documented in a plethora of academic and management journals and it is interesting to note the number of business cases which seriously underestimate the time and costs involved.  Additionally the difficulty in preparing a tight computer systems specification has been highlighted in many journals over the past thirty years. Primarily the business case may not reflect the reality of the new system.  This thesis has highlighted the difficulty in establishing a business case and a functional specification when more than one player is involved.  In publicly funded systems there will always be a need for either central or local government  to require some form of statistical information.  This is right and proper as the spending of public money is a political exercise and politicians should be aware of local needs before making their decisions.
There needs to be a specification of the new system. The local and central requirement depend on each other but the centre must be in a position to require a certain standard of information from the practitioner.  In the case studies reviewed above, this was lacking. Hence there is an overwhelming need for central government to have a clear and expressed requirement from the constituent parts of its organisations. Local practitioners should be tutored in two areas – the need for the centre to have some say in the national strategy and secondly the availability of computing power which can now partially or in whole replace main frame systems.  Included in this teaching exercise there is a need for the chosen designer to be aware of the checks and support which new systems can provide.  Thereafter the new system can be properly assessed against a ‘before and after’ model.  Computers not only store data, the manipulation of data is also vital.  The ‘blue sky’ thinking which may not be part of the practitioner’s remit, may have to be purchased from academia, industry, the computer supply industry or more and more often, consultancy. Whilst the central bureaucracy will states its requirement, the local system must meet local needs.  Differences in law in Scotland with respect to the rest of the United Kingdom should not be overlooked by English based central government and so Scotland should be able to specify its own particular set of systems.  This is particularly important in  the criminal justice field, in education, health, housing and other devolved matters.  Thus the requirement from central government should be in addition to the operational needs of practitioners in the field – always with the caveat, that the general population is now more mobile than in previous years.  This facet of mobility requires that data files should be able to be transferred say from a doctor in Fife to a doctor in Somerset – without any loss of integrity

Contract stage
Secondly, once the specification is set, and negotiations start with the computer suppliers, any deviation from the requirement can only be undertaken if properly managed – perhaps through the use of interactive computer systems – PRINCEII for example.  These systems would then calculate the extra time and effort involved in implementing the changes. Again, in the early days of police computing, changes were made and introduced without any real appreciation of the consequences. This was particularly apparent in the case of addresses which was a particular problem some 30 years ago. There are reported cases in the computer and general press where charges to specification in the midst of system design, have seriously affected the ability of the implementation team to deliver a system to time and cost.
  The perceived problem is that the tenure of senior politicians can be measured in short years or  months at cabinet level and each new incumbent requires some form of legacy. To date there have been five Home Secretaries since 1997 – a tenure of some 20 months each and the tenants of the office of the Secretary of State for Health is no better .  Hence changes are required and the system designers are faced with the problem of implementation. There is little that can be achieved at implementation level when faced with these changes other than to ensure that all requests for change are fully documented and responsibility properly apportioned.
Implementation, training and evaluation
Lastly and in the 1970s, the most difficult to achieve, is the compatibility of computer operating systems.  The ability of one mainframe computer being able to access, in a secure manner, the data contained in another computer, is paramount to dispersed organisations.  Whilst large scale commercial organisations may be able to introduce similar systems in different parts of the country, the need for local authorities, quasi-independent organisations to be constrained to meet central needs, is paramount.  However, the purchasing rules have changed over the past 30 years.  New financial arrangements including Public Private Partnerships, Private Finance Initiatives, covenant schemes and many other efforts to procure systems whilst staying within spending guidelines, have all lead to the focussing of system designers to meet external dictats. In the past thirty years, technology has moved to allow different systems to transfer data securely and without any intervention from the practitioner.  However, this can only be achieved by allowing the specification to ensure this compatibility.  The training of staff is paramount and as now computing is taught in schools and most literate students have sufficient understanding of systems, there is the presumption that training has been completed at school.  This is not the case and careful training will allow the organisation to meet its strategic and operational goals. 
The evaluation of new systems is notoriously difficult in large and dispersed organisations.  Whilst computers can audit trail each transaction and can show exception reports of aborted efforts to access data, the evaluation of systems is often held up to public scrutiny when the public are left without their rightful benefits.










‘plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose’
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Chief Officer Questionnaire 1976








Questions set to Chief police officers in certain police forces 
Question One	What benefit will the computer bring to the force in terms of operational efficiency?
Question criteria; the question required the subject to answer in terms of those areas of policing where operational efficiency had been deemed to be lacking.  This could include operational deployment of resources, data handling for crime, fixed penalty tickets, payroll and other administrative tasks. The crucial part of the question is ‘benefit’ ie had there been some sort of appraisal of the way the force worked.
Answers
The majority of forces (66%) stated that there was a ‘hope’ that the computer system of whatever type would assist policing operationally but no formal appraisal had been completed.  Two forces only had completed a model which showed a theoretical payback period of 10 years.  The saving in manhours over the 10 year period would in theory pay for the computer system. No follow up work has been concluded to establish if these claims were achieved. (compare with Manning’s results of poor follow up in USA police forces to the introduction of new technology)
Question Two  Is the police authority in favour of the acquisition of a computer system?
Question criteria This was a straightforward enquiry as to whether the local police authority had been consulted and acquiesced to the spend of probably 7%-9% of the revenue budget of the force for the foreseeable future.  The hidden enquiry was whether there had been any thought given to other means of financing the computer project – either by a covenant, relaxation of the local government rules on capital spending or by commercial leasing.
Answers
All chief officers stated that the police committee would allow the necessary spend to meet operational needs.  However one police committee stated that only computer companies which were not involved in supplying systems which would assist in the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be allowed to supply a computer system. This referred particularly to McDonnell Douglas, a computer hardware supplier in the United States – but also the supplier of aircraft designed to carry nuclear weapons.


Question Three.  What cost is there attributed to the computer project?
Question criteria The research in this area should be based on some ecosystem rating scale – with one answer being the actual amount of cash which has been approved within the force and thereafter  by the local authority  and the second answer being that which reflects the aspirations of the force in terms of transitional and long term costs.  The transitional costs are the hidden costs of computer projects such as uninterrupted power supplies, backup generators, consequential wiring and safety features, the purchase of computer peripherals, computer tapes, listing paper, accommodation for staff – both computer suppliers and police staff, training costs and materials and lastly the support of a wide spread computer network stretching across a force area.

Answers  In all forces (100%) the question of costs was answered ambiguously.  The computer supply industry was attempting to offer entry price solutions in the hope of further forces adopting the same systems.  Hence ‘ball park figures’ were used, with all forces willing to commit more than had been estimated in the first round of negotiations.
Question Four  What professional computer or management assistance have the chief officers sought?
Question criteria  To try to gauge the extent of the assistance from computer experts with experience of large scale data handling outwith the police service, this question was posed to the chief officer group. In 1976 there were only three pure science police officer graduates in the Scottish police service (HMCIC Report 1977) and few had computer science as a main subject.  Hence within forces there was a distinct lack of formal training of police officers.  The caution from the Home Office that civilian staff were liable to strike action, mitigated against an all civil staff complement of staffing for a 24 hour/ 7 day communications system.  The cost of non police consultancy in this area was the supplementary question if indeed there was an positive response.
Answers Again all forces questions had asked the local authority to provide professional expertise in the field of either computing per se or in the conjoined field of telecommunications.  All forces had at least one expert in the project team and police officers along with administrative staff were able to utilise that expertise in day to day project management  and system design.
Question Five Is the project team circumscribed in terms of seeking solutions in other areas of the United Kingdom or in overseas countries?
Question Criteria This was the key question in terms of strategic thinking for chief officers.  The need to exchange information regarding criminals was seen to be paramount amongst detective officers (Baldwin 1984) and any new system could have operational benefits beyond the force’s borders.  The need to raise the view to encompass other forces had already started with the Police National Computer but these new in- force systems would have regional rather than national effects.  Secondly other countries such as the United States and Italy were already well down the computerisation of  crime recording route and their expertise was important.
Answers Only one force had allowed an officer to venture to another country to examine computer systems.  That force became the first to install a working crime recording system some 3 years ahead of any other and to budget.  All other forces sent their officers on the tour of like forces in England and Scotland, where they were able to learn from the mistakes of fellow police entrepreneurs.
Question Six What particular functions of police work do you want computerised?
Question criteria In seeking a response to this question, the enquiry sought to establish any long term planning for the future use of computers in those areas where police data collection, storage and retrieval was at present lacking.
Answers  Only 40% of the chief officers responded with a clear pathway for their computer project.  This paucity of clear vision showed that either there was no strategic review of their own requirements or the force was awaiting the results of other research and would benefit from the mistakes of others.  All chief officers were of the opinion that something had to be done to bolster public confidence in the police but many were unsure of the pathway.  Those forces with clear vision were able to show documentary evidence of some management overview of the functions undertaken in the force and which functions required to be computerise.


Question Seven Has there been a feasibility or scooping study completed?
Question Criteria As part of strategic planning, the needs of the force should be set down clearly and costed, so that a simple cost/benefit analysis can be performed.  The concept of the paperless office was seen to be one goal of the police in the 1976 (West Yorkshire Police Feasibility study 1976).

Answers Only 6 forces  (40%) were able to produce some form of feasibility study which showed the results of questionnaires within their own force area.  The questionnaires had been designed to elicit the perceived requirements of operational officers in a variety of police posts.  The functional areas highlighted by these questionnaires were;
traffic tickets; command and control; lost and found property; criminal records; crime reporting; criminal intelligence; correspondence administration; message switching.




Question Eight Have you spoken to other Chief Officers in the area to share expertise and costs?
Question Criteria A check question to prise any sign of inter force collaboration in any functional computerisation projects.
Answers No chief officer admitted making any overtures to any other police force.  Each force had sent a project team to visit other forces with the strict instruction to assess the ideas being promulgated and to return with fresh ideas for their own computer project.  The Police National Computer was seen as the test bed for computerisation and as it had been rolled out in phases over a 4 year period up to 1978, there was no apparent appetite to collaborate with other forces.

Chief Officer Questionnaire 1989/1990
Questions set to all police forces (53) in 1989/1990 in relation to a new Casualty Bureau system
(Explanatory Note









In late 1989 and early 1990, chief officers of all 53 police forces in the United 

Kingdom were visited by a small Home Office Team and the following questions





Do you agree to the remote handling of telephone calls during a major incident?

Question Rationale
This fundamental question sought to establish whether all 53 police forces would be willing to work together during an emergency in another police area.  
Question Response
The unanimous response was positive. All chief officers agreed that a single force could no longer be expected to deal with an incident in which there were many people involved.
Indeed the response was overwhelming to the extent that there were only two common provisos;
	that the system could not be initiate unless with the express consent of the host force chief constable and
	that a computerised system be made available as soon as practicable.

Analysis






What amount of Information should  be initially captured?

Question Rationale








Whilst accepting the assistance which other forces could supply, all chief constables required absolute control over data capture and its analysis.  The Home Office Team was repeatedly told that the chief constable was responsible at law for events in his /her area.

Question Three/ Question Four
These questions related to the design and format of forms across all aspects of a major incident and did not evoke any new information from the chief officers.

Question Five




The discussion around this topic tested the resolve of chief officers to assist other forces.  If there were to be an inordinate delay in supplying assistance, then the whole concept of collaborative working would be seen as a negative enhancement to existing arrangements.

Question Response
Taking a starting point of 10 telephone receivers (operators accepting calls from the public), then 75% of forces could be working with 30 minutes; the remaining 25% between 45 minutes to two hours for some of the smallest forces in the land..

Question Analysis





There were further questions relating to whether there should be a national emergency number standard across all four nations, whether there should be a police officer ready to broadcast that number on national radio and television and under what circumstances and finally what financial resources should the Home Office make available to pay for the new system and its training.









Forces contemplating computer projects 1976



















































This appendix lists those pieces of legislation extant in Scotland and some in England and Wales,  under which some form of investigation is required on the receipt of information relating to an incident, and which may result in a report to the prosecuting authorities.  If after investigation, the result of the investigation presumes that there will not be a further report or enquiry, then the event can be classified as ‘no crime’, or ‘insufficient evidence’.  There is a subjective decision to be made in these circumstances.  If a report is submitted to the prosecuting authority and the decision by that authority to proceed to a tribunal hearing of some sort, then the event will be  recorded in any consolidated report sent by a chief constable to the appropriate Secretary of State.

ARREST AND SEARCH LEGISLATION FOR SCOTLAND

Animal Boarding Establishments Act 1963

Inspection of premises	A local authority officer or veterinary surgeon or practitioner may enter any premises in respect of which a licence is in force at all reasonable times and inspect them or any animals found thereon and anything therein to ascertain whether an offence has been or is being committed against the statutory provisions.​[1]​  He may be authorised in writing by the local authority and may be required to produce his authorisation.  It is an offence wilfully to obstruct or delay an inspector in the exercise of his powers of entry or inspection.​[2]​


Consumer Credit Act 1974

Enforcement authorities	The Director General of Fair Trading and local weights and measures authorities are the ‘enforcement authorities’ charged with the duty of enforcing the Consumer Credit Act 1974 and regulations made under it.​[3]​  Authorities officers of the enforcement authorities have extensive powers relating to entry into premises and seizure of goods and documents.​[4]​


Crofters (Scotland) Act 1955

Rights of entry and inspection	Any person authorised by the Secretary of State or the Crofters Commission may at all reasonable times, on producing his authority if so required, enter and inspect any land for the purposes of determining whether and to what extent the powers vested in the Secretary of State or the commission are to be exercised and whether any directions have been compiled with.​[5]​  In the case of land used for residential purposes seven days notice must be given and, as regards any other land, not less than 24 hrs notice.  Any person obstructing a person so authorised is liable to a fine not exceeding level 1 on the standard scale.

N.B. ‘Cottar’ means the occupier of a dwelling-house situated in the crafting countries, with or without land, who pays no rent, or the tenant from year to year of a dwelling-house situated in those countries who resides therein and pays an annual rent not exceeding £6 in money whether with or without garden ground but without arable or pasture land.


Customs and Excise Management Act 1979

Power of Arrest	Any officer or any member of Her Majesty’s armed forces or coastguard may arrest any person who has committed, or whom there are reasonable grounds to suspect has committed, any offence for which he is liable to be arrested under the customs and excise Acts.​[6]​  This power may be exercised at any time within twenty years of the date of the commission of the offence.  If it was not practicable to arrest such a person at the time of the commission of the offence or if such a person is arrested and escapes, he may be arrested by any of the persons mentioned above at any time and proceeded against as if the time of final arrest was the time of the offence.​[7]​  Those who commit offences and are members of the crew of one of Her Majesty’s ships may be detained on board if so required by the arresting officer until they can be brought before the court.​[8]​  Where the person making the arrest under the foregoing power is not an officer, then the former must give notice of the arrest to an officer at the nearest convenient customs and excise office.​[9]​


Powers of search and entering	Powers are given to officers to search premises​[10]​ and enter land​[11]​ and to search vehicles, vessels, aircraft and persons.​[12]​
	If there are reasonable grounds to suspect that any thing liable to forfeiture under the customs and excise Acts is being kept or concealed in any building or place, then an officer who has a writ of assistance is permitted to enter the building or place in question at any time in order to search for, seize or detain any such thing as aforementioned, and, if necessary, to break open any door, window or container and force and remove any other impediment or obstruction.​[13]​
	Where reasonable grounds exist for suspecting that a suspect is carrying an article chargeable to duty which has not been paid or secured, or the importation of which is prohibited or restricted, an officer may require the suspect to permit the search of any article which he has with him and to submit to a search of his person, if considered necessary or expedient.​[14]​  If the suspect is not under arrest he may be detained as long as necessary for the exercise of the powers mentioned and for the exercise of the right mentioned hereafter in relation to searches.


Electricity Lighting Act 1882

Rights of entry generally	The Scottish electricity boards and companies have rights of entry to consumers premises.​[15]​  These rights are granted for the purposes of inspecting, testing, removing and replacing apparatus (including lines and meters), and for ascertaining the quantity of electricity consumed.  These rights were amplified by the Confirmation Act 1956 to permit the South Board to take entry to premises where electrical fittings have been installed with a view to taking a supply of electricity from the board for the purpose of inspecting such fittings, ascertaining whether electricity supply legislation has been contravened and cutting off the supply where such contravention exists or where the board is otherwise authorised by law to do so.​[16]​

Procedure for entry	The rights of entry of a Scottish electricity board are subject to the provisions of the Rights of Entry (Gas and Electricity Boards) Act 1954, which regulates the manner of exercise of the rights.  It does not itself give any rights of entry to a board.  The Act provides for a minimum period of notice of intention to take entry (except in an emergency or where the premises are unoccupied or where notice would defeat the purpose of entry) and lays down the procedure for application to a justice of the peace, sheriff or magistrate to permit the board to obtain a warrant for entry where necessary.​[17]​






Powers of arrest without warrant	Any person who is found committing any act which is an offence under the Explosives Act 1875 and which tends to cause explosion or fire in or about any factory, magazine, store, railway, canal, harbour, wharf, or any carriage, ship or boat, may be apprehended without warrant by a constable, or an officer of the local authority, or by the occupier or his agents or servants or by any other person so authorised.​[19]​

Powers or search	Inspectors appointed by the Health and Safety Executive have general powers of entry and search for the purposes of carrying into effect any of the statutory provisions as to explosives, within the Executives field of responsibility.​[20]​


Food and Drugs (Scotland) Act 1956

Power to enter premises	Except in the case of premises used only as a private dwelling house (in respect of which twenty four hours notice of intended entry must be given to the occupier), an authorised officer of a local authority has a right to enter any premises at all reasonable hours, upon production, if so required, of some duly authenticated document showing his authority, (1) for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is or has been on, or in connection with, the premises any contravention of the provisions of the Food and Drugs (Scotland) Act 1956 or of any regulation made under it which the local authority is required or empowered to enforce; (2) generally for the purpose of the performance by the authority of its functions under the Act or such regulations.​[21]​
	A justice of the peace, sheriff or magistrate may by warrant under his hand authorise a local authority by any authorised officer to enter any premises, if need be by force, if he is satisfied on sworn information in writing that there is reasonable ground for entry for any of the foregoing purposes, and either (a) that admission has been refused or refusal is apprehended and that notice of intention to apply for a warrant has been given to the occupier, or (b) that an application for admission, or the giving of such a notice, would defeat the object of the entry, or that the case is one of urgency, or that the premises are unoccupied or the occupier is temporarily absent.​[22]​






Powers of entry and Enforcement generally	An officer of the Forestry Commission or any other person authorised by them may enter on and survey land to ascertain its suitability for forestation, or to inspect timber thereon, or for any purpose in connection with the exercise of the commissioners statutory functions.​[24]​  They may authorise their officers or servants to enforce their bylaws.  In particular, those officers and servants may be authorised to remove or exclude, after due warning, from any land covered by bylaws, a person who commits, or is reasonably suspected of committing, an offence under the Forestry Act 1967.​[25]​
	Anyone person who obstructs such officers or servants in so enforcing, or otherwise in due exercise of any of, their powers or duties, is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level three on the standard scale.


Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974

Entry, inspection and disclosure of information	Where necessary for the purpose of an inquiry, the appointed person may at any reasonable time enter and make an inspection of any premises to which the inquiry relates and anything in them​[26]​ (and, presumably, this includes the right to inspect documents).  However, there are restrictions on the disclosure of information obtained.  A person must not disclose any information obtained by him as a result of the exercise of this power or inspector’s powers, including, in particular, any information with respect to any trade secret obtained by him in any premise entered by him by virtue of any such power.

Powers of entry, examination and investigation	The powers of an inspector include power:

1.	at any reasonable time (or, in a situation which in his opinion is or may be dangerous, at any time) to enter any premises which he has reason to believe it is necessary for him to enter for the purpose of carrying into effect any of the relevant statutory provisions within the riled of responsibility of the enforcing authority which appointed him.​[27]​
2.	to take with him a constable if he has reasonable cause to apprehend any serious obstruction in the execution of his duty.​[28]​
3.	without prejudice to head (2), on entering any premises by virtue of head (1) to take with him any other person duly authorised by the inspectors enforcing authority​[29]​; and any equipment or materials required for any purpose for which the power of entry is being exercised.​[30]​
4.	to make such examination and investigation as may in any circumstances be necessary for the purpose mentioned in head (I)​[31]​
5.	as regards any premises which he has power to enter, t direct that those premises or any part of them, or any thing therein, is to be left undisturbed (whether generally or in particular respects) for so long as is reasonably necessary for the purpose of any such examination or investigation.​[32]​
6.	to take such measurements and photographs and make such recordings as he considers necessary for the purpose of any such examination or investigation.​[33]​


Public Health (Scotland) Act 1897

Powers of entry	If a local authority or designated medical officer or proper officer of a local authority has reasonable grounds for believing that a nuisance exists in any premises, the local authority or officer may demand admission for themselves, the chief constable or superintendent of police, or any other person or persons whom the local authority may desire to enter and inspect such premises.​[34]​


Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984

	A police authority may employ traffic wardens to discharge certain of its functions in respect of road traffic matters.  Such persons act under the directions of the chief officer of the police.
	The functions of a traffic warden must be specifically delegated by the Secretary of State.  In general terms they relate to the powers of traffic wardens to require compliance with traffic directions.  However, a traffic warden may have the same power as a police officer in certain circumstances to stop a vehicle on the road.​[35]​  He may also require the production of a driving licence in certain circumstances.​[36]​  Further, he has power to require the names and addresses of drivers and others, and the production of insurance or test certificates, if he is either assisting a police officer or has reason to believe that an offence in respect of the foregoing matters has been committed.​[37]​  Traffic wardens may also be employed to act as school crossing patrols and parking attendants at street parking places.​[38]​


Roads (Scotland) Act 1984

Powers of entry	Persons authorised by a roads authority, on production of a duly authenticated document showing that authority, have a right to enter any land at all reasonable hours for the purpose of surveying that land or any other land in connection with the roads authority’s functions under the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984, and may lay or leave apparatus on the land or carry out searching or boring activities.​[39]​
	Authorised persons may also use the power of entry to inspect anything which any person is liable to maintain under the Act or to see whether any work which a person has been required to do, or has been given permission to do under the Act, has been carried out.​[40]​
	Entry may also be taken where a person has been served with a notice under the Act which requires him to carry out work and this has not been carried out so that the authority may carry out the work.​[41]​  An authorised person may gain entry to take any action, or to execute any work, authorised or required to be taken or executed by the roads authority.​[42]​  This could cover any works such as drainage works, lopping of trees or diversion of waters carried out on land which the authority did not own. 
	Except in an emergency, entry to land must not be demanded unless seven days notice of the intended entry has been given to the occupier.​[43]​
 

Salmon Fisheries (Scotland) Act 1868

Powers of arrest	A water bailiff, constable or person appointed by the Secretary of State may, without warrant, arrest any person found committing any of the principal offences​[44]​ relating to salmon fishing and carry him before any sheriff principal or justice of the peace.​[45]​





AGRICULTURE ACT 1970 s76

76 	Inspector’s power to enter premises and take samples

(1)	An inspector may at all reasonable times enter –
(a)	any premises on which he has reasonable cause to believe that there is any fertiliser or feeding stuff which is kept there for the purpose of being sold in the course of trade and is ready for sale;
(b)	any premises (not being used only as dwelling) on which he has reasonable cause to believe that there is any fertiliser or feeding stuff which the occupier of the premises has purchased;
and the inspector may take a sample in the prescribed manner on those premises of any material on the premises (including any material in a vehicle) which he has reasonable cause to believe to be such a fertiliser or feeding stuff as foresaid.

(2)	An inspector may require a person who has purchased any fertiliser or feeding stuff –
(a)	to tell him the name and address of the seller; and
(b)	to produce, and allow him to take copies of –
(i)	any statutory statement received from the seller; and
(ii)	where the fertiliser or the feeding stuff was described or marked as mentioned in section 70(1) or 71(1) of this Act, the document or mark in question;
any any person who without reasonable excuse fails to comply with such a requirement shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding [level 3 on the standard scale].

(3)	An inspector entering any premises by virtue of this section may take with him such other persons and such equipment as may appear to him to be necessary.

(4)	Without prejudice to his powers and duties as to the taking of samples in the prescribed manner, an inspector may for the purposes of this Part of the Act take a sample in a manner other than that prescribed of any material which has been sold for use as a fertiliser or feeding stuff or which he has reasonable cause to believe to be intended for sale as such.

(5)	Where for the purpose of taking a sample of any material an inspector takes some of it from each of one or more parcels of the material which are exposed for sale by retail and none of which weighs more than [six kilograms] the owner of the parcel may require the inspector to purchase the parcel or parcels on behalf of the authority for whom he acts.

N.B. The reference to level 3 on the standard scale in sub-s(2) is substituted by virtue of the Criminal Justice Act 1982, ss38, 46, Vol 27, title Magistrates.






(1)	For the purpose of exercising any power conferred on him by or under section 1 of this Act an authorised person may at any time enter –
(a)	any premises or other place; or
(b)	any vessel, boat, hovercraft, aircraft or vehicle or any other description;
on or in which he has reasonable grounds for supposing thee are or have been any bees or other things subject to control under an order under that section.

(3)	A person seeking to enter any premises or other place, or any vessel, boat, hovercraft, aircraft or other vehicle in exercise of the power of entry under this section, shall, if so required by or on behalf of the owner or occupier or person in charge, produce evidence of his authority before entering.

(4)	Any person who intentionally obstructs a person acting in exercise of the power of entry under this section shall be liable on summary conviction by a court of summary jurisdiction, to a fine not exceeding level three on the standard scale.


BRITISH FISHING BOATS ACT 1983 s3

3	Powers of entry of British sea-fishery officers in relation to premises on land

(1)	Subject to the following provisions of this section, if -
(a)	in England, Wales or Northern Ireland, a justice of the peace; or
(b)	(applies to Scotland only);
is satisfied by information on oath that there is reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence under section 1 of this Act has been committed in relation to any fishing boat, and that any document relevant for determining whether such an offence has been committed in relation to that boat may be found on any premises specified in the information, he may grant a search warrant for the purposes of this section.

(2)	The premises specified in any information laid for the purposes of subsection (1) above must be premises (other than a dwelling-house) used for carrying on a business in connection with the operation of fishing boats or activities connected with or ancillary to the operation of fishing boats.

(3)	For the purposes of this section, a document shall be regarded as relevant for determining whether an offence under section 1 of this Act has been committed in relation to a fishing boat if it relates -
(a)	to that boat, to its fishing operations or to other operations ancillary to its fishing operations; or
(b)	to the nationality of members of the crew of that boat.

(4)	A warrant granted under subsection (1) above shall authorise any British sea-fishery officer named in the warrant, with or without any constables, to enter the premises specified in the information and to search the premises for any document relevant for determining whether the suspected offence has been committed.

(5)	Any such officer may require any person on any premises he has entered in pursuance of any such warrant to produce any document relevant for determining whether the suspected offence has been committed which is in his custody or possession, and may take copies of any such document.

(6)	Any such officer may require any such person to do anything which appears to him to be necessary for facilitating any search carried out by him in pursuance of the warrant.

(7)	Any such officer may seize and detain any document relevant for determining whether the suspected offence has been committed which is produced to him or found in the course of any such search, for the purpose of enabling the document to be used as evidence in proceedings for the offence.

(8)	A warrant granted under subsection (1) above shall remain in force for a period of one month.

N.B. Justice of the peace – A justice of the peace may be either a lay justice or a stipendiary magistrate.  The main provisions relating to justices of the peace (including stipendiary magistrates), covering such matters as appointment, removal and organisation, will be found in the Justices of the Peace Act 1979, Vol 27, title Magistrates, and the office and jurisdiction of justices are considered generally in 29 Halsbury’s Laws (4th edn) paras 201 et seq.


CLEAN AIR ACT s 56

56	Rights of entry and inspection etc

(1)	Any person authorised in the behalf by a local authority may at any reasonable time -
(a)	enter upon any land or vessel for the purpose of -
(i)	performing any function conferred on the authority or that person by virtue of this Act.
(ii)	determining whether, and if so in what manner, such a function should be performed, or
(iii)	determining whether any provision of this Act or of an instrument made under this Act is being complied with; and
(b)	carry out such inspections, measurements and tests on the land or vessel or of any articles on it and take away such samples of the land or articles as he considers appropriate for such a purpose.

(2)	Subsection (1) above does not, except in relation to work under section 24(1) (adaptations to dwellings in smoke control area), apply in relation to a private dwelling.

(3)	If it is shown to the satisfaction of a justice of the peace on sworn information in writing -
(a)	that admission to any land or vessel which a person is entitled to enter in pursuance of subsection (1) has been refused to that person or that refusal is apprehended or that the land or vessel is unoccupied or that the occupier is temporarily absent or that the case is one of emergency or that an application for admission would defeat the object of the entry; and
(b)	that thee is reasonable ground for entry upon the land or vessel for the purpose for which entry is required,
then, subject to subsection (4), the justice may by warrant under his hand authorise that person to enter the land or vessel, if need be by force.

(4)	A justice of the peace shall not issue a warrant in pursuance of subsection (3) in respect of any land or vessel unless he is satisfied –
(a)	that admission to the land or vessel in pursuance of subsection (1) was sought after not less than seven days notice of the intended entry has been served on the occupier; or
(b)	that admission to the land or vessel in pursuance of that subsection was sought in an emergency and was refused by or on behalf of the occupier; or
(c)	that the land or vessel is unoccupied; or
(d)	that an application for admission to the land or vessel would defeat the object of the entry.

(5)	A warrant issued in pursuance of this section shall continue in force until the purpose for which the entry is required has been satisfied.

(6)	(Applies to Scotland only i)






CONSUMER CREDIT ACT 1974 s 162

162	Powers of entry and inspection

(1)	A duly authorised officer of an enforcement authority, at all reasonable hours and on production, if so required, of his credentials, may -
(a)	in order to ascertain whether a breach of any provision of or under this Act has been committed, inspect any goods and enter any premises (other than premises used only as dwelling);






DETENTION OF PERSONS, FORFEITURE AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

138	Provisions as to [arrest] of persons

(1)	Any person who has committed, or whom there are reasonable grounds to suspect of having committed, any offence for which he is liable to be [arrested] under the customs and excise Acts may be [arrested] by any officer … or any member of Her Majesty’s armed forces or coastguard at any time within [20 years] from the date of the commission of the offence.

(2)	Where it was not practicable to [arrest] any person so liable at the time of the commission of the offence, or where any such person having been then or subsequently [arrested] for that offence has escaped, he may be [arrested] by any officer … or any member of Her Majesty’s armed forces or coastguard at any time and may be proceeded against in like manner as if the offence had been committed at the date when he was finally [arrested].

(3)	Where any person who is a member of the crew of any ship in Her Majesty’s employment or service is [arrested] by an officer for an offence under the customs and excise Acts, the commanding officer of the ship shall, if so required by the [arresting] officer, keep that person secured on board that ship until he can be brought before a court and shall then deliver him up to the proper officer.

[(4)	Where any person has been arrested by a person who is not an officer -
(a)	by virtue of this section; or
(b)	by virtue of section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in its application to offences under the customs and excise Acts, [or
(c)	By virtue of Article 26 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 in its application to such offences]




DOCKYARD PORTS REGULATION ACT 1865 s 12

12	Power to search, etc

	The Queen’s harbour master, or any person having authority in writing from the [the Secretary of State] in this behalf may, with proper assistants, enter into any vessel in a dockyard port, and there search for gunpowder, shotted or loaded guns, fire, or light, or combustible substances had or suspected to be had on board in contravention of any Order in Council under this Act, and may extinguish any such fire or light; and if any person wilfully obstructs the Queen’s harbour master or other person in the execution of the authority conferred by this section, he shall for each offence be liable to a penalty not exceeding level one on the standard scale.

N.B. Order in Council – Orders regulating dockyard ports may be made under s 5 ante.


EDUCATION ACT 1997 s40

40	Inspector’s right of entry etc

(1)	The inspector in the case of any inspection under section 38, and any person assisting him, shall have at all reasonable times -
(a)	a right of entry to the premises of any local education authority to which the inspection relates, and
(b)	a right to inspect, take copies of, any records kept by the authority, and any other documents containing information relating to the authority, which he considers relevant to the exercise of his functions;
and section 42 of the Schools Inspection Act 1996 (inspection of computer records for the purpose of Part 1 of that Act) shall apply for the purposes of this section as it applies for the purposes of Part 1 of that Act.


ELECTRICITY ACT 1989 s 8

8	Provisions as to power of entry

(1)	Where in pursuance of any powers of entry conferred by this schedule, entry is made on any premises by an officer authorised by a public electricity supplier -
(a)	the officer shall ensure that the premises are left no less secure by reason of the entry; and
(b)	the supplier shall make good, or pay compensation for, any damage caused by the officer, or by any person accompanying him in entering the premises, in taking any action therein authorised by this schedule, or in making the premises secure.

(2)	Any officer exercising powers of entry conferred by this schedule may be accompanied by such persons as may be necessary or expedient for the purpose for which the entry is made, or for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) above

(3)	If any person intentionally obstructs any officer exercising powers of entry conferred by this schedule, he shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level three on the standard scale.

(4)	The Rights of Entry (Gas and Electricity Boards) Act 1954 (entry under a justice’s warrant) shall apply in relation to any powers of entry conferred by this schedule.







(a)	a justice of the peace is satisfied on information on oath that there is reasonable ground for suspecting that a fraud offence which appears to be of a serious nature is being, has been or is about to be committed on any premises or that evidence of the commission of such an offence is to be found there, or
(b)	in Scotland a justice, within the meaning of section 307 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, is satisfied by evidence on oath as mentioned in paragraph (a) above he may issue a warrant in writing authorising any authorised person to enter those premises, if necessary by force, at any time within one month from the time of the issue of the warrant and search them.

(2)	A person who enters the premises under the authority of the warrant may -
(a)	take with him such other persons as appear to him to be necessary;
(b)	seize and remove any documents or other things whatsoever found on the premises which he has reasonable cause to believe may be required as evidence for the purposes of proceedings in respect of a fraud offence which appears to him to be of a serious nature;
(c)	search or cause to be searched any person found on the premises whom he has reasonable cause to believe to be in possession of any such documents or other things;
	but no woman or girl shall be searched except by a woman

(3)	The powers conferred by a warrant under this paragraph shall not be exercisable –
(a)	by more than such number of authorised persons as may be specified in the warrant;
(b)	outside such times of day as may be so specified, or
(c)	if the warrant so provides, otherwise than in the presence of a constable in uniform.

(4)	An authorised person seeking to exercise the powers conferred by a warrant under this paragraph or, if there is more than one such authorised person, that one of them who is in charge of the search shall provide a copy of the warrant endorsed with him name as follows -
(a)	if the occupier of the premises concerned is present at the time the search is to begin, the copy shall be supplied to the occupier;
(b)	if at that time the occupier is not present but a person who appears to be authorised person to be in charge of the premises is present, the copy shall be supplied to that person;
(c)	if neither paragraph (a) nor paragraph (b) above applies, the copy shall be left in a prominent place on the premises.






6. -	(1)	Where an authorised person has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a fraud offence has been committed he may arrest anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of the offence.

	(2)	In this paragraph “a fraud offence” means an offence under any provision of paragraph 15(1) to (5) below.


FORESTRY ACT 1967 s 48

48	Powers of entry and enforcement

(1)	An officer of the Commissioners or any other person authorised by them in that behalf (on production, if so required, of his authority) enter on and survey any land for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is suitable for forestation or for the purpose of inspecting any timber thereon, or for any other purpose in connection with the exercise of the powers and performance of the duties of the Commissioners under this Act or the Plant Health Act 1967.

	(3)	Anyone who obstructs an officer or servant appointed or employed by the Commissioners in the due exercise or performance of his powers or duties under the foregoing subsection shall be guilty of an offence and be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding [level 3 on the standard scale].


GAMING ACT 1968 s43

43	Provision for inspectors and rights of entry and related rights

	(1)	The board may appoint such number of persons as the Secretary of State may with the consent of the Treasury determine to be inspectors for the purposes of this Act, and in this Act “inspector” means any person so appointed.

(2)	Any inspector or constable may at any reasonable time enter any premises in respect of which a licence under this Act is for the time being in force, and while on the premises may -
(a)	inspect the premises and any machine or other equipment on the premises, and any book or document on the premises, which he reasonably requires to inspect for the purpose of ascertaining whether a contravention of this Act or of any regulations made under it is being or has been committed;
(b)	take copies of any such book or document or of any entry in it; and
(c)	if any information reasonably required by him for that purpose is contained in a computer and is accessible from the premises, require it to be produced in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible.

(3)	If any person, being the holder of a licence under this Act in respect of any premises or a person acting on behalf of the holder of such a licence, -
(a)	fails without reasonable excuse to admit an inspector or constable who demands admission to the premises in pursuance to subsection (2) of this section, or
(b)	on being required by an inspector or constable to do so, fails without reasonable excuse to permit the inspector or constable to inspect the premises or any machine or other equipment on the premises, or
(c)	on being required by an inspector or constable to produce any book or document in his possession or under his control which relates to those premises and which the inspector or constable reasonably requires to inspect for the purpose specified in subsection (2) of this section, fails without reasonable excuse to produce it to the inspector or constable and to permit the inspector or constable (if he so desires) to take copies of it or of an entry in it, or
(ca)	fails without reasonable excuse to comply with a requirement imposed in relation to those premises under subsection (2) (c) of this section; or
(d)	on being required by an inspector to furnish any information relating to the premises which is reasonably required by the Board for the purposes of the performance of their functions, fails without reasonable excuse to furnish that information to the inspector, the holder of the licence shall be guilty of an offence.

	(4)	If, on information on oath with respect to any premises, -
(a)	a justice of the peace, if the premises are in England and Wales, or
(b)	(applies to Scotland only)
is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence under this Act is being, has been or is about to be committed to those premises, he may issue a warrant in writing authorising any constable with or without one or more inspectors, to enter the premises, if necessary by force, … and to search the premises.

	(5)	Any constable who enters any premises under the authority of a warrant issued under subsection (4) of this section may -
(a)	seize and remove any document, money or valuable thing, instrument or other thing whatsoever found on the premises which he has reasonable cause to believe may be required as evidence for the purposes of proceedings in respect of an offence under this Act, …
[(aa)	if he has reasonable cause to believe that any information which is contained in a computer and is accessible from the premises and may be required for those purposes, require it to be produced in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible; and]
(b)	… search any person found on the premises whom he has reasonable cause to believe to be committing or to have committed any such offence.
[(5A)	The holder of a licence under this Act in respect of any premises shall be guilty of an offence if he, or any person acting on his behalf, fails without reasonable excuse to comply with a requirement imposed in relating to those premises under subsection (5) (aa) of this section.]

	(10)	Any person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale.

N.B. Sub-s (2) was substituted, sub-ss (3)(ca), (5)(aa), (5A) were inserted by the Gaming (Amendment) Act 1990, s1, Sch, para 2.






(1)	Subject to the provisions of section 19 and this section, any inspector may, for the purpose of carrying into effect any of the relevant statutory provisions within the field of responsibility of the enforcing authority which appointed him, exercise the powers set out in subsection (2) below.

(2)	the powers of an inspector referred to in the preceding subsection are the following, namely -
(a)	at any reasonable time (or, in a situation which in his opinion is or may be dangerous, at any time) to enter any premises which he has reason to believe it is necessary for him to enter for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1) above;
(b)	to take with him a constable if he has reasonable cause to apprehend any serious obstruction in the execution of his duty;
(c)	without prejudice to the preceding paragraph, on entering any premises by virtue of paragraph (a) above to take with him-
(i)	any other person duly authorised by his (the inspector’s) enforcing authority; and
(ii)	any equipment or materials required for any purpose for which the power of entry is being exercised;
(d)	to make such examination and investigation as may in any circumstances be necessary for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1) above;
(e)	as regards any premises which he has power to enter, to direct that those premises or any part of them, or anything therein, shall be left undisturbed (whether generally or in particular respects) for so long as is reasonably necessary for the purpose of any examination or investigation under paragraph (d) above;
(f)	to take such measurements and photographs and make such recordings as he considers necessary for the purpose of any examination or investigation under paragraph (d) above;
(g)	to take samples of any articles or substances found in any premises which he has power to enter, and of the atmosphere in or in the vicinity of any such premises;
(h)	in the case of any article or substance found in any premises which he has power to enter, being an article or substance which appears to him to have caused or to be likely to cause danger to health and safety, to cause it to be dismantled or subjected to any process or test (but not so as to damage or destroy it unless this is in the circumstances necessary for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1) above);
(i)	in the case of any such article or substance as is mentioned in the preceding paragraph, to take possession of it and detain it for so long as is necessary for all or any of the following purposes, namely -
(i)	to examine it and do to it anything which he has power to do under that paragraph;
(ii)	to ensure that it is not tampered with before his examination of it is completed;
(iii)	to ensure that it is available for use as evidence in any proceedings for an offence under any of the relevant statutory provisions or any of the proceedings relating to a notice under section 21 or 22;
(j)	to require any person whom he has reasonable cause to believe to be able to give any information relevant to any examination or investigation under paragraph (d) above to answer (in the absence of persons other than a person nominated by him to be present and any persons whom the inspector may allow to be present) such questions as the inspector thinks fit to ask and to sign a declaration of the truth of his answers;
(k)	to require the production of, inspect, and take copies of or of any entry in -
(i)	any books or documents which by virtue of any of the relevant statutory provisions are required to be kept; and
(ii)	any other books or documents which it is necessary for him to see for the purposes of any examination or investigation under paragraph (d) above;
(l)	to require any person to afford him such facilities and assistance with respect to any matters or things within that persons control or in relation to which that person has responsibilities as are necessary to enable the inspector to exercise any of the powers conferred on him by this section;
(m)	any other power which is necessary for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1) above.

N.B. Constable – This means any person holding the office of a constable (as to which, see 36 Halsbury’s Laws (4th edn) paras 201 et seq), not a member of a police force holding the rank of a constable, see the Police Act 1964, s18, Sch 2, Vol 33, title Police (repealed by the Police Act 1966, s29) and as to their jurisdiction, see s19 of that Act (repealed by the Police Act 1966, s30).


HIGHWAYS ACT 1980 s 289

289	Powers of entry of highway authority for the purpose of survey

(1)	A person duly authorised in writing by a highway authority may at any reasonable time enter on any land for the purpose of surveying that or any other land in connection with the exercise by that authority, in their capacity as a highway authority, of any of their functions.

(2)	The power conferred by this section to enter on lands include power to place and leave on or in the land any apparatus for use in connection with any survey of that or any other land (whether from the air or on the group) and to remove such apparatus.

(3)	The power conferred by this section to survey land includes power to search and bore for the purpose of ascertaining -
(a)	the nature of the subsoil or the presence of minerals in it;
(b)	whether any damage to a highway maintainable at the public expense for which the authority are the highway authority is being caused by mining operations or other activities taking place under the highway or in or under land adjoining, or in the vicinity of the highway.


290	Supplementary provisions as to powers of entry for the purpose of survey

(1)	A person authorised under Section 289 above to enter on any land shall, of so required, produce evidence of his authority before or after entering on that land.

(2	A person so authorised may take with him on to the land in question such other persons, and such vehicles and equipment, as he may consider necessary.

(3)	Subject to subsection (6) below, a person shall not under section 289 above demand admission as of right to any land which is occupied unless at least 7 days notice of the intended entry has been given to the occupier.

(4)	Subject to subsection (6) below, a person shall not, in the exercise of a power conferred by section 289 above, place or leave any apparatus therefrom unless notice of his intention to do so has been included in the notice required by subsection (3) above and a like notice has been given to the owner of the land.

N.B. For compensation for damage resulting from and offences connected with exercise of powers of entry etc under this section, see 292 post.
A local authority which has power by virtue of sub-s (1) of section 289 above to authorise a person to survey or enter on any land as mentioned in the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, s15 (1), Vol 19, title Compulsory Acquisition (power of local authorities to survey land which they propose to acquire compulsorily), is not entitled by virtue of the said 15(1) to authorise a person to survey or enter on the land, see 15(9) of that Act.


PUBLIC HEALTH ACT 1936 s 287

287	Power to enter premises

(1)	Subject to the provisions of this section, any authorised officer of a council shall, on producing, if so required, some duly authenticated document showing his authority, have a right to enter any premises at all reasonable hours -
(a)	for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is, or has been, on or in connection with the premises any contravention of the provisions of this Act or of any bylaws […] made thereunder, being provisions which it is the duty of the council to enforce.
(b)	for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not circumstances exist which would authorise or require the council to take any action, or execute any work, under this Act or any such bylaws;
(c)	for the purpose of taking any action, or executing any work, authorised or required by this Act or any such byelaws […], or any order made under this Act, to be taken, or executed by the council;
(d)	generally, for the purpose of the performance by the council of their functions under this Act or any such byelaw […].


NIGHT POACHING ACT 1928 s 2

2	Owners or occupiers of land, lords of manors, or their servants, may apprehend offenders

… Where any person shall be found upon any land committing any such offence as is herein-before mentioned it shall be lawful for the owner or occupier of such land … or for the lord of the manor or reputed manor wherein such land may be situated, and also for any gamekeeper or servant of any of the persons herein mentioned, or any person assisting such gamekeeper or servant, to seize and apprehend such offender upon such land, or, in case of pursuit being made, in any other place to which he may have escaped therefrom, and to deliver him as soon as may be into the custody of a peace officer, in order to his being conveyed before two justices of the peace; and in case such offender shall assault or offer any violence with any gun, crossbow, firearm, bludgeon, stick, club, or any other offensive weapon whatsoever towards any person hereby authorised to seize and apprehend him, he shall (be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding [level 4 on the standard scale, or to both].

N.B. ‘Offensive weapon’ – For the purposes of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, an offensive weapon is defined as “any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having with him for such use by him or by some other person”; see 1(4) of that Act.


ROAD TRAFFIC REGULATION ACT 1984 s 96

(1)	An order under section 95(5) of this Act may provide that, for the purposes of any functions which traffic wardens are authorised by the order to discharge, but subject to the provisions of subsection (3) below, references to a constable or police constable in all, or any of the enactment’s specified in subsection (2) below shall include references to a traffic warden.

(2)	The enactments referred to in subsection (1) above are -
(a)	section 52 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839, so far as it relates to the giving by the commissioner of directions to constables for preventing obstructions;
(b)	section 22 of the local Act of the second and third year of the reign of Queen Victoria, chapter 94, so far as it makes similar provision with respect to the City of London;
[(bb)	in this Act -
(i)	section 100(3) (which relates to the interim disposal of vehicles removed under section 99); and
(ii)	section 104 and 105 (which relate to the immobilisation of illegally parked vehicles);]
(a)	in [the Road Traffic Act 1988] -
(i)	[sections 35(1), 36 and 37] (which relate to compliance with traffic directions given by police constables);
(ii)	[sections 163] (which relates to the power of a constable to stop vehicles);
(iii)	[section 164(1), (2) and (6)] (which relate to the power of a constable to require the production of a driving licence in certain circumstances); [and]
(iv)	[sections 165 and 169] (which relate to the powers of constables to obtain names and addresses of drivers and others and to require production of evidence of insurance or security and test certificates); and
[(d)	section 11 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988].

(1)	Any power of a constable for the purposes of the following provisions of [the Road Traffic Act 1988, namely, sections 163, 164(1), (2) and (6) and 165], shall be exercisable by a traffic warden under an order made by virtue of subsection (1) above only where –
(a)	the traffic warden is assisting a constable, or
(b)	the traffic warden has reasonable cause to believe that an offence has been committed of a description specified in relation to the section in question for the purposes of this paragraph by the order, and, in the case of a power for the purposes of [section 165 of the Road Traffic Act 1988], the order authorises the use of that power in relation to that offence, or
(c)	in the case of a power for the purposes of [section 163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988], the traffic warden is exercising functions in connection with the control and regulation of traffic (including pedestrians) or stationary vehicles.

[(4)	Where an order has been made pursuant to subsection (2)(bb)(i) above, in section 100(3) of this Act the words “chief officer of the police force to which the constable belongs” shall be deemed to include a reference to a chief officer of police under whose direction a traffic warden acts.

(5)	Any order made under section 95(5) of this Act may make different provisions for different cases or classes of case, or in respect of different areas.]


SALMON AND FRESHWATER FISHERIES ACT 1975 ss 31 and 32

31	Powers of search etc

(1)	Any water bailiff appointed by a water authority and any person appointed by the minister -
(a)	may examine any dam, fishing weir, fishing mill dam, fixed engine or obstruction, or any artificial water course, and for that purpose enter on any land;
(b)	may examine any instrument or bait which he has reasonable cause to suspect of having been or being used or likely to be used in taking fish in contravention of this Act or any container which he has reasonable cause to suspect of having been used or likely to be used for holding any such instrument, bait or fish;
(c)	may stop and search any boat or other vessel used in fishing in a water authority area or any vessel which he has reasonable cause to suspect of containing -
(i)	fish which has been caught in contravention of this Act;
(ii)	any such instrument, bait or container as foresaid;
(d)	may seize any fish and any instrument, vessel, vehicle or other thing liable to be forfeited in pursuance of this Act.

(2)	If any person refuses to allow a water bailiff or a person appointed by the Minister to make any entry, search or examination which he is by this section authorised to make, or to seize anything which he is so authorised to seize, or resists or obstructs a water bailiff or person so appointed in any such entry, search, examination or seizure, he shall be guilty of an offence.


32	Power to enter lands

(1)	Subject to subsection (2) below, -
(a)	any water bailiff or other officer of a water authority, under a special order in writing from the authority, and
(b)	any person appointed by the minister, under an order in writing from him,
may at all reasonable times, for the purpose of preventing any offence against this Act, enter, remain upon and traverse any lands adjoining or near to [any water] other than –
(i)	a dwelling house or the curtilage of a dwelling house, or
(ii)	decoys or lands used exclusively for the preservation of wild fowl.

(2)	An order under subsection (1) above shall not remain in force for more than 12 months.

N.B. Water bailiff – by s36(3) post, a police constable whose services are provided under Sch 3, para 39(1)© post has the powers of a water bailiff.






(1)	Subject to the provisions of this section, an authorised officer of a council shall, on producing, if so required, some duly authenticated document showing his authority, have a right to enter any premises at all reasonable hours -
(a)	for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is or has been on, or in connection with, the premises any contravention of the provisions of this Part of this Act or of any bylaws made under it, being provisions which the council are required or empowered to enforce, and
(b)	generally for the purpose of the performance by the council of their functions under this Part of the Act or under any such bylaws;
but admission to any premises used only as a dwelling-house shall not be demanded as of right unless 24 hours notice of the intended entry has been given to the occupier.

(2)	If a justice of the peace, on sworn information in writing, -
(a)	is satisfied that there is reasonable ground for entry into any premises for any such purpose as mentioned in subsection (1) above, and
(b)	is also satisfied either -
(i)	that admission to the premises has been refused, or a refusal is apprehended and that notice of the intention to apply for a warrant has been given to the occupier, or
(ii)	that an application for admission, or the giving of such a notice, would defeat the object of the entry, or that the case is one of urgency, or that the premises are unoccupied or the occupier temporarily absent;
the justice may by warrant under his hand, which shall continue in force for a period of one month, authorise the council by any authorised officer to enter the premises, if need be by force.

(3)	An authorised officer entering any premises by virtue of this section, or of a warrant issued under it, may take with him such other persons as may be necessary, and on leaving any occupied premises which he has entered by virtue if such a warrant shall leave them as effectively secured against trespassers as he found them.

(4)	If any person who, in compliance with the provisions of this section, or of a warrant issued under it, is admitted into a factory or workplace discloses to any person any information obtained by him in the factory or workplace with regard to any manufacturing process or trade secret, he shall, unless the disclosure was made in the performance of his duty, be liable to a fine not exceeding [level 3 on the standard scale] or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months.

(5)	Nothing in this section shall authorise any person, except with the permission of the local authority under the [Animal Health Act 1981], to enter any cowshed or other place in which an animal affected with any disease to which that Act applies is kept and which is situated in a place declared under that Act to be infected with such a disease.











All Crimes and offences recorded by the police 1930 – 2003 


























Crimes and Offences in Scotland - Coding Table from Scottish Executive (August 2007.)
LIST OF CRIMES AND OFFENCES WITH RELEVANT STATUTES                               
WITH EFFECT FROM 1 APRIL 2007
     	 






 	1	Culpable homicide (common law)
 	2	Causing death by dangerous driving
 	3	Death by careless driving when under influence of drink or drugs
 	4	Causing death by careless driving
 	5	Illegal driver, disqual/unlicensed etc involved in fatal accident
 	6	Corporate homicide
4	 	Serious Assault *
6	 	Robbery and assault with intent to rob
7	 	Threats and Extortion
8	 	Cruel and Unnatural Treatment of Children
 	1	Cruelty (neglecting & causing) to & unnatural treat. of children
 	2	Child stealing (plagium)




 	1	Possess a firearm with intent to endanger life, commit crime & cause
 	2	Abduction
 	3	Ill treatment of mental patients
 	4	Cruel and unnatural treatment of an adult
 	5	Drugging
 	6	Chemical  weapon offences
 	7	Female genital mutilation
 	 	 





 	3	Assault to commit unnatural crimes
#	 	Rape
#	 	Assault with intent to rape or ravish
#	 	Indecent Assault
#	 	Lewd and Libidinous Practices and Indecent Exposure
 	1	Lewd and libidinous practices
 	2	Public indecency**
#	 	Procuration and Other Sexual Offences
 	1	Procuration (excluding homosexual acts)
 	2	Sexual intercourse with girl under 13
 	3	Sexual intercourse with child under 16
 	4	Carnal knowledge of mentally disordered person
 	5	Householder permitting carnal knowledge of mentally disordered
 	6	Abducting girl under 18 woman mentally disordered
 	7	Brothel keeping
 	8	Person with custody & care of girl or other causing her seduction
 	9	Immoral traffic
 	#	Offences related to prostitution
 	#	Procuration of Homosexual Acts
 	#	Commission or conspiracy to commit sexual acts outside the U.K.
 	#	Grooming of children for the purposes of sexual offences
 	#	Procuration of sexual services from children under 18
 	#	Procuration of child under 18 for pornography 
 	#	Soliciting services of a person engaged in prostitution
 	 	 
GROUP 3:  CRIMES OF DISHONESTY
18	 	Housebreaking
 	1	Theft by housebreaking
 	2	Housebreaking with intent to steal
 	3	Attempted housebreaking with intent to enter and steal
 	 	 
GROUP 5:  OTHER CRIMES
#	 	Crimes against the state
 	1	Treason                                                          
 	2	Sedition                                                         
 	3	Official Secrets Acts                                            
#	 	Crimes against Public Order
 	1	Mobbing and rioting                                              
 	2	Public processions etc                                           
 	3	Trespass, crimes against public order                           
 	4	Raves, crimes against public order                               
 	5	Obstruct/hinder other emergency worker in pursuance of duty
#	 	Prevention of Terrorism Acts
 	1	Terrorism, money laundering related offences                     
 	9	Prevention of Terrorism, other offences                          
#	 	Explosives
 	1	Explosive Substances Legislation                       
 	2	Unlawful use of explosives                                       
 	3	Reckless blasting                                                
#	 	Crimes against Public Justice (non-court)
 	2	Election etc offences                                            
 	3	Public mischief (including wasting police time)                  
 	4	Falsely accusing (named) person of crime                         
 	6	Escape and rescue (incl escape from police custody or prison)       
 	7	Resisting arrest                                                 
 	#	Personation of police                                            
 	#	Failing to give name to or remain with constable                 
 	#	Obstructing constable in pursuance of lawful duty                
 	#	General attempts to defeat/pervert the course/ends of justice     
 	#	Failure to notify police or provision of false information     
#	 	Crimes against Public Justice (court)
 	1	Contempt of court                                                
 	2	Failing to appear after undertaking to police                    
 	4	Publishing restricted info about person under 16 involved in trial     
 	5	Failing to appear for trial having been given court bail         
 	6	Re-offending while on bail                                       
 	7	Bail offences other than absconding or re-offending              
 	8	Accused failing to appear at trial diet (formerly 38/16)         
 	9	Defence Witness, offences by (formerly code 38/15)               
 	#	Prevarication on oath etc (formerly code 38/5)                   
 	#	Perjury and subornation (formerly code 38/1)                     
 	#	Breach of non harassment order (criminal court)                     
 	#	Breach of non harassment order (civil court)                     
 	#	Breach of anti social behaviour order
 	#	Breach of sex offender order
 	#	Breach of parenting order
 	#	Breach of risk of sexual harm order (sho) or interim risk of sho
 	#	Breach of football banning order
#	 	Conspiracy                                                         
#	 	Sacrilege                                                          
#	 	Wrecking Piracy and Hijacking 
 	1	Wrecking                                                           
 	2	Piracy and Hijacking                                               
#	 	Offensive Weapons
 	1	Possession of an offensive weapon
 	2	Restriction of offensive weapons
 	3	Having in a public place an article with a blade or point
#	 	Drugs
 	1	Illegal importation of drugs                                     
 	2	2 Production, manufacture or cultivation of drugs                  
 	3	Supply, possession w.i. to supply etc of drugs                   
 	4	Possession of drugs                                              
 	5	Drugs, money laundering related offences                         




GROUP 6:  MISCELLANEOUS OFFENCES (Cont)
#	 	Harbour Acts                                                       
#	 	Obscene Material and Sex Shop Offences
 	1	Handling obscene material                                        
 	2	Sex shop offences                                                
 	3	Taking, distrib'ing, possession etc of indecent photos of children
#	 	Drunkenness
 	1	Drunk and incapable              
 	3	Drunk in charge of a child                                       
 	4	Drunk and attempting to enter licensed premises                  
 	5	Drunk or drinking in unlicensed premises                         
 	6	Disorderly on licensed premises or refusing to quit              
 	7	Drunk in or attempting to enter designated sports ground         
#	 	Offences by Licensed Persons
 	1	Sale of drink to person under 18                                 
 	2	Employing a person under 18 in a bar                             
 	3	Licensed person, employee or agent drunk in licensed premise     
 	4	Permitting riotous behaviour in licensed premises                
 	5	Permitting betting and gaming offences in licensed premises      
 	6	Contravening condition of premises w children's certificate       
 	7	Dealing wholesale other than from  permitted premises            
 	8	Wholesaler selling liquor to person under 18                     
 	9	Wholesaler permitting person < 18 to sell alcohol                
 	#	License holder of offsales permit person < 18 to sell alcohol        
 	#	Licensed persons, other offences                                 
#	 	Other Offences Against Liquor Licensing Laws
 	1	Carriage of liquor in contract carriage                          
 	2	Consuming outwith permitted hours                                
 	3	Trafficking without a licence                                    
 	4	Club licensing offences                                          
 	5	Hawking excisable liquor                                         
 	6	Person under 18 buying excisable liquor or consuming in bar      
 	7	Consuming liquor on licensed premises on credit (other than hotels)
 	8	Inducing holder of off-sales license to sell liquor illegally        
 	9	Purchasing excise liquor for consumption by person under 18       
 	#	Breaking sales restrictions on licences other than for pubs      
 	#	Alcohol offences, travelling to and from sporting event          
 	#	Sports grounds offences (possessing alcohol etc)                 
 	#	Confiscation of alcohol from person under 18                 
 	#	Liquor licensing laws, other offences                            
#	 	Labour Laws
 	1	Factories legislation (not elsewhere classfd)                       
 	2	Fire Precautions Acts 1971
 	3	Health and Safety at Work Acts                                   
 	4	Employment and property protection legislation                   
 	5	Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978                   
 	6	Wages Councils Act 1979                                          
 	7	Trade Union & Labour Relations Act 1974                          
#	 	Mines Acts                                                         
#	 	Shops Acts                                                         
#	 	Social Security Offences                                           
#	 	Merchant Shipping Acts (not elsewhere classfd)                        
#	 	Naval Military and Air Force Laws
 	1	Absentees and deserters                                          
 	#	Naval military and air force, other offences                     
#	 	Parks etc                                                          
#	 	Pawnbrokers, Dealers, Firearms Offences                                     
#	 	Pedlars Act & Off Against Certificates Issued by Local Auth           
#	 	Civic Government (S) Act 1982 & Similar Provisions




GROUP 6:  MISCELLANEOUS OFFENCES (Cont)
#	 	Consumer Protection
 	1	Weights & Measures Acts                                          
 	2	Registration of Business Names                                   
 	3	Prices Act 1974                                                  
 	4	Goods & Services (price control) Acts                            
 	5	Counter Inflation Act 1973                                       
 	6	Patents Acts                                                     
 	7	Copyright Acts                                                   
 	8	Fair Trading Act 1973                                            
 	9	Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976                             
 	#	Consumer Protection Acts                                         
 	#	Consumer Credit Act 1974                                         
 	#	Trading offences                                                 
 	#	Accommodation Agencies Act 1953                                  
 	#	Registration of care establishments                        
 	#	Rent Acts                                                        
 	#	Video Recordings Act 1984 (not elsewhere classfd)                   
#	 	Post Office, Telecommunications & Data Protection
 	1	Wireless Telegraphy Act offences                                     
 	2	General post office/telecommunications offences                      
 	3	Disclosure of information                                        
 	4	Interception of Communications                      
 	5	Data Protection Act offences                                     
 	6	Computer Misuse Act 1990                                         
#	 	Other Offences
 	1	Prisons (S) Act 1989 (not elsewhere classfd)                        
 	2	Charitable collections offences                                  
 	3	Agricultural offences                                            
 	4	Investment legislation                                           
 	5	Industrial training and statistics of trade offences             
 	6	Building legislation                                             
 	7	Building Societies Act 1986                                      
 	8	Public utilities (gas electricity etc) legislation               
 	9	Supplementary benefits offences                                  
 	#	Fire services legislation                                        
 	#	Emergency powers Acts                                            
 	#	Solicitors (S) Acts                                              
 	#	Aviation legislation                                             
 	#	Local Government Legislation                                     
 	#	Architects registration offences                                 
 	#	Estate agents acts                                        
 	#	Insurance Brokers (Registration) Act 1977                        
 	#	Sex Discrimination Act 1975                                      
 	#	Census Acts                                                      
 	#	Race Relations Legislation                                               
 	#	Legal aid and advice legislation                                 



















































^1	   	Animal Boarding Establishments Act 1963 (c43), s 2(1).
^2	   	Ibid, s 2(2)
^3	   	Consumer Credit Act 1974 (c39), ss 161(I)(a), (b), 189(I).  Every local weights and measures authority must, whenever the Director requires, report to him in such form as he requires on the exercise of their functions under the Acts 161(3).
^4	   	Ibid, s162
^5	   	Crofters (Scotland) Act 1955 (c21), s 30(1), (2)
^6	   	Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (c2), s 138(I), (amended by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c60), s114(I), and the Finance Act 1988 (c39), s 11(I), (3).
^7	   	Ibid, s81(2).  No regulations are currently in force under this section.
^8	   	See the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, s81 (7), (amended by the Merchant Shipping (Registration etc) Act 1993(c22), s 8(I), Sch 2, para 12).
^9	  	Ibid, s 138 (4), (substituted by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 119(I), Sch 6, Pt II, para 37).
^10	  	Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, (c2), s161, (amended by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c60), s 119(I), Sch 6, Pt II, para 38.
^11	  	Ibid, s 162.  This power is to be used for or in connection with access to pipelines.
^12	  	Ibid, s 164, (amended by the Finance Act 1984 (c43), s 8, Sch 4, Pt II, para 6; the Finance Act 1988 (c39), s 10; and the Channel Tunnel (Customs and Excise) Order 1990, SI 1990/2167, art 4, para 25).  The powers in relation to the search of persons are subject to the restriction imposed under the Finance (no 2) Act 1992 (c48), s4, namely that they are not to be exercisable as regards any person entering or leaving the United Kingdom so as to prevent the free movement of such between different member states.
^13	  	Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, s 161 (I).
^14	  	Ibid, s 164(I), (amended by the Finance Act 1988, s 10(I), s 10(2)).
^15	  	See the Electricity Lighting Act 1882 (c 56), s 24 (amended by the Rights of Entry (Gas and Electricity Boards) Act 1954 (c 21), s 1(2), and the Energy Act 1983(c25), s 14 (I)) as extended by the Electric Lighting Act 1909 (c 34), s 16 (amended by the Rights of Entry (Gas and Electricity Boards) Act, s 1(2)) and the Electric Lighting Act 1899 (c 19), s 1, Schedule, s 56 (amended by the Energy Act 1983, s 15, Sch 1, para 12).
^16	  	See the South of Scotland Electricity Order 1956, s 50.
^17	  	Ibid, s 2
^18	  	Energy Act 1983 (c 25), s 14
^19	  	Explosive Act 1875 (c 17), s 78 (amended by the Explosives Act 1875 and 1923 etc (Repeals and Modifications) Regulations 1974, SI 1974/1885, regs 2, Sch 2, para 20.
^20	  	See the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (c37), s 20.
^21	  	Food and Drugs (Scotland) Act 1956 (c 30), s 36(1)
^22	  	Ibid, s 36(2), (8).  The warrant remains in force for one month.
^23	  	ie the Slaughter of Animals (Scotland) Act 1988 (c13), s 4
^24	  	Forestry Act 1967 (c 10), s 48(1).
^25	  	Ibid, s 48(2).
^26	  	Health and Safety Inquiries (Procedure) Regulations 1975, SI 1975/335, reg 9, made under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (c37), s 14(4)(a).
^27	  	Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (c37), s 20(2)(a).
^28	  	Ibid, s 20(2) (b).
^29	  	Ibid, s 20(2)(c) (I)
^30	  	Ibid, s 20 (2) (c) (ii)
^31	  	Ibid, s 20 (2) (d)
^32	  	Ibid, s 20 (2) (e)
^33	  	Ibid, s 20 (2) (f)
^34	  	See the Public Health (Scotland) Act 1897 (c38) (amended by the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1972 (c58), s64(I), Sch 6, para 43; the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978 (c29), s 109, Sch 15, para 10; the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 (c65), ss 214(2), 237(I), Sch 27, Pt II, para 30, Sch 29; and the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (c48) s 77, Sch 15, para 6).  This provision also describes related powers and procedures.  For ancillary provisions, see the Public Health (Scotland) Act 1897 (c38), ss 19-27, 31, which have in the main been amended.
^35	  	Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, s 96(2)(c)(ii) (as so amended to apply the powers contained in the Road Traffic Act 1988, s163).
^36	  	Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, s 96(2)(c)(ii) (as so amended to apply the powers contained in the Road Traffic Act 1988, s164(I), (2), (6)).
^37	  	Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, s 96(2)(c) (iv), (3) (as so amended to apply the powers contained in the Road Traffic Act 1988, ss 163, 164(I), (2), (6), 165, 169)
^38	  	Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, s 95(4).
^39	  	Roads (Scotland) Act 1984 (c54), s140(I)(a-c).
^40	  	Ibid, s140(I)(d-f).
^41	  	Ibid, s140(I)(g).
^42	  	Ibid, s140(I)(h)
^43	  	Ibid, s140(2)
^44	  	ie any offence against the Salmon Fisheries (Scotland) Act 1868.
^45	  	Salmon Fisheries (Scotland) Act 1868, s 29 (amended by the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Protection) Act 1967, ss 12(2), 25(2), Sch 2, and the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971 (c 58), extended and applied by the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Protection) (Scotland) Act 1951, s12(1), which in turn applied by the Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 1967, 18(2), and the Inshore Fishing (Scotland) Act 1984, (c 26), s 7(2).
^46	  	Salmon Fisheries (Scotland) Act 1868, (c 123), s 27 (as amended by the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Protection) (Scotland) Act 1951 (c26), s 25, Sch 1)
